Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Herman Dooyeweerd: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-36) Excerpt on Epistemology, Volume II

© J. Glenn Friesen 2003.

Notes regarding WdW II, 400

1. Corresponds to NC II, 467.

2. The NC doesn’t use consistent terminology. Here it uses ‘disjunction’ of the cosmic temporal meaning-systasis instead of ‘dis-stasis.’

3. Why does Dooyeweerd say that to speak of the "knowing subject" is so problematic? One reason must be that he has a very different view of 'subject' than does immanence philosophy. For Dooyeweerd, the subject is the supratemporal selfhood.

4. Therefore the next question that he asks is whether the Gegenstand is set over-against our supratemporal selfhood. You would at first think that he would answer "yes" to this question. For our supratemporal selfhood is what is involved in every act of knowing. But he points out that the Gegenstand arises from the theoretical dis-stasis of the temporal systasis of meaning. Our selfhood is not found in this temporal systasis [Dooyeweerd emphasizes this 'not' with italics. This emphasis is not carried through in the NC].

Those reformational philosophers who see theory as the abstraction of universals have ignored this issue. They seem to assume that we still act out of our center, although they sometimes deny that it is supratemporal, adopting Vollenhoven's view of a pre-functional center. They then say that it is only a difference of degree of abstraction of universals. But their idea of abstraction is different than what Dooyeweerd means by dis-stasis

5. If it is not our supratemporal self that is opposing, then this implies that we have opposed our logical aspect itself to the Gegenstand. How do we do this? This is the essence of the Gegenstand-relation, and it has not been commented on by adherents of Dooyeweerd. It is we ourselves who oppose the Gegenstand, but from within the temporal modal horizon. We intentionally move into the lower level of the temporal. We can do this because temporal reality has its existence in the religious root in which we participate. We intentionally choose a level of inexistence (Inexistenz). We choose to will a refraining from the continuity of cosmic time. (II, 402).

6. Somehow the logical aspect has this relative autonomy, of giving us a temporary separate consciousness within temporal reality. Dooyeweerd says that dis-stasis is something given within the logical aspect of reality itself. Thus, the dis-stasis is not a result of the Gegenstand relation; theory only makes manifest a possibility in the logical aspect. (NC II, 472). No other aspect has the capability of allowing us to move into this level and be over-against another aspect.

7. We may say then that the logical aspect does double duty. It somehow provides the basis for the setting-over-against relation. And it also is the function by which we analyze those split-apart aspects. For me the question now arises, "Why does Dooyeweerd think that the logical aspect has these double properties? Why is it so important in the Gegenstand process, and why do no other aspects have this capability? I believe that the answer has to do with some unacknowledged acceptance by Dooyeweerd of the logos doctrine. The logos is all of meaning, but it also functions in the analytical aspect. As logos, the analytical gives us the power of disclosing reality, of deepening our relation to it. In saying this, I am aware that Dooyeweerd criticizes Kuyper for his teaching about the logos [logosleer] in the article "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer." Nevertheless I believe that it remains in Dooyeweerd. However, it has been relativized to a merely temporary use of this logos. Perhaps what he objects to is using the logos doctrine to speculate on universals as the ideas of God.

8. In any event, this partial autonomy is only temporary. We are tempted to see our logical function as actually independent. This is the source of the dichotomistic belief of a distinction between body and soul:

…the traditional dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul is doubtless connected with the misconception, that the antithetic relation in the theoretical attitude of thought answers to reality itself (NC I, 44).

9. The Gegenstand-relation is accomplished by an epoché or refraining from the continuity of time. This refraining is by ourselves.

10. The idea of the 'resistance' ['tegenstand'] to the dis-stasis by theoretical thought is not made clear d in the NC. The WdW says that the resistance is due to our act of setting-over-against. There is therefore resistance to our placing ourselves in the level of temporal reality.

Baader is helpful here. He says that this resistance is for our own good! That is because there is a temptation to remain at that level. Baader also speaks of moving into the temporal domain as a kenosis. From enstasis we move into the temporal reality, and this is an ek-stasis. Dooyeweerd uses ek-stasis in referring to temporal reality

11. Dooyeweerd goes on to say that the setting-over-against is in essence the dis-stasis. The splitting apart cannot occur without this setting-over-against. The Gegenstand-relation is necessary to setting apart the aspects.

12. The dis-stasis also involves analysis. The logical aspect is referred to for this analysis. Therefore, this part of the section is a reiteration of the special place of the logical aspect for the setting-over-against and the resulting dis-stasis of meaning. The logical aspect has a very special correlation with the Gegenstand.

13. Of course once the aspects have by dis-stasis been split out from their temporal coherence, they are distinguished, compared, analogies are found, they are opened. All of this demands logical distinction and analysis of the logical aspect. But the differentiated cosmic diversity is not to be identified with this logical distinction.

14. Dooyeweerd uses 'penetrating' [doordringen] and 'durchschauen' to describe analysis.

15. After analysis, we have to re-enter the continuity of cosmic time in the theoretical synthesis.

16. Dooyeweerd's use of the terms 'logos,' 'penetrating,' totality,' and 'center' will no doubt encourage some people to dismiss his thought as logo-phallo-centric or some such postmodern term. It would be better to reject Dooyeweerd than to pretend to be an adherent and to consistently misinterpret him. But before you dismiss his philosophy on that basis, you should carefully consider the ideas, especially as they were previously developed in Baader, that that we move into the world in theory because of wonder. And in an act of loving kenosis, we gather up of sparks of God in a non-egotistical way, in order to preserve them forever without loss of distinction.