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© J. Glenn Friesen 2003. |
Notes regarding WdW II, 399 1. Corresponds to NC II, 467. 2. The WdW's title of Volume II is "The functional Meaning-Structure of Temporal Reality and the Problem of Knowledge." The English title of is very different: "The General Theory of the Modal Spheres." 3. The NC uses the words "inter-modal synthesis of meaning" whereas the original Dutch merely refers to"synthesis of meaning." Perhaps this was due to a fear of confusing theoretical synthesis with accommodation synthesis of Ground-Motives. But by adding more words, it makes the sentence more difficult to read, as well as confusing. It has prevented some readers from seeing that the synthesis is between our actual thought [an act from out of our selfhood] and the Gegenstand of abstracted aspects, which is not actual or ontical, but only intentional. See synthesis. 4. Of more significance is the fact that the NC loses the impact of the question, "How is synthesis of meaning possible?" This is found in Kant. 5. The second question is, "What is it that is set-over-against the logical aspect in this synthesis?" This is unclear in the NC because it uses the phrase "theoretical antithesis" for the "setting-over-against." Antithesis is a logical function. But the setting-over-against is an opposition of the logical aspect itself to the other aspects. The logical aspect has the capability of having a Gegenstand. Such a capability is not the same as the logical function's categories of logical analysis, distinction or contradiction. 6. The NC adds a new paragraph regarding the raising of these questions in the Prolegomena. 7. The NC adds that immanence philosophy cannot ask the questions "in a really critical manner." 8. The NC re-words "in the “strict givenness” of that which is purified by the phenomenological reduction." I find the WdW clearer. 9. Note that Dooyeweerd's own use of 'intentional' should not be confused with the phenomenological usage. 10. Dooyeweerd expressly says that his use of the word 'Gegenstand' is different from the multivocal use of that word in phenomenology. He also says that his use of the word 'epoché' is also different (IKI, 402). 11. Dooyeweerd uses the Idea of givenness. But his Idea of the given differs from phenomenology. For phenomenology, the 'given' is something that has been abstracted and purified by theoretical reduction. For Dooyeweerd, the givenness is an ontic apriori. Reality is given by God's law. 12. The NC adds that Husserl says that the world is "constituted by the transcendental consciousness itself." 13. The NC adds that pre-Kantian metaphysics saw substance as that which is opposed to our thought. The substance is the 'anticheimenon.' It was regarded as independent of human experience. That of course is not Dooyeweerd's position. Revised July 11/04 |
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