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© J. Glenn Friesen 2003-2008 |
Linked
Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless
indicated.See concordance
for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance
is in pdf format.)
wetend beleven of in-leven
[conscious 'Erleben' or Hineinleben] |
II, 410, 411, 414
NC II, 474-75 ( (conscous enstatic Hineinleben) |
| experience [ervaring] |
I, 45, 47, 60, 127, 129, 130 (ding-ervaring),
130 (ervaringswerkelijkheid), 129, 131
II, ix, 8 fn1 (the a priori structure of reality can only be known
by experinece), 410, 482, 488, 493, 495, 496
NC I, 3, 113 fn2: Inner acts of experience can be theoretically
studied because they have a modal structure of a universally valid
character.
NC II, 7 fn2 (the apriori structure of reality can only be known
from experience), 477 (related to the human I-ness), 479 (immediate
enstatic experience), 537 (philosophic sense of the word is determined
by the starting point of philosophy), 563, 552 (experience is by
our selfhood), 559 (experiential horizon) |
| experiences [ervaart] |
II, 409, 414 |
| Erleben |
NC II, 29-30 (reines Erleben), 475 (pre-theoretical conscious
'Erleben') |
| Erlebnis |
NC II, 113 fn1: The inner act of experience as a concrete 'Erlebnis'
cannot be restricted to its psychic feeling-aspect.
NC II, 111 |
in-leven
[Hineinleben] |
II, 410 |
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is based on our experience,
both within and outside of time. The very first sentence of Dooyeweerd’s
New Critique asks us to consider the nature of our experience:
If we consider reality as it isgiven in the naïve
pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical
analysis… (NC I, 3).
Dooyeweerd emphasizes the importance of experience as
the foundation of theoretical knowledge:
That which is irreducible in theory is at
the same time indefinable, and each true definition rests in the final
analysis on such irreducible moments. Without immediate insight
into the indefinable, a real concept of what is definable is
excluded. And “insight” itself remains rooted in a final
foundation of experience [beleving], which oversteps
the boundaries of the theoretical attitude of knowledge, and which excludes
an absolute split between theoretical and pre-theoretical experience.
Only in experience does the knowledge of reality become our own, and
the sense of it being our own is the
first condition for real knowledge. "The
Problem of Time in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea," Philosophia
Reformata 5 (1940) 160-192, at 161.
Dooyeweerd emphasizes the importance of our experience
in relation to knowledge of God and of our selfhood:
The true knowledge of God and of ourselves is concerned
with the horizon of human experience and therefore also with that of
theoretical knowledge. It rests on our trustful acceptance of Divine
revelation in the indissoluble unity of both its cosmic-immanent sense
and its transcendent-religious meaning; an acceptance with our full
personality and with all our heart. It means a turning of the personality,
a giving of life in the full sense of the world, a restoring of the
subjective perspective of our experience, enabling us to grasp reality
again perspectively in the light of Truth. This does not mean a kind
of mystical supernatural cognitive function, but it refers to the horizon
that God made for human experience in the cosmic order created by Him.
The subjective perspective has been obfuscated by sin and distorted
and closed to the light of the Divine Revelation (NC II, 563).
Dooyeweerd here rejects a kind of mysticism. But the
mysticism that he rejects is that of a “supernatural” cognitive
function. This is because Dooyeweerd rejects any distinction between natural
and supernatural. His own mysticism
is one that is given within the cosmic order. It is “the horizon
that God made for human experience.” In other words, we do not need
a mysticism that seeks to go above the horizon of our experience that
God created. But the horizon of our experience is both within and above
time. It includes the supratemporal realm
of the aevum. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that we do
have (experiential) knowledge of the supratemporal:
According to my modest opinion, and in the light of
the whole Scriptural revelation concerning human nature it is just this
possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness
to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the
essence [wezen] of man, to the “image of God” in him–by
means of which he is able to not only relatively but radically go out
[uitgaat] above all temporal things. And that is how I also understand
Ecclesiastes 3:11. If in fact man’s heart were also a “temporal
thing” among other temporal things, than it would be difficult
for this heart to know of the supratemporal. In order to have a religious
sense [besef] of eternity, man must in the depths of his being
participate in it [34], although our thinking always remains subjected
to time. (Second
Response to Curators)
Man transcends time in his selfhood, but within the
temporal coherence, man is universally-bound-to-time (NC I, 24). Dooyeweerd
also says this in his 1960 article, “Van Peursen’s Critische
Vragen bij “A New Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Philosophia
Reformata 25 (1960, 97-150, at 103:
En slechts in en uit Hem leren wij in de gemeenschap
van de H. Geest verstaan, in welke zin wij in het centrum onzer existentie
de tijd te boven gaan, ofschoon wij tegelijk binnen de
tijd besloten zijn [italics Dooyeweerd's]
[And only in and from out of Him do we learn to understand,
in the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, in what sense we transcend
time in the center of our existence, whereas we are simultaneously
limited within time.]
We are restricted and relativized by (but
not at all to) our temporal cosmic existence (NC II,
561).
The horizon of our human experience has several dimensions
or levels: the religious, the temporal, the modal, and the dimension of
individuality structures. The religious level is the supratemporal level
of our selfhood. From there we descend to
the temporal level. It includes the modal
level. And the temporal and modal levels together encompass the fourth
level, that of individuality structures.
Our experience is therefore supratemporal
as well as temporal. Our temporal experience
is both pre-theoretical and theoretical.
Our experience includes the experience of “cosmic
consciousness.” In this cosmic self-consciousness we are aware
of temporal cosmic reality being related to the structure of the human
selfhood qua talis. (NC II, 562). Dooyeweerd says that the animal mode
of awareness of things cannot be called experience since it lacks any
relation to a selfhood (NC III 58).
Dooyeweerd speaks of the a priori
structure, the ontical conditions of our experience. This ontical
structure can be known only from experience, although not as experience
is conceived of by immanence philosophy (NC II, 7, footnote 2)
This emphasis on experience is not the same as empirical
experience. For Dooyeweerd denies that things exist in themselves. In
fact, temporal reality has no existence apart
from its supratemporal root (NC I, 100; II, 53).
Nor is our experience to be viewed in terms of a subjective
psychical feeling. Dooyeweerd specifically denies that feeling is even
an act of our selfhood. Modern psychology has been led astray by conceiving
of feeling as one of the chief classes of ‘Erlebnisse’
and by co-ordinating it with volition an knowing as the two other
classes. (NC II, 111)
Our experience is therefore not an ‘Erlebnis’
but a ‘Hineinleben.’ Now ‘hinein’
means ‘within.’ So experience includes a relatedness within.
Hineinleben is ‘beleven,’ and this involves
a living “in identity.” (II, 414). Identity is the coincidence
in the fullness of meaning in our central
selfhood (NC II, 478-79; WdW II, 413).. And there is an identity between
the aspects in which we function in time (in our body or functiemantel)
and the aspects in which individuality structures function:
In het vóór-theoretisch zelfbewustzijn
blijft naar de kosmische wetsorde het theoretische gefundeerd. Aan alle
theoretisch denken over de zin-zijden der werkelijkheid en aan alle
schouwend in-zicht ligt een be-leving in identiteit ten grondslag, welke
in het theoretisch-schouwend in-zicht slechts verdiept, maar nimmer
opgeheven kan worden (WdW II, 415).
The NC translation (NC II, 480) does not make this clear,
so I will re-translate:
In accordance with the cosmic law order, our theoretical
self-consciousness remains founded in this pre-theoretical self-consciousness.
There is a foundational experience in identity that is lived experientially
[be-leving in identiteit] between all theoretical thought about the
meaning-sides of reality and all intuitive in-sight. This identity can
only be deepened in the theoretical-intuitive in-sight, but never sublated
or cancelled [opgeheven].
The emphasis on experience as a ‘Hineinleben’
also serves to distinguish Dooyeweerd's emphasis on experience from Gadamer's
criticism of “subjective” feeling.
Our experience is of a given
reality. It is not of a constructed
reality.
And our supratemporal, religious experience is an immediate
experience of our heart.
Neo-Hinduism also emphasizes experience of ‘anubhava.’
See my thesis on Abhishiktananda.
Revised Jan 29/08
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