Standing in the Truth: A Response
to Lambert Zuidervaart
Dr. J. Glenn Friesen
.pdf version of this article
This article is a response to Lambert Zuidervaart’s
recent article “After Dooyeweerd: Truth in Reformational Philosophy.”
 Zuidervaart says that he wants to transform
the idea of truth by “critically retrieving” Dooyeweerd’s
conception of truth. He explicitly abandons Dooyeweerd’s ideas
of transcendent truth, the supratemporal selfhood, and numerous other
ideas. He claims (p. 12) to be a “loyal critic” of Dooyeweerd,
and says he wants to preserve the holism and normativity of Dooyeweerd’s
conception, and that he is introducing the idea of “authentication”
to appropriate insights from Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on “standing
in the truth.”
Although Zuidervaart’s article is an interesting
example of what reformational philosophy might be like if it continues
to reject Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, Zuidervaart’s suggestions
cannot be said to be in any way a continuation of or an appropriation
of Dooyeweerd’s ideas. In fact, Zuidervaart sets out exactly the
kind of philosophy that Dooyeweerd opposed: a temporalized view of our
experience and existence, or what Dooyeweerd calls “immanence
This article will examine how Zuidervaart’s article
(1) is itself based on immanence philosophy, which Dooyeweerd opposed;
(2) is itself based on the self-sufficiency of thought; (3) misinterprets
Dooyeweerd’s view of “standing in the truth”; (4)
makes simplistic and misleading comparisons of Dooyeweerd to other philosophers
such as Husserl and Heidegger, and fails to address recent research
regarding the history of Dooyeweerd’s ideas; (5) makes other fundamental
errors of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.
I. Immanence philosophy
Dooyeweerd mentions the term ‘immanence philosophy’
on 169 pages of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee 
, sometimes several times on the same page, and he mentions the term
‘immanence standpoint’ on 107 pages. So Zuidervaart is correct
that a central goal of Dooyeweerd’s reformational philosophy is
to free scholarship from immanence philosophy. However, within Dooyeweerd’s
meaning of the term, Zuidervaart’s philosophy is itself immanence
Many reformational philosophers understand ‘immanence
philosophy’ to mean a philosophy that finds its Origin within
(immanent to) created reality, and that therefore denies God as creator
. But that is only part of what Dooyeweerd means
by the term.
Certainly, Dooyeweerd believes that Christian philosophy
must affirm God as Creator and Origin.
But for Dooyeweerd, a philosopher may be a Christian, and affirm that
God is the Creator, and yet still be engaged in immanence philosophy.
To understand this, we need to look at Dooyeweerd’s three transcendental
Ideas: God as eternal Origin, man as supratemporal
Totality (participating in Christ the New Root), and the Idea of temporal
coherence (NC I, 69; 501-508). These three transcendental Ideas
also correspond to Dooyeweerd’s three transcendental problems:
The three transcendental Ideas correspond to the
three transcendental basic problems of the theoretical attitude of
thought. Theoretical thought hereby gains successively its concentric
direction to the presupposita which alone make it possible…(NC
But the way the way that Zuidervaart formulates the
three transcendental problems (p.6) loses sight of their connection
to the three transcendental Ideas and their distinctions of eternity,
The meaning of ‘immanence philosophy’
does not just relate to whether philosophy accepts the Idea of God as
Origin. We also need to accept the second transcendental Idea of the
deeper, supratemporal unity, which is our central
and supratemporal selfhood.
Anyone who does not accept such a supratemporal selfhood as the starting
point, or Archimedean
point, of theoretical thought is practicing immanence philosophy,
since such a person must then seek for an Archimedean point within or
immanent to time. Zuidervaart rejects supratemporality, and adopts a
thoroughly temporalized view of man, and so he is promoting the kind
of immanence philosophy that Dooyeweerd opposed.
In his first
response to the curators of the Vrije Universiteit (April 27, 1937),
in response to Valentijn Hepp's complaints about his philosophy, Dooyeweerd
states that it is his view of the supratemporal heart that distinguishes
his philosophy from immanence philosophy. His philosophy makes a radical
[from ‘radix,’ ‘root’] break with immanence
philosophy in its idea that our whole temporal human existence (including
our act of thought) proceeds from out of the
religious root, the heart:
As is extensively argued in the Prolegomena [to
the WdW], the radical break that the Philosophy of the Law-Idea
makes with immanence philosophy consists in the fact that the former
by the light of Scripture penetrates to the religious root of thought,
and that it understands the whole of temporal human existence in its
issuance [uitgang] from this religious root, its heart in
the Scriptural sense. Then it is stated how the fall into sin consists
in the falling away of man’s heart from his Creator. This is
the cause of spiritual death, which may not be confused with either
bodily death or with eternal death. The acknowledgement of spiritual
death as the consequence of the fall into sin is so central in the
Philosophy of the Law-Idea that if it is negated, one can understand
no part of this philosophy. 
Immanence philosophy does not penetrate to the religious
root of thought, our full supratemporal selfhood. Immanence philosophy
is therefore obliged to find its starting point not within the selfhood,
but within philosophic thought itself. But in doing this, immanence
philosophy is uncritical, for “Only in the religious center of
his existence does man transcend time.” 
The ‘religious root of thought’ is our
All absolutizing of time rests on a lack
of critical self-reflection.
But we cannot learn to know of the true concentration
point, the supratemporal root of our existence, from a self-empowered
philosophy, which necessarily remains closed up within the horizon
of time. We can only learn it from the divine Word revelation.
Only this Revelation discovers us to our selves. As Calvin
remarks in his Institutio, we can only come to true self-knowledge
through true knowledge of God. I call this the religious law of
concentration of human existence.
The “soul” of human existence, which
according to the testimony of Scripture is not affected by temporal
death, but which continues to exist even after the putting off
of the “body,” i.e. of all of the temporal forms of
existence closed up in individuality structures, is the religious
root of human existence. Scripture also calls it the “inward
man” or the “heart” of man, “out of which
proceed the issues of life” and “in which eternity is
laid.” It is, as Kuyper expresses in his Stone Lectures,
“that point in our consciousness in which our life is still
undivided and lies comprehended in its unity…”
A real Christian philosophy of time is then also
not possible whenever theoretical thought is not directed to the true
supratemporal concentration point of the temporal cosmos. Theoretical
thought is never self-sufficient in philosophy, but, because of the
structure of creation itself, it is necessarily religiously determined,
whether in an apostate direction, or in the direction to the true
Origin of all things, as revealed itself in Jesus Christ (‘Tijdsprobleem,’
This supratemporal selfhood must be the presupposition
of any truly Christian view of society, in contrast to immanence
But according to our view, the Christian understanding
of a person, the 'individual I' can no more be sought within time.
And we thereby stand in principle against the position of sociology
in the humanities, which seeks to do just this in its immanence philosophy.
The individual selfhood is through and through religious, supratemporal.
In the cosmic temporal order, selfhood or I-ness cannot be reached
by [sociological conceptions of] either individual man, or of societal
structures. This is the principal point of departure for any truly
Christian view of temporal society. 
The Archimedean point of immanence philosophy rejects
any basis for thought that transcends the immanent functions of consciousness
(WdW I, 15; NC I, 12). The selfhood as the religious
root of existence is invisible from the immanence standpoint (WdW
I, 25; NC I, 21). Immanence philosophy fails to recognize religious
transcendence, and this is because it lacks a radical-critical self-consciousness
(WdW I, 29). Christian philosophy chooses its Archimedean point
differently than immanence philosophy (WdW I, 466-73; II, 28;
NC I, 501-8; II, 31).
The immanence standpoint involves a wrong view of the
(WdW II, 82; III, 628; NC III, 782). The religious
root of existence, as concentration point of all of temporal existence,
is the boundary [grens] of all immanence philosophy. For as
soon as the thinker can cross that boundary, he will see the immanence
standpoint as a falling away from his full selfhood (“afval van
de volle zelfheid,” WdW I, 466; NC I, 500).
Dooyeweerd’s philosophical anthropology, which
emphasizes the supratemporal selfhood, is the basic theme of his philosophy.
All of his philosophical investigations are “nothing but a necessary
preparation” for this philosophical anthropology (WdW
III, 627-630; NC III, 781). The central question, “Who
is man?” is “the beginning and end of philosophical reflection,”
but it remains insoluble on the immanence standpoint (WdW III,
630; NC III, 783). Because Zuidervaart denies the supratemporal
selfhood, he is caught within immanence philosophy, even though he believes
in God as Creator and Origin.
II. The dogma of the autonomy
Zuidervaart is correct (p. 1) that opposition to immanence
philosophy depends on a view of truth that does not regard theoretical
thought as being self-sufficient. But Zuidervaart does not recognize
that his own philosophy is based on this assumption of the self-sufficiency
or autonomy of thought.
Many reformational philosophers understand the autonomy
of thought as the denial that we are subject to any law of God. In autonomy,
we don’t accept God’s law, but set out our own law—we
are auto-nomos. That is certainly part of what Dooyeweerd means
by the idea of the self-sufficiency of thought. Even here, it is doubtful
that Zuidervaart agrees with Dooyeweerd, since Zuidervaart rejects any
absolute transcendent horizon of our experience, and rejects the idea
of any principles that are given to us, which we then positivize in
But just like the idea of immanence philosophy, the
idea of the autonomy of thought does not only relate to God as Origin
and law-giver. The idea of the autonomy of thought is also related to
the second transcendental Idea–the supratemporal selfhood as religious
root. Autonomy is the way of thinking we express when we suppose that
our act of thought is independent of our supratemporal selfhood.
Dooyeweerd makes this clear in the first two pages
of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, where he contrasts his radical
revolution in philosophy with Kant’s supposed Copernican revolution
. Dooyeweerd philosophy is radical because it
makes the distinction of a supratemporal center and a merely temporal
periphery. Whereas Kant relativized all things to a supposed transcendental
subject of thought, such a revolution still remained on the temporal
periphery in comparison to Dooyeweerd’s revolution, which
relativizes “the whole temporal cosmos” in relation to the
supratemporal selfhood as the religious root of creation.”
This leads to the realization that temporal reality cannot be neutral
with respect to its religious root. ‘Religiously neutral’
does not just mean the attempt to be neutral from God; it means the
attempt to make temporal reality neutral with respect to its religious
root, our supratemporal selfhood. There is no temporal reality “an
sich” [no things
in themselves], unrelated to our selfhood.
The idea of the self-sufficiency of thought is thus not only a denial
of God’s law, but represents “a fall from our true human
selfhood” (“afval van de ware menschelijke zelfheid”).
If the central religious root relativizes peripheral temporal reality,
then we can no longer believe in the religious neutrality of theoretical
thought, since theoretical thought is part of temporal reality (NC
I, vi). In other words, the rejection of the dogma of the autonomy of
theoretical thought is related to the supra-theoretical a priori
of the heart as religious root. Conversely, to reject the idea
of the supratemporal heart is to necessarily become involved in immanence
Because it denies the supratemporal selfhood, immanence
philosophy seeks its starting point in a temporal function–the
function of thinking. It “seeks its Archimedean point in philosophic
thought itself” and it regards that function as self-sufficient
over against the other immanent functions of consciousness (WdW
I, 16; NC I, 14).
The idea of the autonomy of thought in immanence philosophy
is therefore related to the denial of the selfhood as the religious
center which expresses
itself in the temporal act of thought:
Why is this presupposition of the “self-sufficiency
of theoretical thought in its own area” uncritical and dogmatic?
Because theoretical thought in its modal-logical aspect (and that
is what is here intended) cannot by its own power [eigenmachtig]
determine its relation over against the remaining modal aspects of
reality. In the “cogito” [Descartes’ “I
think”], the thinking selfhood is active, which as such functions
not only in the logical-analytical aspect, but equally in all aspects
of reality. At the same time, this selfhood is the concentration point
of temporal human existence. If all aspects are equally enclosed by
cosmic time and thus have an intrinsically temporal character, then
the concentration point of human existence, in which all temporal
aspects come together in one focus [brandpunt], cannot itself
be of a temporal, but must be of a supratemporal, transcendent character.
The theoretical synthesis is determined both by cosmic time as well
as by the supratemporal transcendent selfhood.
The immanence standpoint can only seemingly be maintained,
by – following the so-called critical philosophy – unexpectedly
identifying the thinking selfhood with the so-called transcendental-logical
subject of thought (in Kant, “the transcendental-logical unity
of apperception”). (‘Tijdsprobleem,’
Immanence philosophy does not give an adequate account
of the conditions that make philosophic thought possible. It does not
distinguish between the selfhood and its act
of theoretical thought . Thus, the whole thrust
of immanence philosophy is related to its denial of the supratemporal
selfhood as concentration
point of man’s temporal functions. Immanence philosophy denies
the transcendent horizon of our experience; this transcendent horizon
plays no acknowledged role in its cosmology or epistemology (WdW
II, 482; NC II, 552).
The idea of the autonomy of thought necessarily arises
when we restrict ourselves to the temporal periphery. And for Zuidervaart,
there is no other horizon
than this temporal periphery. For him, there is no transcendent center,
no transcendent horizon. And so, despite his objections to the contrary,
his philosophy is also based in the self-sufficiency of thought.
Zuidervaart also does not understand the source
of Dooyeweerd’s critique of the self-sufficiency or autonomy of
thought. He seems to assume that the idea was original to Dooyeweerd.
But Dooyeweerd denies that his philosophy is original (WdW
III, vii-viii; not in NC). And the opposition to the autonomy
of thought was certainly not original to Dooyeweerd. More than forty
years before the WdW, Abraham Kuyper had already recognized
and praised Franz
von Baader’s even earlier opposition to the modern idea of
the autonomy of thought:
In spite of his Praktisches Vernunft it was this
desire which actuated Kant, of whom Baader correctly wrote, ‘The
fundamental error of his philosophy is that man is autonomous and
spontaneous, as if he possessed reason of himself; for it transforms
man to a God, and so becomes pantheistic. 
Zuidervaart has ignored these historical sources in
his interpretation of Dooyeweerd.
Zuidervaart’s idea of “critical retrieval”
of what he finds to be useful in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is a
further example of the autonomy of thought and of immanence philosophy.
The term ‘critical retrieval’ is often associated with the
ideas of Paul Ricoeur. But Ricoeur’s idea presupposes that we
first go through the process of a hermeneutics of suspicion before we
get to this stage of critical retrieval. That idea cannot be squared
with Dooyeweerd’s views of the transcendental critique.
The very idea of eclectically choosing only bits of
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is troubling. It runs counter to what
Dooyeweerd himself says about the ideas that are fundamental to his
philosophy–ideas like cosmic time and the supratemporal heart.
Dooyeweerd says that his philosophical anthropology is the basic idea
in his philosophy, its beginning and its end point .
In his 1964
lecture, Dooyeweerd indicates that he wanted to continue with the
third volume of his Reformation and Scholasticism. That volume
was to be devoted to philosophical anthropology. It has never been published,
but the draft of this second volume was exhaustively analyzed in W.J.
Ouweneel’s doctoral thesis . A part
of Ouweneel’s thesis was summarized in an article in Philosophia
Reformata. Ouweneel correctly emphasizes the key nature of this
idea of the supratemporal heart for Dooyeweerd:
From around 1930 onward, this view of the Supratemporality
of the heart or the religious root-unity of the cosmos becomes the
essential, unchangeable, and indissoluble cornerstone of his thought.
The pivotal place of this view in Dooyeweerd’s thought must
be emphasised over against all those who have expressed objections
to this view. They suppose that it is possible to drop this idea but
to maintain the “rest” of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.
They fail to see that the very core of his thought – the metaphor
of the prism with its law of refraction, the law of concentration,
the idea of the unity, fullness and totality of the religious root,
the theory of time, the transcendental critique of thought –
as well as the whole theory of the modalities, according to which
the modalities are seen as “temporal aspects,” stand or
fall with the idea of the supratemporality of the heart. 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy must be read as a whole.
Zuidervaart’s attempted solution of a critical retrieval of only
parts of the philosophy cannot work. For as Dooyeweerd himself says
in the 1964
lecture, problems arise when people accept the philosophy “only
up to a certain point.” 
III. Standing in the Truth
Citing NC II, 564 Zuidervaart correctly says
(p. 10) that for Dooyeweerd, standing in the Truth means sharing in
the fullness of meaning of the cosmos in Christ. In the New Critique,
the heading of this paragraph states that this standing in the truth
is freedom in the transcendent horizon
of experience. But Zuidervaart denies any transcendent horizon of experience!
(p. 27: “all horizons are historical…Strictly speaking,
and contrary to Dooyeweerd’s problematic notion of a “transcendent
horizon,” there is no ultimate horizon.”) He therefore cannot
possibly share Dooyeweerd’s idea of standing in the truth.
When we temporalize our experience, we necessarily
end up absolutizing
or hypostatizing part of the temporal horizon. From Dooyeweerd’s
point of view, all temporalizing of human existence involves apo-stasis
[apostasy] , the standing away from
truth. Temporalizing of our experience is therefore the opposite
of standing in the truth. The same page of the NC II, 564 refers
to the fall into sin, which made the human selfhood “fall away
into the temporal horizon.” Such a temporalized horizon is not
standing in the truth, but rather “apostasy from the fulness of
meaning of the Truth that alone makes all temporal truth possible”
(NC II, 564). The WdW (II, 496) uses the word ‘afval’
or “falling away” from the fullness of meaning of truth.
This state of falling away is the lie at the foundation of the whole
epistemology of immanence philosophy. According to this lie,
our experience is limited to a temporal complex of functions. When we
are governed by this lie and not by the truth, we do not experience
of truth (WdW II, 493; NC II, 561). Sin turns man’s
power away from its religious fulness; instantly the striving after
its absolutization came into existence, the disregard for its temporal
meaning-coherence, root and Origin. (WdW II, 186; NC
II, 248). Immanence philosophy lacks a fixed basis of truth because
it does not come from out of the truth and does not stand in the truth
(WdW II, 512; NC II, 578). At the end of the WdW,
Dooyeweerd explicitly rejects any view of the heart as merely temporal
(WdW III, 629; NC III, 784; also NC I, 31
Note the contrast between fullness of truth and temporal
truth. The fullness of truth cannot be given in time. All temporal meaning
beyond itself to its supratemporal fulfillment (WdW I, 71;
NC I, 106). Fullness is supratemporal and central, just like
This whole diversity of modal aspects of our experience
makes sense only within the order of time. It refers to a supra-temporal,
central unity and fulness of meaning in our experiential world, which
is refracted in the order of time […] this diversity is related
to the central unity of the human selfhood, which, as such, surpasses
all modal diversity of our temporal experience. 
Our selfhood participates
in the meaning totality; as fullness of meaning, this totality transcends
all specialty of meaning (WdW I, 9; NC I, 8). But
in our falling away, we have lost the Archimedean point of our religious
root of existence (WdW I, 25). Apostatic man has lost his concentration
in the central focus of his existence and has become dispersed in the
diversity of meaning of our temporal cosmos (WdW I, 26). Apostasis
is the superficial supposition that we are restricted to the temporal
horizon, but this is in conflict with the structure of our selfhood
(WdW II, 505; NC II, 572).
To find our way again, we now have to participate (WdW
II, 496 says “deelnemen”) in Christ, the New
Root, in order to stand in the truth. And when we do that, our state
is no longer fallen away (apo-static) but resurrected and restored
“to stand again”), even in this life (WdW I, 80).
Zuidervaart denies any such present fullness. For him, fullness is something
only eschatological, in the future (p. 27, and fn lxii).
Dooyeweerd makes it clear that we can participate
the New Root in this way only because of our supratemporal selfhood:
Man, in his full selfhood, transcends the
temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos in all its aspects, and partakes
in the transcendent root of this cosmos (NC II, 593; Cf.
WdW II, 597).
It is interesting that when the Association for Calvinistic
Philosophy was founded, Vollenhoven objected to Christ being referred
to as the New Root. But the phrase remained in Article 2 of the constitution
of the Association . And in his 1964
Lecture, given the year before his retirement, Dooyeweerd said that
we cannot even understand Christ’s incarnation
apart from the idea of our selfhood as being able to transcend time.
For the incarnation of the Word
is “an event that simultaneously reaches into the central sphere
of our life as well as the temporal sphere of our bodily
existence.” The central sphere is our supratemporal existence,
and the temporal sphere is our bodily existence, or the temporal periphery.
This idea of supratemporal
center and temporal periphery is essential to Dooyeweerd’s
understanding of our selfhood, of standing in the Truth, and of Christ
the New Root in whom we participate.
And this standing in the Truth is “the indispensable
prerequisite for the insight into the full horizon of our experience”
(WdW II, 496; NC II, 564).
We have seen how the idea of ‘standing’
(‘stasis,’ root ‘sta-‘) plays
a role in the idea of standing in the truth, of apo-stasis,
and of ana-stasis. There are other words that Dooyeweerd uses
that also build on this same root ‘sta-.’ These
terms are enstasis, systasis, and dis-stasis. Let
us look at each of these briefly, for Zuidervaart has failed to understand
these terms, too.
We will first look at enstasis .
At NC II, 562 (two pages before the “standing in the
truth” passage), Dooyeweerd says
In the limitation and weakness of the flesh, we
grasp the absolute truth in our knowledge of God derived from His
revelation, in prayer and worship. This knowledge in the full sense
of the word contains the religious principle and foundation of all
true knowledge, and primarily has a religious enstatic character.
It no more rests primarily on a theoretical meaning-synthesis than
does the cosmic self-consciousness.
We must first understand that by ‘revelation,’
Dooyeweerd does not just mean Scripture. For Dooyeweerd, revelation
is the revealing [openbaring] from a higher ontical level to
a lower level. In his 1964
Lecture, given a year before his retirement, he says we cannot understand
revelation apart from the idea of the supratemporal selfhood. And indeed,
Dooyeweerd uses the same term ‘openbaren’ to describe
the way that our supratemporal selfhood expresses itself within the
Enstasis is the relation of our supratemporal
selfhood into temporal reality. Man’s selfhood is able to enter
enstatically into the coherence of cosmic time. Only humans can
have this relation, for only humans have a supratemporal selfhood. In
contrast to man’s entering into [in-gaan] of temporal
are absorbed within [opgaan] temporal reality, in the relation
ek-stasis (WdW II, 415; NC II, 480). This idea
of ek-stasis as purely temporal comes from Scheler, whom Dooyeweerd
does not footnote here, but whom he many years later acknowledged as
the source . In this idea (although not in
his phenomenology), Scheler was influenced by Franz
von Baader, and we find the same idea of ekstasis in Baader,
as well as how animals and humans are differentiated by their supratemporal
selfhood. Because he denies the supratemporal selfhood, Zuidervaart
cannot understand what Dooyeweerd means by ‘enstasis,’
and so we find that Zuidervaart confuses this term with the purely temporal
coherence, or ‘systasis.’
He refers to enstatic knowing as the experience of full temporal reality
And the true idea of ‘enstasis’
is the relation of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal world.
Dooyeweerd refers to this as ‘cosmic
consciousness,’ where our supratemporal
selfhood recognizes temporal reality as “its
own.”  Zuidervaart does not adequately
distinguish between cosmic consciousness and cosmological consciousness,
and between pre-theoretical intuition
and theoretical intuition. He merely says that he “leaves aside
Dooyeweerd’s parallel discussion of “pre-theoretical intuition”
and “cosmic self-consciousness.” (p. 37 fn xii). But the
result is to misunderstand what Dooyeweerd means by “our own.”
He also fails to distinguish pre-theoretical intuition and theoretical
intuition, a distinction that Dooyeweerd says is crucial .
‘Systasis’ is a word that Dooyeweerd
uses to describe the coherence of temporal reality .
It therefore corresponds to the third of Dooyeweerd’s three transcendental
Ideas, the Idea of temporal coherence. Zuidervaart speaks of systasis
in terms of holism and temporal coherence. But because Zuidervaart denies
any transcendent horizon, he cannot understand even the temporal horizon.
Now it is indeed correct that we could have no true
sense of time unless we did not go above time in the deepest part
of our being. All merely temporal creatures lack a sense of time.
[…] A real sense of time supposes a transcendent centre of experience
of time.” (‘Tijdsprobleem,’
179, 181; Cf NC I, 32).
In his last
article, Dooyeweerd confirms that the idea of temporal coherence
cannot be understood except in relation to the supratemporal selfhood:
the mutual irreducibility
and unbreakable reciprocal meaning-coherence
of the modal aspects are “not to be separated from the transcendental
idea of the
root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human
100) The universality in its own sphere of the modalities can only be
understood from the Christian transcendence viewpoint; but this universality
always puts immanence philosophy on the wrong track because its Archimedean
point hides an absolutizing of meaning (WdW II, 263; NC
II, 333). And a recently discovered letter dated October 27, 1929 from
Dooyeweerd to A. Janse says that even the law-Idea
itself cannot be understood apart from this supratemporal convergence
of the differentiated modal laws:
Het komt mij niet geheel juist voor, de wetsidee
in het bijzonder aan de natuurwet te orienteren. De wetsidee, dat
is voor mij, de terugvoering van alle differentiering in de goddelijke
wetten ( en daaronder vallen zowel natuurwetten als normen) op de
eeuwige religieuze zin der wet, de onderworpenheid aan Gods souvereiniteit.
Ik gebruik daarvoor steeds het symbool van de straalbreking van het
licht in de regenboog.
De wetsidee is de idee van de diepste oorsprong en onderlinge samenhang
van alle wetsgebieden, waarin onze tijdelijke kosmos besloten is.
De wetsidee moet immers oorsprong en samenhang der wetskringen uitdrukken.
Therefore, from Dooyeweerd’s perspective, Zuidervaart
has not understood what is meant by systasis or temporal coherence.
Nor does he understand the whole law-Idea in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.
Dooyeweerd does not mean a purely temporal holism. Furthermore, in his
book Artistic Truth, Zuidervaart also redefines ‘systasis’
…the adjective ‘systatic” derives
from Herman Dooyeweerd’s discussion of the “intermodal
systasis of meaning” that grounds any “theoretical synthesis.”
In Dooyeweerd’s account, “systasis” refers to the
wholeness or integrality with which the “modal aspects”
of reality present themselves in ordinary or “pre-theoretical”
experience. [NC 2:427 ff] My term systatic availability refers
to the multidimensional “handiness,” both predicative
and nonpredicative, of the entities with which human beings have dealings.
But Dooyeweerd does not speak in terms of predicative
availability, nor is Zuidervaart correct in understanding the subject-object
relation in this way . Indeed, Dooyeweerd
says that the entire Aristotelian system of logic with its idea of properties
or predicates carries with it the danger of substance thinking .
So not only does Zuidervaart fail to understand temporal coherence in
its relatedness to the supratemporal root unity, he has also redefined
the term in a way that leads to substance
Finally, ‘dis-stasis’ is the
(i.e. non-ontical ) splitting apart of temporal
reality by means of our theoretical thought. This is done in the theoretical
which is possible only because our supratemporal selfhood is able to
enter into its temporal functions . Zuidervaart,
like many other reformational philosophers, misunderstands the Gegenstand-relation
as the opposing of the logical aspect to the other aspects. But Dooyeweerd
specifically rejected that view in his last article, directed against
D.F.M. Strauss (‘Gegenstandsrelatie’).
Because of Zuidervaart’s rejection of the supratemporal
selfhood, and of the distinction between concepts and Ideas, he does
not understand Dooyeweerd’s view of theoretical synthesis, which
relies on the unity of our supratemporal selfhood to unite that which
has been merely intentionally and not ontically split apart in theoretical
dis-stasis. Synthesis of meaning can only be accomplished by
a selfhood that transcends
all diversity (WdW I, 26). It is only because we both transcend
time and are immanently fitted into temporal reality that we can perform
the theoretical act of synthesis of meaning .
“The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible
when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above
time, enters into its temporal meaning functions. 
While Zuidervaart’s views are interesting in
their own right, they are in no way a representation of Dooyeweerd’s
IV. Historical Comparisons
It is important to look for the historical sources
of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, for as already noted, he denies that
his philosophy is original.
and the Perspectival Nature of Truth
It is entirely superficial for Zuidervaart to argue
that Dooyeweerd’s idea of “horizons” comes from the
perspectivalism of phenomenology (p. 15: “He appears to have adopted
it from phenomenology and then wed it to a revised Kantian notion of
the a priori”; p. 29: Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven agree
with Husserl’s notion of “self-givenness”). Zuidervaart
is wrong on both counts. Dooyeweerd relies neither on phenomenology
nor on Kant. He is also wrong in attributing Dooyeweerd’s idea
of “givenness” to phenomenology. Let us begin by looking
at the idea of an experiential horizon.
Dooyeweerd’s idea of “horizon” goes
back to a much earlier tradition than phenomenology. The idea of a horizon
[Horizont] is already in Kant . Kant’s
limited idea of our experiential horizon (related to his idea of the
autonomy of thought) was refuted by Franz
von Baader. The issue is whether our experience includes that which
goes beyond the temporal or not. Kant’s view is that our horizon
is limited to the temporal. Baader and Dooyeweerd say we are not so
restricted, and that Kant’s view is the result of his adherence
to the dogma of the autonomy, or self-sufficiency, of theoretical thought.
Dooyeweerd says that although our knowledge of God is bound to the temporal
function of faith, it “transcends the temporal horizon in our
selfhood” (NC II, 564). We are limited by but
not at all to the temporal horizon (NC I, 24; II,
561). This is because we are, even now, both supratemporal and temporal
beings; we have a supratemporal selfhood and a temporal body in which
that selfhood expresses itself.
According to my modest opinion, and in the light
of the whole Scriptural revelation concerning human nature it is just
this possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous
subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together
belong to the essence [wezen] of man, to the image of God
in him by means of which he is able to not only relatively but radically
go out [uitgaan] above all temporal things. And that is how
I also understand Ecclesiastes 3:11. 
In his farewell lecture [afscheidscollege]
on Oct 16, 1965, Dooyeweerd refers to the horizon of our experience,
En onder ‘ervaringshorizon’, een term
die ge in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee herhaaldelijk zult tegenkomen,
verstond ik het begrenzende apriorisch (in de zin van voorafbepaald)
kader, waarbinnen zich alle mogelijke menselijke ervaring beweegt,
maar welks onuitputtelijk gecompliceerde structuur, die in het wijsgerig
onderzoek slechts stuksgewijs en op altijd feilbare wijze te benaderen
valt, in de goddelijke scheppingsorde gegrond is, die all creatuurlijk
bestaan en eerst mogelijk maakt, zodat de ervaringshorizon tegelijk
de bestaanshorizon is van de mens en van de wereld, waarin hij zich
geplaatst vindt. 
[And by ‘horizon of experience,’ a term
which you will repeatedly come across in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea,
I understood the limiting framework, which is a priori (in
the sense of fixed in advance), and within which all possible human
experience takes place. But its inexhaustibly complicated structure,
which philosophical research can only approximate in a partial and
always fallible way, is grounded in the divine order of creation,
which first makes all creaturely existence possible. So the horizon
of experience is at the same time the horizon of existence for man
and for the world in which he finds himself placed.]
Our horizon of experience is therefore an ontical
framework which is given
in advance, and not constructed
by our rational thought. And Dooyeweerd emphasizes that this horizon
goes beyond the temporal:
But if our experience were limited to our
temporal functions of consciousness, or rather to an abstractum taken
from our temporal complex of experiential functions, as is taught
by the critical and the positivistic epistemologies, it would be impossible
to have true knowledge of God, or of ourselves, or of the cosmos (NC
According to Dooyeweerd, our horizon of experience
has four ontical levels or dimensions: the religious or supratemporal,
the dimension of cosmic time, the dimension of the modal aspects, and
the dimension of individuality structures (NC II, 552-53, 560-61).
Zuidervaart misunderstands each of these dimensions of our horizon of
The transcendent religious horizon
Zuidervaart correctly points out that Dooyeweerd describes
as the root of self-consciousness in which human experience transcends
time (p. 13). This root of self-consciousness is supratemporal,
But Zuidervaart contrasts these ontological conditions in the transcendent
religious horizon of experience with the idea that religion is the all-pervasive
direction in which human life is oriented (p. 13). Zuidervaart refers
ideas in support of this rejection of the ontical in favour of the directional
(p. 14, fn xlii). But it is clear that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd disagreed!
For Dooyeweerd, the religious or transcendent dimension is ontical:
it is based on our supratemporal selfhood, which really transcends time
even now. It is the transcendent horizon of the selfhood that
radiates through all human experience perspectively (WdW II,
492; NC II, 560). Zuidervaart accepts Vollenhoven’s idea
of a pre-functional, fully temporal heart (p. 20). So, although Zuidervaart
would like to follow Vollenhoven, who denied the supratemporal selfhood,
and who believed religion to be merely the direction of a fully temporal
heart, that is certainly not Dooyeweerd’s view. It is especially
surprising that Zuidervaart makes this mistake, since he acknowledges
“Insofar as the religious horizon encompasses all others, the
distinction between structure and direction is not so clear in Dooyeweerd
as subsequent reformational thinkers, perhaps influenced by H. Evan
Runner’s reading of Vollenhoven, sometimes suggest” (p.
38, endnote xxi).
Zuidervaart makes a further mistake with respect to
the religious horizon. He says that Dooyeweerd’s view of our experience
of the religious experience is “rather rarified” (p. 38
endnote xxiii). But he misunderstands the quotation that he refers to.
The religious horizon belongs implicitly to our experience. It is only
made explicit in our theoretical thought. The distinction implicit/explicit
corresponds to naïve/theoretical. It does not at all mean that
our religious experience is rarified, or that it is the least accessible
to ordinary experience. And Zuidervaart’s statement (p. 15) that
religious truth cannot be unique and all-pervasive is also wrong. Of
course religious truth can be unique and all-pervasive. It is human
sin that prevents us seeing it.
The horizon of cosmic
From Dooyeweerd’s standpoint, Zuidervaart cannot
understand the horizon of cosmic time, because we can only understand
what time is because we are supratemporal. Without the experience of
our transcendent selfhood, the perspectival structure of our experience
is not properly understood:
Naarmate het transcendente-besef van den mensch
verzwakt, verzwakt ook zijn zelf-bewustzijn en zijn vermogen de perspectivische
structuur van de tijd te ervaren.(‘Tijdsprobleem,’
[To the degree that man's understanding of the transcendent
is weakened, so also is weakened his self-consciousness and his ability
to experience the perspectival structure of time].
In his 1964
Lecture, given the year before his retirement, Dooyeweerd says that
the modal aspects and individuality structures are one of the least
understood ideas in his philosophy. I suggest that this is still the
From Dooyeweerd’s perspective, Zuidervaart cannot
understand the modal horizon without the idea of supratemporality, or
the transcendent religious horizon. Zuidervaart correctly says that
or kernel of an aspect is not something alongside of its anticipations
but rather that which permeates all of these. But he does not explain
why this is so–that the kernel is supratemporal and the analogies
are temporal . In his last article, Dooyeweerd
says that the irreducibility
of the modal aspects cannot be understood apart from their coinciding
outside of time in our supratemporal selfhood, the religious root unity
in which they coincide (‘Gegenstandsrelatie’).
Zuidervaart asks how it is that aspects can determine
individuality of meaning (NC II, 553). The answer is related
to how individuality
structures differ from the idea of substance,
which I have discussed elsewhere. 
It should be noted that for Dooyeweerd, in the modal
horizon of our experience, we do not experience the modes as distinct
from each other. The temporal horizon is not time in a specific (theoretically
isolated) meaning-modality, but time in its cosmic all-sidedness, time
which maintains all law-spheres in coherence of meaning (WdW
II, 482; NC II, 552). A distinguishing of the modes occurs
only in the theoretical attitude, which is not ontical, but merely intentional
horizon of individuality structures
Here Zuidervaart does a curious thing. He inserts
the theoretical attitude as a fifth horizon, between the modal horizon
and the plastic horizon of individuality structures. Now it is true
that Dooyeweerd does speak of “the horizon of all true theoretical
knowledge” (NC II, 554). But it is not theoretical thought
that forms that horizon. Theoretical thought is bound to the ontical
structural horizon of inter-modal meaning synthesis. And as we have
seen, for Dooyeweerd, that inter-modal synthesis relies on the ontical
horizons already mentioned, and in particular on the religious horizon
of our supratemporal selfhood.
In contrast to the four ontical horizons, the theoretical
attitude is merely intentional.
We can, for example, experience the modal aspects both in the pre-theoretical
attitude and in the theoretical attitude (NC II, 553) And whereas
a higher ontical horizon “encompasses and determines” all
lower horizons (NC II, 560), that certainly cannot be said
of the theoretical attitude. It does not contain and determine the final
horizon of individuality structures.
How does Zuidervaart make this mistake? I suggest it
is because he fails to understand the plastic horizon of individuality
structures. He sees this horizon as “the entire latticework of
“structural principles” that govern different types of entities”
(p. 9). This distinction between individuality structure and entities
that they govern is incorrect; individuality structures are the
entities themselves. They are what we experience in pre-theoretical
experience . Dooyeweerd denies that individuality
structures are universals that can be abstracted ,
or that objectivity means universally valid law-conformity (NC
II: 370-73). The horizon is called the ‘plastic’ horizon
not for the reason given by Zuidervaart – that structural principles
are more concrete – but because individuality structures themselves
show this plasticity in that they are formed, with both a law-side and
a subject-side. To assume that individuality structures are merely a
law obtaining for entities leads to the idea of substance. Zuidervaart’s
lack of understanding of things as individuality structures, and the
relation of enkapsis
of one individuality structure within another, also leads to difficulties
in his theory of art. 
2. The “Givenness”
Zuidervaart says (p. 37 endnote xv) that Dooyeweerd’s
idea of the givenness of our experience (“het wezenlijk zelf-gegevene”)
reflects a phenomenological influence. That is not so. Dooyeweerd’s
idea of the given has nothing to do with phenomenology. Dooyeweerd said
that phenomenology is one of the most dangerous forms of immanence philosophy
(WdW II, 422; NC II, 478-90). There are several key
differences between Dooyeweerd and phenomenology with respect to the
idea of the “given.”
a) For Dooyeweerd, the “given” is pre-theoretical
whereas for phenomenology it is a product of theory. Dooyeweerd opposes
what is “given” in pre-theoretical
experience with the product of theoretical analysis in the Gegenstand-relation.
The given is contrasted with what we make into a theoretical “problem”
(Dilemma 7, Crisis 89). Because immanence philosophy must seek
its starting point within temporal reality, it necessarily absolutizes
the function of thought and theory, and therefore falsifies this givenness
of reality–it falsifies it by turning the givenness into the product
of theory, and then elevates this theoretical, merely intentional abstraction
as if it were reality. Phenomenology recognizes this problem, but Dooyeweerd
does not accept the solution offered by phenomenology–to go beyond
the merely symbolical by penetrating to the thing's “essence.”
But in searching for the essence, aspects are torn apart into noumenon
and phenomenon (WdW I, 68). Naive experience is falsified
by a theoretical interpretation (WdW I, 140; NC I,
In his last
article, Dooyeweerd indicates that Strauss confused this distinction
between the given and the theoretical, and that therefore his philosophy
does not differ from current epistemologies:
…we also find in [D.F.M.] Strauss a continual
confusion between the “ontical” and the epistemological
states of affairs. In the Prolegomena of the transcendental critique
of the theoretical attitude of thought and experience, I have remarked
that in the subject-object relations of naïve attitude of thought
and experience, empirical reality is understood as it gives itself,
that is to say in the continuous systatic coherence and relatedness
of its modal aspects within cosmic time. But in the Gegenstand-relation,
these modal aspects are epistemologically (not “ontically”)
split apart and set over against each other, with the intention of
bringing them into view in their general modality, and thereby making
them available for theoretical concepts (Gegenstandsrelatie,
By relating Dooyeweerd’s idea of givenness to
phenomenology’s theoretical standpoint, Zuidervaart is making
a similar confusion between the ontically given and the epistemological.
As we shall see, as a result of the priority he gives to the epistemological,
Zuidervaart also tries to undermine the ontically given (the structural
a priori) in favour of a purely subjective and historical
a priori. But that is also an indication of Zuidervaart’s
belief in the self-sufficiency of thought. As Dooyeweerd says, “In
autonomy, man thought he could create his own horizon of experience”
(WdW II, 496; NC II, 563). This is a misuse of religious
freedom and results in the slavery of darkness.
b) Dooyeweerd's use of the word ‘intentional’
must also be distinguished from Husserl's idea of intentionality. He
does not mean it in the sense of “directed towards the object,”
because Dooyeweerd does not share the same view of objects. For Dooyeweerd,
intentionality involves a willed movement of the selfhood into the temporal
by means of the Gegenstand-relation. The Gegenstand
that is set over-against our temporal logical function is then merely
intentional and not ontical. Dooyeweerd says that by "intentional"
[bedoelend] he means that we direct ourselves to states of
affairs in [temporal] reality or in our imagination. We relate these
states of affairs to our [supratemporal] I-ness
in order to “make them our
own.” But the phenomenologist presumes that there is no problem
of a ‘Gegenstand,’ since he supposed that he discovers
it by his intentional consciousness in the “strict givenness”
of that which is purified by the phenomenological reduction. According
to phenomenology, the world is only given to us as an “intended
Gegenstand!” (WdW II, 399; NC II, 466).
c) Dooyeweerd's use of the word ‘epoché’
is carefully distinguished from Husserl's usage. He does not mean it
in the sense of the "bracketing" of our assumptions, but in
the sense of a “refraining” from the coherence of cosmic
time, an abstraction
from full temporal reality (WdW II, 402 fn1; NC II,
d) The whole view of things and events as “phenomena”
reflects a view that these things and events exist in
themselves, apart from us. But for Dooyeweerd, temporal things do
not exist except in their supratemporal
root. Dooyeweerd objects to the view that our pre-theoretical experience
is of separate entities. Such a view was held by Scheler, who said,
“There is nothing more certain than the fact that all the objects
given in natural observation, are given as singular and individual objects.”
It is of great methodological importance to point
out that by limiting my theoretical attention to this concrete natural
thing, I am actually engaged in a theoretical abstraction. In veritable
naive experience, things are not experienced as completely separate
entities. This point is ignored or rather denied by Scheler. It must
be emphasized, however, if we are to understand the plastic horizon
of reality, and if we are to avoid a naturalistic and atomistic interpretation
of the latter (NC III, 54; Cf. WdW III, 34-5).
It may be objected that surely Dooyeweerd is wrong,
for don’t we experience separate entities when we perceive them
by our senses? Dooyeweerd rejects that kind of empiricism:
One should not be led astray by the fact that physiology
and empirical psychology tell us that separated impressions come from
the outer world into our sensory organs, or, through them, into our
sub-consciousness. For our real experience as Erlebnis always
has structure and embraces reality within structures of individual
totality. These latter cannot have the character of a pure subjective
synthesis. Rather they are the transcendental frameworks both of experience
and reality. 
e) Dooyeweerd says that phenomenology’s view
of consciousness is still based on an abstraction. It lacks true self-consciousness
(WdW II, 422; NC II, 489). And for Dooyeweerd,
true self-consciousness requires the supratemporal selfhood.
f) Dooyeweerd's use of the term 'aspect'
must also not be understood in terms of the perspectivalism of phenomenology,
where we view a reality that exists apart from us from different angles
or perspectives. Dooyeweerd's perspectivalism is a horizon of experience
with different levels or dimensions. And aspects are meaning-sides of
g). Dooyeweerd has a different view of “actuality.”
of each subject function is the actuality that is referred to in phenomenology.
(WdW I, 78; NC I, 101).
Zuidervaart acknowledges that Dooyeweerd opposed phenomenology,
and yet he fails to ask what Dooyeweerd’s true source for the
idea of givenness might be. For Dooyeweerd, what is given, what is ontical,
is opposed to that which is merely theoretical. And we find that idea
of givenness in Baader,
who opposed Kant’s constructive view of reality. Already in his
early writings, Baader says that there must be a givenness that we ourselves
do not give:
Überall um den Menschen wird allen alle Augenblicke
gegeben und alle empfangen. Sie selbst geben sich es nicht, darum
muß wohl etwas außer ihnen sein… 
Our experience is a discovery and not an invention
(‘finden’ not ‘erfinden’).
The knowledge that we find derives from a source that ‘dominates’
and founds this knowledge. But that our experience is given does not
mean that it is a static structure. For Baader, what is given (gegeben)
is also given as task (Aufgebung) to be returned (as Rückgabe)
to the Giver. Even our act of prayer is not something we construct,
but we give back what has already been given to us (Werke 1,
346, 397; 5, 347; 7, 182; 8, 37; 9, 110; 12, 163).
And similarly for Dooyeweerd, the givenness of our
experience, even of the supratemporal, does not mean any kind of static
being (NC I, 31 fn1). Nor are principles given in a static
and unchanging way; for this reason he opposed Groen van Prinsterer’s
idea of revelation:
Dit is een wijze van schriftgebruik, die men nog
steeds onder gelovige christenenen kan aantreffen,die Gods Woord als
laatste richtsnoer ook voor het tijdelijk leven erkennen. Waar een
schijnbaar ondubbelzinnige uitspraak in de Bijbel over bepaalde tijdelijke
levensverhoudingen is aan te wijzen, buigt men zich onvoorwaardelijk
voor de Goddelijke autoriteit en spreekt dan gaarne van een ‘eeuwig
[This is a manner of using Scripture that we still
find used by believing Christians. They use God's Word as a final
guide for temporal life. Where an apparently unambiguous expression
can be shown in the Bible about certain temporal relations in our
life, man bows unconditionally before the Divine authority and speaks
readily about an‘eternal principle.’]
Already in his first lecture at the Free University
(1926) Dooyeweerd says that principles
are what give direction to our thought . God’s
revelation is the principle that is the foundation for our knowledge
(WdW II, 494; NC II, 562). Dooyeweerd praised Kuyper
for not specifying the content of the “reformational principles”
referred to in the constitution of the Free University (1964
Discussion, 16). Principles need to be positivized.
But as already noted, Zuidervaart rejects that idea of a positivization
of something that is given (p. 40 fn lix). For Zuidervaart, everything
is purely historically conditioned, and he says that he “revises”
Dooyeweerd’s ontology of principles (p. 25).
Kant’s a priori versus the
Dooyeweerd says there is a structural a priori
that we experience – and this structural a priori
is prior to any thinking whatsoever, including thinking of those
truths that Kant believed were analytical truths. The idea of a structural
a priori is therefore not a revised Kantian idea–as Zuidervaart
supposes–but an idea that Dooyeweerd, like Baader
before him, uses to oppose Kant’s ideas.
Baader says that the first work of philosophy must
be to seek out the mediations and limitations under which humans attain
to the free use of their faculty of knowledge (Werke 1, 324).
This sounds like Kant’s transcendental critique, but in fact Baader
is turning Kant’s critique against itself. Baader says that these
limitations of thought are given by God’s law to which creation
is subject. The law must always precede the finite being as its true
a priori (Zeit 32, 33 fn. 14).
Dooyeweerd also applies Kant’s transcendental
critique against Kant (NC I, 118; not in WdW). This
is why Dooyeweerd’s work is called A New Critique of Theoretical
Thought. Kant sought to show the conditions under which thought
is at all possible. But Kant takes for granted the conditions required
by thinking itself. The structure of our thinking experience has an
a priori character. This is why he says, “Critical theory
must lead to the genetic relativity of meaning” (WdW
I, 11; NC I, 9).
For Dooyeweerd, we know the a priori structure
of reality only by experience.
But this experience is not the merely temporal ‘ervaring’
or ‘erleben’ known by immanence philosophy. It
is rather a ‘Hineinleben,’ an entering into of
temporal reality by our supratemporal selfhood. (WdW II, 8
fn1; NC II, 7 fn2). Zuidervaart (p. 37 fn xiv) correctly refers
to the Dutch “een enstatisch wetend beleven of in-leven”
(WdW II, 41), but does not go into what that means in relation
to the supratemporal selfhood which “lives into” the temporal
This structural a priori comes before all
thought whatsoever. It is therefore not a subjective truth. Dooyeweerd
refers to it as something that is prior to our suppositions, or pre-suppositional
(vóór-onderstelling). There is also a subjective
sense of the a priori, where we attempt to discover this previously
existing structure (NC II, 552). Dooyeweerd refers to these
attempts as our theoretical presuppositions (vooronderstellingen).
But our theoretical presuppositions are not themselves the pre-suppositions,
the ontical conditions that make possible our thought.
Theoretical thought hereby gains successively its
concentric direction to the presupposita which alone make
it possible…(NC I, 69).
Zuidervaart acknowledges that Dooyeweerd distinguishes
between a structural and a subjective sense of the a priori,
and that our subjective insight does not determine the structure
of theoretical truth, but only discovers the structure (p.
11). And Zuidervaart acknowledges that for Dooyeweerd the supratemporal
selfhood and its transcendent religious horizon is for Dooyeweerd one
of those structural conditions.
But then Zuidervaart tries to undermine this structural
a priori by arguing that it is inconsistent with Dooyeweerd’s
own thought. He says that it is inconsistent with Dooyeweerd’s
idea of a religious direction, and that to speak of a religious horizon
with an ontical structure confuses direction and structure. And yet
Zuidervaart acknowledges that this idea of direction is much more prominent
in Vollenhoven than it is in Dooyeweerd. Vollenhoven needed the idea
of heart direction towards the transcendent because he did
not have the idea of a supratemporal selfhood, where man’s heart
is even now actually supratemporal and transcendent. Dooyeweerd sometimes
mentions direction of the heart, but for him, a religious direction
is not a direction from out of the temporal towards the supratemporal.
Direction is the willed act of our supratemporal heart where we deny
God as Origin,
and also deny our true ontical status as the supratemporal
root of creation. We either acknowledge and participate
in our true status as supratemporal beings, or we substitute the lie
of immanence philosophy, and pretend that we are merely temporal beings.
The lie is a falling
away [af-val] from our true ontical position, and the truth
is an acknowledgment and participation in our true state. Thus, Dooyeweerd’s
idea of direction is in no way in conflict with his idea of the supratemporal
selfhood as one of the ontical conditions that make our thought possible.
Indeed, even the falling away, and consequent idolization of the temporal,
is itself possible only because of our supratemporal selfhood (NC
I, 31). Without the law of religious concentration in human existence,
idolatry would be impossible. 
Zuidervaart finds a “near-conflation”
in Dooyeweerd’s account of the ontical and the subjective a
priori (p. 38 fn xxviii). This is similar to Michael DeMoor’s
view that even the religious a priori has a subjective character
because we can direct it towards God or away from God .
But the fact that we can subjectively misunderstand the ontological
givenness does not make that givenness subjective! We subjectively “give
an account” of those ontical conditions Dooyeweerd keeps the ontical
and the subjective very distinct. It is only because of the ontical
presuppositions (vóór-onderstellingen) that we
can have any subjective presuppositions at all, including analytical
Why does Zuidervaart try so hard to undermine the
structural a priori? He has to, if he is to maintain his temporalized
view of man, with no transcendent horizon. Zuidervaart’s immanence
philosophy does not allow him to appreciate Dooyeweerd’s transcendence
Zuidervaart’s own philosophy is heavily indebted
to Heidegger, as he acknowledges. He wants to find similarities with
Dooyeweerd. He says, “This probably indicates that Dooyeweerd
recognized significant affinities between Heidegger’s critique
of Kant and his own.” (p. 37 fn xix).
But Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is not at all like
Heidegger’s, nor of Heidegger’s critique of Kant. The best
evidence for this is Dooyeweerd himself. He says that Heidegger seeks
the selfhood in the temporal (historically understood) ‘Dasein,’
and that we therefore cannot seek any break from immanence philosophy
in his thought (WdW II, 458; NC II, 526). “For
Heidegger also eliminates the cosmic order of time and even merges the
selfhood into time” (NC II, 527). By rejecting the supratemporal
selfhood, Zuidervaart is also merging the selfhood into time in his
Despite what some reformational philosopher’s
have claimed, Dooyeweerd’s view of cosmic time was not derived
from Heidegger, but is in opposition to Heidegger:
Even Heidegger's "existential time" is
not cosmic time guaranteeing the continuous coherence between the
modal aspects of experience. If he [Heidegger] had had real insight
into cosmic time, he would never have sought the transcendence of
the selfhood of the inner experience of the 'ex-sistere',
in the historical time-aspect with its anticipatory future. (NC
Dooyeweerd's own copy of Sein und Zeit (6th
ed. 1949) contains marginal notes that make it clear that Dooyeweerd
is critical of Heidegger. For example, p. 381 “gebrek aan modale
analyse der tijdservaring.” There are many exclamations in the
margin opposite such as p. 384 of Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger
says “Nur das Freisein für den Tod gibt dem Dasein das Ziel
schlechthin und stösst die Existenz in ihre Endlichkeit.”
or on p. 410, “so bleibt es die Auszeichnung der Zeitlichkeit
eigentlicher Existenz, dass sie in der Entschlossenhiet nie Zeit verliert
und immer Zeit hat.” There are enough questions and exclamation
marks to make it clear that Dooyeweerd disagrees with Heidegger's ideas.
Page 263 of Sein und Zeit has the notation “anti-Christelijk”
and “antinomie” in the margin. And there are many more such
Instead of looking to Heidegger’s temporalized
view of reality as a source for Dooyeweerd’s views on time, we
need to look for a source that distinguishes eternity, supratemporality,
and cosmic time. A comparison of Baader
with Heidegger leaves no doubt as to which view of time was more influential
for Dooyeweerd. Baader’s ideas on time were undergoing a renaissance
at the same time that Heidegger was writing, and at the same time that
Dooyeweerd was formulating his philosophy. And both Baader and Dooyeweerd
share the idea that man, who has a supratemporal
selfhood, is (with respect to his temporal
time along with that part of created reality that does not have
a supratemporal selfhood.
In his article on art ,
Zuidervaart makes other comparisons of Heidegger and Dooyeweerd. He
says that Dooyeweerd’s view of “things” is what Heidegger
referred to as inert ‘Vorhandenes.’ But Dooyeweerd
never refers to art works in this way. He says, “The thing presented
here is the work of art. A natural thing is not given at all in this
structure” (NC III, 115). More importantly, Dooyeweerd
specifically rejects any view of reality as inert ‘Vorhandenes’!
He says that Heidegger’s view of temporal reality as Vorhandenes
rests on a failure to appreciate the dynamic character of reality, a
failure to appreciate the ex-
sistence of all created things as meaning, with no rest
in themselves (WdW I, 79; NC I, 112). Dooyeweerd criticizes
Heidegger’s view of Vorhandenes as a blind and meaningless
nature into which human existence (Dasein) is thrown (WdW
II, 24; NC II, 22). And Dooyeweerd says that Heidegger knows
only the transcendence of the temporal finite human “Dasein”
above what Heidegger calls the ‘Vorhandene” (the sensible
things that are given), but that this is not an ideal transcendence
above time itself (WdW II, 456; NC II, 525). In other
words, Dooyeweerd rejects Heidegger’s temporalized view of the
selfhood. Instead, Dooyeweerd emphasizes the supratemporal nature of
V. Other misunderstandings of Dooyeweerd
1. Dialogue with other Philosophers
Zuidervaart complains that if Dooyeweerd is right
that we cannot truly experience the world unless our heart is directed
to God, then we cannot communicate with other philosophers. This is
the old problem of the point of contact for apologetics, which Dooyeweerd
addressed in his debate with Cornelius Van Til .
But whereas Van Til argued for no point of contact at all, Zuidervaart
is arguing for contact to such an extent that there is no longer any
ultimate or transcendent horizon of truth. This is the other extreme,
where all distinctiveness of Christian philosophy is gone. Dooyeweerd’s
position is a middle course, where he acknowledges partial or relative
truths to other philosophers. These
states of affairs are truths in the temporal
periphery. These relative truths remain unrelated to their true
supratemporal center and central Truth. Our central selfhood relativizes
all such partial truths (WdW I, vi and II, 240). The full significance
of these truths cannot be seen unless they are related to the center.
center relativizes all previous thought. Dooyeweerd’s New
Critique is therefore not just describing how philosophers think,
but he is prescribing how they ought to think. He is trying
to change their thought.
Zuidervaart is also wrong (p. 15) that Dooyeweerd
only added this reference to states of affairs in the New Critique.
The idea of states of affairs (‘standen van zaken’) is already
found on at least 120 pages of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee.
The New Critique is merely “a sharpening of the method
of transcendental criticism” that was already set out in De
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. 
Zuidervaart says that to grant only partial truths
to others privileges the Christian position (pp. 9, 14, 17). Well, yes,
it does, but Dooyeweerd also says that his philosophy has links and
connections in a thousand ways to other philosophy and to the perennial
tradition (WdW I, 82; NC I, 118). He specifically
denies that his philosophy is original (WdW III, vii-viii;
not included in the NC). What is privileged is a way of experiencing
that is dependent on acknowledging more than just a temporal horizon.
The Christian position says it best, but other philosophers (like Plato)
have attempted to say it; their problem is that they have absolutized
the temporal in attempting to express this truth. Plato's mistake (which
caused his dualism) was not that he acknowledged both a temporal and
a supratemporal horizon. His mistake was to limit the soul to the rational
In Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysical psychology,
only the “reasonable,” the thinking part of the soul (logistikon)
possesses immortality... (WdW 1, 29)
Dualism for Dooyeweerd relates to absolutizing the
temporal. It is never related to the expression
of a center
into a periphery. The supratemporal selfhood and the mantle of functions
constitute the only fundamental dichotomy, a dichotomy that is really
a nonduality [twee(een)heid]. 
Like other reformational philosophers, Zuidervaart
waffles as to whether his objection to Dooyeweerd’s supratemporality
is because it is monistic or because it is dualistic (p.39 fn xliv).
It is neither. 
Zuidervaart refers to Dooyeweerd’s statement
that his philosophy does not end with a sermon, but that we cannot do
away with the scandal of the cross. Zuidervaart comments:
Because Dooyeweerd construes religious responses
in an antithetical manner, the absurd consequence follows that only
Christians, or perhaps even only authentic Christians, would subjectively
be capable of experience. In other words, religion would trump experience
rather than direct and sustain it. We would not have an epistemology
but rather a denial of epistemology. The “problem of knowledge”
would be “solved” by taking it off the table. This solution
would be philosophically scandalous, I admit, but hardly the “scandal
of the cross.” Nor do I think it is the result that Dooyeweerd
actually had in view. (p.16)
But Zuidervaart has framed the problem incorrectly.
He is here not using ‘religion’ in Dooyeweerd’s sense
of our religious, i.e. supratemporal horizon of experience. He is using
‘religion’ in the sense of a set of beliefs. For Dooyeweerd,
the religious is not a set of beliefs, nor does it trump our experience.
Rather, it is experience. It is in fact the most inclusive of our experiential
horizons. This might be better understood today if Dooyeweerd had used
the word ‘spiritual’ instead of ‘religious.’
And Zuidervaart has failed to recognize what Dooyeweerd
means by the cross.
The cross is not some kind of theological knowledge. The cross is
the intersection of the temporal and the supratemporal. It is the
insistence on such an intersection between the temporal and the supratemporal
that gives offence to those people who attempt to temporalize our experience.
Dooyeweerd speaks of the importance of meditation or concentration on
the cross of Christ as a symbol of the coincidence of meaning in
the supratemporal fullness of meaning (WdW I, 71; NC
I, 106). This use of the image of the cross to express coincidence of
meaning, the intersection of the vertical and the horizontal, is also
one that is used by C.G. Jung. Jung uses the cross as a symbol of wholeness,
and as the intersection of four elements of a mandala.
A late letter shows that Dooyeweerd continued to think
of the cross in terms of the necessity of coming to terms with the boundaries
and limits of our thinking. Prof. Dr. JJ. Duyvené de Wit of Bloemfontein,
South Africa. De Wit had written to Dooyeweerd about creation science
and evolution. Dooyeweerd says in a letter Feb. 11, 1964:
Whether we say that science can show that there is
a phylogenetic relation from the first cell to man, or whether we
deny such a relation–both arguments will lead to a falsification
of science, to speculative philosophy and to false prophecy.
Dooyeweerd says that it is hard for a scientific person
to acknowledge that he stands here before a boundary [grens].
Remarkably, Dooyeweerd places this boundary question in the context
of the cross of Golgotha:
Aan het Kruis van Golgotha heeft onze Heiland Zèlf
het “Mijn God, Mijn God, waaròm?” uitgeroepen vóór
Hij de Geest gaf met het “In Uwe handen beveel ik Mijn Geest.”
Maar dan staan we ook bij het Kruis dat de Joden een ergernis en de
Grieken een dwaasheid was.
[On the Cross of Golgotha, our Saviour Himself called
out "My God, My God, why?" before He gave up the
Spirit with “In your hands I commend My Spirit.” But then
we stand by the Cross which was a hindrance to the Jews and foolishness
to the Greeks.]
Dooyeweerd says that Teilhard de Chardin, who as a
Christian wants to say that there is evolution from alpha to Omega,
does not want to accept that hindrance of the Cross. Whether or not
Dooyeweerd is correct in his assessment of de Chardin, the point about
the Cross is that there is a boundary between temporal and supratemporal.
And Dooyeweerd opposes the kind of creation science that tries to interpret
God’s supratemporal acts in temporal terms. On the cross, this
boundary of temporal and supratemporal was overcome, as Christ gave
up his Spirit into the hands of the Father. The spiritual continues
across the boundary.
Zuidervaart says that for his view of theoretical
intuition, Dooyeweerd can only appeal to
religious self-consciousness. That is true. But religious self-consciousness
It is something that must be tried. We must “taste” the
Truth. The idea that we need to experience something in order to know
it is not unique to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. We can see this in
other mystical philosophers, such as Ken Wilber, who emphasizes the
experiential nature of knowledge. The inadequacy of dualistic knowledge
can be realized only by recognizing another mode of knowing. And that
mode can be experienced, or tasted . Wilber
differentiates this kind of experiential knowledge from empirical experience,
which reduces the meaning of experience to sensibilia. 
Similarly, Dooyeweerd distinguishes his idea of experience from its
meaning in immanence philosophy. Instead of ‘erleben,’
Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘Hineinleben’-the entering
into of temporal reality by our supratemporal selfhood, which is also
what he means by ‘enstasis’ (NC II, 474-79; WdW
II, 410: “wetend beleven of in-leven in de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid”).
And Dooyeweerd speaks of the importance of “religious self-reflection”
as a way of discovering our supratemporal selfhood .
I am not suggesting that Wilber and Dooyeweerd are identical ,
but perhaps there is more commonality with Wilber, who does not limit
our horizon to the temporal, than with Zuidervaart’s temporalized
view of man, which Wilber would characterize as a “flatland”
view of reality. In contrast to such a temporalized flatland, Dooyeweerd
affirms our immediate and supratemporal religious experience.
We cannot oppose heart direction to ontical structures.
A wrong, apo-static
heart direction is the denial of the true ontical structure of
our experience. When our heart acknowledges the ontical conditions that
make our temporal experience possible—including our supratemporal
selfhood–we then experience the world as it really is. This does
away with the lie of immanence philosophy, which tries to hide the true
nature of reality. We can again see and experience correctly. Without
the experience of our selfhood as the religious root, we do not experience
the world as it really is–as meaning
(NC III, 30; WdW III, 12). Even Christians do not
always see the world aright, for the line of antithesis
runs through the hearts of Christians, and does not divide Christians
from non-Christians (WdW I, 497; NC I, 523-4).
Nor is Zuidervaart correct that Dooyeweerd’s
view leaves him with a static view of reality. He mischaracterizes Dooyeweerd
as saying that truth becomes never changing in changed circumstances.
(p. 14). This ignores Dooyeweerd’s distinction between principles
and their positivization
in history. Such positivization in no way means that Dooyeweerd accepts
a limited view of the autonomy of thought .
Although Zuidervaart has abandoned the idea of positivization, he needs
to assess Dooyeweerd on his own terms, and those terms include that
idea of principles and positivization.
The Allegation of Circularity
Zuidervaart complains that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy
involves a “vicious circle” and “self-referential
incoherence” (p.16) in presupposing that which it wants to prove.
Zuidervaart has made this accusation before .
Dooyeweerd responded to this allegation of a vicious circle in his last
article, written in 1975 against D.F.M. Strauss. From Dooyeweerd’s
point of view, the allegation of circularity is based on Strauss’s
logicism. I have shown how Strauss’s arguments are themselves
based on a fallacious use of logic . I suggest
that a similar problem exists with Zuidervaart’s critique. A certain
circularity is inevitable, but it is the circularity of a center to
the periphery, the relation of Idea to concept. Dooyeweerd already spoke
of this in his Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946, reissued
in 1962) , where he refers to the very idea
of encyclopedia as “learning in a circle” [en-kykios].
But this is not a vicious circle.
I would point out that although Zuidervaart complains
of the circularity in Dooyeweerd’s view of theory, Zuidervaart
acknowledges that his own ideas of theory and truth have “an unavoidable
circularity” (p. 24). But unlike Heidegger’s view, to whom
Zuidervaart appeals (“the key is to enter the circle in the right
way”), Dooyeweerd’s circularity depends on the relation
of supratemporal center and temporal periphery. Our concepts
are restricted to the periphery,
but our Ideas
towards the center. Zuidervaart misunderstands Dooyeweerd’s use
of ‘Idea’ in terms of Kant’s view of a regulative
idea that goes beyond the boundaries of theoretical concepts (p.
24). But that is an interpretation that Dooyeweerd specifically denies
Discussion). Zuidervaart himself abandons the distinction between
Idea and concept. For Zuidervaart, “whatever can be discussed
can be conceived.” (p. 24).
Philosophy of Art
Zuidervaart presents his philosophy of art as an instance
of his view of truth. But as already discussed, he has misunderstood
Dooyeweerd because he has not properly understood
individuality structures, enkapsis,
and the act of imagination.
Furthermore, he incorrectly compares Dooyeweerd’s ideas to those
of Heidegger, when in fact Dooyeweerd expressly opposed such ideas.
In the present article, Zuidervaart continues his misunderstanding of
imagination. He does not accept Dooyeweerd’s view that this is
an act (p. 22). For Dooyeweerd, imagination is one of the three directions
that our acts
take as they issue from our supratemporal
selfhood. And Zuidervaart continues his incorrect comparison with
Heidegger’s temporalized view of humanity.
Zuidervaart misunderstands the Gegenstand-relation
as being the opposition of the logical aspect to the other aspects.
But Dooyeweerd specifically denies that this is the case. He says that
it is the act of thought opposed to one of the aspects that
have been intentionally (i.e. not really) split apart. The Gegenstand
may include the logical aspect itself. This act is made possible only
because of our supratemporal selfhood, which can enter into our own
temporal functions . Zuidervaart’s mistake
is the same as that of D.F.M. Strauss, against whom Dooyeweerd directed
his last article (Gegenstandsrelatie).
Scripture, Revelation and Truth
Zuidervaart refers to the “hearted” character
of truth (p. 10). He says that this is an acceptance of Scriptural truths.
But he says (p. 19) that it does not mean that living the truth requires
transcendent insight into God’s revelation. All of our living
and learning occurs within the “temporal horizon.”
But for Dooyeweerd, the working of God’s
Word in our heart is not a temporal phenomenon. Indeed, it cannot
be understood apart from our supratemporal heart (1964
Lecture and Discussion).
Zuidervaart incorrectly says that Dooyeweerd’s
philosophy is derived from biblical interpretation (p. 10). Although
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy “accords with” Scripture,
he emphatically denies that ideas of heart or creation, fall and redemption
can be determined by religious exegesis. 
Zuidervaart complains that Dooyeweerd “never
fully explains how what is transcendent and supratemporal can encompass
and determine that which is immanent and temporal.” (p. 14). But
D. does explain. The supratemporal is a totality that expresses
itself in the temporal, just as God’s eternity expresses itself
in the supratemporal and the temporal. Both are revelation,
openbaring. And the temporal in turn refers back to the supratemporal
and the eternal. It may be that Zuidervaart cannot accept this kind
of ontology, or this view of revelation as the expression of a higher
ontical realm in a lower realm, which lower realm then refers back to
the higher for its meaning. But the explanation is there in Dooyeweerd’s
Life and Death.
Zuidervaart correctly says (pp. 26, 32) that the right
philosophy is life-giving. But Dooyeweerd goes beyond that: he says
that the acceptance or rejection of his philosophy is a matter of spiritual
or death (NC I, vii; Twilight, 94, 146). And here
it seems to me that reformational philosophy has been held back by an
impoverished theology from understanding what Dooyeweerd means. Dooyeweerd
refers to the dynamis of the Holy Spirit in our lives, our
in Christ, which we can only do because of our supratemporal
selfhood, and of our being brought into the relationship of sonship
with God (NC I, 61; not in WdW). Dooyeweerd says,
“In Christ’s human nature our heavenly Father has revealed
the fullness of meaning of all creation” (NC II, 563).
Reformational philosophy has not followed these ideas, but they are
already in Kuyper, who in his Pro Rege, says that the miracles
of Christ are demonstrations not of his divinity (which he does not
deny), but demonstrations of what redeemed humanity can do.
It is important in this context that we do not turn
the miracles of the Son of man into miracles of the Son of God. It
would be easy to do so. God is almighty. It is easy to attribute Christ’s
signs and miracles to His divine powers and to regard these miracles
as proof of His divinity. To so regard these miracles would be to
misunderstand them completely. Jesus never referred to His miracles
as proof of his divinity. Their purpose was to show that the Father
had sent Him, that He had a task to perform on earth. He never made
a sharp distinction between His own miracles and those of His disciples.
He made the remarkable promise to the disciples that whoever believed
in Him would do even greater works than His (John 14:12) […]
While on earth, He neither ruled as the Son of God nor did He display
the majesty of His divinity, but He appeared among us as a human being,
as one of us, and He did not reveal any power other than that potentially
available to all humanity. 
I do not see this kind of spiritual life in today’s
reformational philosophy. Perhaps it comes down to the difference between
Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. Dooyeweerd praised the meditational and
devotional side of Kuyper; Vollenhoven said it did not much interest
him. And Vollenhoven chose the vision of a merely mediated
While Zuidervaart’s article is interesting insofar
as it presents his own conception of truth, he has not at all followed
Dooyeweerd’s ideas, and his article can only lead to further misunderstandings
of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.
Dooyeweerd said that many of his ideas can be developed
further, but that the central ideas of his philosophy must be accepted
or else the development is no longer within the same tradition (1964
Lecture and Discussion). It is not that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy
is beyond criticism. But as he said in that 1964 Lecture, one must first
understand what one is criticizing. His philosophy must be interpreted
in terms of the ideas that he says are central, such as the Idea of
the supratemporal selfhood. And surely Dooyeweerd was the most knowledgeable
about which ideas are central to his own philosophy. Zuidervaart’s
idea of “critical retrieval” seems to be serving as a way
to avoid grappling with the meaning of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy
as a whole.
By abandoning Dooyeweerd’s idea of the religious
horizon as ontical, and rejecting the idea of the supratemporal selfhood,
Zuidervaart has ended up with exactly the kind of philosophy that Dooyeweerd
opposed: immanence philosophy, which seeks its starting point within
time, and which therefore relies on the self-sufficiency of theoretical
Zuidervaart’s article “After Dooyeweerd”
is an expression not only of a rejection of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy,
but an attempted substitution of the kind of philosophy he opposed.
I hope that this discussion will encourage readers to look at what Dooyeweerd
himself says. For Dooyeweerd’s philosophy gives spiritual life,
and not the kind of immanence philosophy proposed by Zuidervaart, with
no ultimate or transcendent horizon. If Zuidervaart’s recommendations
are followed, it will mean not only the rejection of Dooyeweerd’s
philosophy, but also the end of reformational philosophy as distinct
from immanence philosophy.
 Lambert Zuidervaart: “After
Dooyeweerd: Truth in Reformational Philosophy,” (Toronto:
Institute for Christian Studies, 2008), online at [http://records.icscanada.edu/ir/articles/20081007-1.shtml].
A portion of this article has since been published as “Dooyeweerd’s
Conception of Truth: Exposition and Critique,” Philosophia
Reformata 73 (2008) 170-189. But Zuidervaart says at p. 179 fn
3 that the online article is the "more extensive exposition and
critique" of Dooyeweerd.
 Herman Dooyeweerd: De
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935) [‘WdW’],
translated and revised as A New Critique of Theoretical Thought
(Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969; first published 1953) [‘New
Critique’ or ‘NC’].
 See J.M. Spier: Inleiding
in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, online at [http://members.lycos.nl/groenzicht/spier.htm].
Also Gerrit Glas: “Schepping
en verstoring: het kennen van de scheppingsorde en de werking van het
First response to the Curators, April 27, 1937. Translation online
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het
Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” Philosophia
Reformata 5 (1940) 160-192, 193-234, at 178-9, [‘Tijdsprobleem’].
translation at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Tijdsprobleem.html]
 Herman Dooyeweerd: De Crisis der Humanistische
Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931) [‘Crisis,’]
Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke opvatting der persoonlijkheid,
kan evenmin het 'individueele ik' in den tijd worden gezocht en daarmede
nemen wij principieel tegen de 'geesteswetenschappelijke sociologie'
positie, die zulks met de geheele immanentie philosophie juist wel
doet. De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk.
In de kosmische tijdsorde kan nòch aan den individueelen mensch,
nòch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het
cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing
der tijdelijke samenleving.
 WdW I, v-vi; This is badly translated
in at NC I, v-vi, and the contrast with Kant is not made clear.
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het
dilemma voor het christelijk wijsgeerig denken,” Philosophia
Reformata 1 (1936) 1-16 [‘Dilemma’] at 4 and 8.
 Abraham Kuyper: “De
Verflauwing der Grenzen,” (Amsterdam: J.A. Wormser, 1892),
online at [http://www.neocalvinisme.nl/ak/broch/akverfl.html], fn. 26.
This has been translated as “Pantheism’s Destruction of
Boundaries,” tr. Hendrik de Vries, The Methodist Review (July
 See NC III, 783-84.
He also says this in “The
Idea of the Individuality Structure and the Thomistic Concept of Substance,”
Philosophia Reformata 8 (1943), 65–99; 9 (1944) 1–41,
10(1945) 25ff, 11(1946) 22ff. Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Substance.html].
 W.J. Ouweneel: De Leer
van de mens (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1986). Ouweneel’s
own summary of this work is available in English, online at [http://www.reddmer.ca/~tplant/cp/SA-MO-HTM].
 W. J. Ouweneel: “Supratemporality
in the Transcendental Anthropology of Dooyeweerd, ” Philosophia
Reformata 58 (1993) 210-220, at 213.
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Center
and Periphery: The Philosophy of the Law-Idea in a changing world.”
[‘1964 Lecture and Discussion’] (Discussion, 1). The 1964
Talk was published in Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) 1-19.
Translation of both online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/1964Lecture.html].
 Sometimes Dooyeweerd hyphenates the word.
(WdW I, 75 ‘apo-statische,’ 80).
 Dooyeweerd, Herman: In the Twilight
of Western Thought. Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of Theoretical
Thought, (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968, first published
1961) [‘Twilight’], 7. As Paul Otto has shown, the later
Mellen Press edition is not reliable.
 Johan Stellingwerff: De VU na Kuyper,
(Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1987), 207.
 The word ‘enstasis’
is usually attributed to Mircea Eliade, who used it in his 1954 book
on yoga. The original term he used was ‘l’entase.’
See Yoga: Immortality and Freedom (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1958), p. 37. But Dooyeweerd’s usage was far
earlier, and so we need to look at his sources for the idea. I find
them in Franz
 Max Scheler: Man’s
Place in Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1962, originally
published as Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 1928). In
his 1961 article, “De Taak ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie,”
Philosophia Reformata 26), Dooyeweerd explicitly refers (at
p. 48) to this work by Scheler in support of temporal beings being exstatically
absorbed by their temporal existence.
 See the references in Thesis 83 of my “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/
 See Dooyeweerd’s
last article, “De
Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,”
Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101 [‘Gegenstandsrelatie’].
Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/
 The use of the word in the
sense of an integral whole is sometimes attributed to Jean Gebser (1905-1973),
who used it to mean “the conjoining or fitting together of parts
into integrality” in his book The Ever Present Origin
(1986, first published in German as Ursprung und Gegenwart
in 1949). But Dooyeweerd used the term at least fifteen years earlier.
In a footnote (NC III, 36 ft. 1), he says that 'systasis' is
an obsolete word, but he does not indicate from where he obtained it.
 In Dooyeweerd Archives, Amsterdam.
 Lambert Zuidervaart: Artistic
Truth: Aesthetics, Discourse, and Imaginative Disclosure (Cambridge,
2004), 236 fn 27.
 Zuidervaart: Artistic Truth, 235
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “The
Idea of the Individuality Structure and the Thomistic Concept of Substance:
A Critical Investigation into the foundations of the Thomistic doctrine
of being,” Philosophia Reformata 8 (1943), 65–99;
9 (1944) 1–41, 10(1945) 25ff, 11(1946) 22ff. Translated online
at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/ Substance.html]. The excerpts
are from pages 89-92.
 See references in Thesis 88 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 See references in Thesis 89 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 Herman Dooyeweerd: De Crisis der Humanistische
Staatsleer, in het licht eener Calvinistische kosmologie en kennistheorie
(Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), 103.
 Herman Dooyeweerd: Encyclopedia
of Legal Science (1946), p. 12, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/
 For example, Kant speaks of the “horizon
of science” [Horizont der Wissenschaft] as well as various
private horizons with their standpoints.
 Herman Dooyeweerd:
Second Response to Curators, Oct. 12, 1937, 34, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorish
Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de grondslag der Vrije
Universiteit,” Philosophia Reformata 31 (1966) 3-15,
 See references for Thesis 16, “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 J. Glenn Friesen: “Individuality
Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and
German Idealism,” (2005), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Enkapsis.html].
 See references in Thesis 22 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 See references in Thesis 88 of ’95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 J. Glenn Friesen: “Individuality
Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and
German Idealism,” (2005), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/
 J. Glenn Friesen: “Dooyeweerd’s
Philosophy of Aesthetics: A Response to Zuidervaart’s Critique,”
(2006), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Aesthetics.html]
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “De
leer van den mensch in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee”, Correspondentie-Bladen
VII (Dec. 1942), first translated as “The
Theory of Man: Thirty-two Propositions on Anthropology,” Proposition
XV, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/32Propositions.html].
See also ‘Tijdsprobleem,’
 Herman Dooyeweerd: Transcendental Problems
of Philosophic Thought (Eerdmans, 1948), 32-33, fn 2).
 Franz von Baader: Seele
und Welt: Franz Baaders Jugendtagebücher 1786-1792 (Volksverband
Bücherfreunde, 1928), 61.
 Herman Dooyeweerd: Vernieuwing en Bezinning,
(Zutphen: J.B. van den Brink, 1959), 242.
 Cited in Marcel Verburg: Herman Dooyeweerd:
Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer (Baarn: Ten
Have, 1989), 105.
 “Cornelius van Til
and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Jerusalem
and Athens (Presbyterian & Reformed, 1971), 75. Also, Encyclopedia
of the Science of Law, (original 1967 Dutch SRVU version; the distinction
between ‘vooronderstellingen’ and ‘de vooronderstelde’
is improperly translated in the 2002 edition). See also “De transcendentale
critiek van het wijsgeerig denken,” Philosophia Reformata
6 (1941), 1-20 [‘Transcendentale Critiek’], at 5 for the
distinction between theoretical and supra-theoretical presuppositions
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “The
Secularization of Science," tr. R.D. Knudsen, International
Reformed Bulletin, IX (July 1966, p. 5, cited by Steen, p. 74 ft.
 Michael J. DeMoor: “Rational
Autonomy and Autonomous Rationality: Dooyeweerd, Kant and Fichte on
Subjectivity, Objectivity and Normativity,” Philosophia Reformata
72 (2007) 105-129.”
 J. Glenn Friesen: “Principles
and Positivization: Dooyeweerd and Rational Autonomy; A Response to
Michael J. DeMoor,” (2008), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/DeMoor.html].
 See Franz von Baader: Concerning
the Concept of Time
(1818) [Über den Begriff der Zeit], translation at
[http://www.members.shaw.ca/baader/Zeit.html]. And Elementary
concepts concerning Time: As Introduction to the Philosophy of Society
(1831) [Elementarbegriffe über die Zeit: als Einleitung
zur Philosophie der Sozietät und Geschichte], translation
online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/baader/Elementar.html].
 Lambert Zuidervaart: “Fantastic
Things: Critical Notes Toward a Social Ontology of the Arts,”
60 Philosophia Reformata, (1995), 37-54.
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Cornelius
Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,”
Jerusalem and Athens (Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co.,
In his 1974 interview by his son-in-law Magnus Verbrugge, Dooyeweerd
emphasized again that he had merely a sharpened the transcendental critique.
His critics are wrong in supposing that this was a fundamental revision.
The interview is online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/1974Interview.html].
 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Kuyper’s
Wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939), 193-232,
 J. Glenn Friesen: “Monism,
Dualism, Nondualism: A Problem with Vollenhoven’s Problem-Historical
Method,” (2005), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Method.html].
 Ken Wilber: The Spectrum of Consciousness
(Quest, 1984, first published 1977), 23, 40.
 Ken Wilber: Eye to Eye: The Quest for
a new paradigm (Boston: Shambhala, 2001), 38.
 See references in Theses 5 and 95 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 Wilber’s Buddhist view of the selfhood
(or non-self, anatman), and Dooyeweerd’s view of the
self as supratemporal image of the eternal God are quite different ideas.
 See my response to DeMoor referred to above.
 See Lambert Zuidervaart:
“The Great Turning Point: Religion and Rationality in Dooyeweerd's
Transcendental Critique,” Faith and Philosophy (January,
2004). Zuidervaart speaks of “circularity” and “logical
slippage” in Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique, and that
it seems “self-referentially incoherent.” But as Dooyeweerd
emphasized in his 1974
Interview, there was no fundamental revision, or great turning point.
 J. Glenn Friesen: “Did
Dooyeweerd Contradict Himself? A Response to D.F.M. Strauss,”
(2008), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Strauss.html]. The
article was written in response to a challenge by Strauss to show that
his analysis of Dooyeweerd was wrong. Strauss has not responded to my
 Herman Dooyeweerd:
Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946), translation online
 See references for Thesis 89 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 See references for Thesis 42 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 See references for Theses 50-52, 65 and
66 of “95
Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd.”
 Abraham Kuyper: You
Can Do Greater Things Than These, tr. Jan H. Boer (Nigeria, 1991),
17. This is a partial translation of Pro Rege of het koningschap
van Christus (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1911), pp. 143-246.
 See J. Glenn Friesen: “Dooyeweerd
versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy,”
Philosophia Reformata 70 (2005) 102-132, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Dialectic.html].