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Imagination, Image of God and
Wisdom of God: by © 2006 Part 6 A .pdf version of the entire article can be downloaded here. Click here to go back to Introduction. Or select a different part of this article using the navigation bar at the left. VI. Imagination and theoretical thought In this final part, we will look at how imagination relates to Dooyeweerd’s understanding of theoretical thought, and to the intentional Gegenstand-relation on which theory is based. A. Theoretical opening of the sensory aspect The opening process does not always involve theoretical thought. Naïve experience can include a limited opening of aspects. But naïve experience does this in relations to structures of individuality. It is still bound to the sensory aspect. The anticipatory spheres of the sensory aspect are also opened by theoretical thought:
As discussed, in naïve experience, we have anticipations of the logical in the sensory aspect, since we can distinguish things. The anticipation of the logical in the sensory aspect is opened up. But the anticipation that is opened is only an anticipation of the logical aspect in its own closed or restrictive form. In pre-theoretical thought, the logical aspect is only actualized in its retrocipatory or closed structure (NC I, 29; II, 120; both added to WdW). In order for the logical aspect to be fully opened, we require theoretical thought. What does this mean? It means that without theory, our logical analysis is restricted to distinguishing concrete things and their relations. We are bound to the sensorily founded characteristics of these things:
Being bound to sensory perception in relation to individuality
structures is what makes the pre-theoretical experience naïve! (NC
III, 31; WdW III, 13).
In contrast to naïve thought, which is bound to these psychical factors in directing our attention, theoretical thought is “free” in being able to direct itself to modal states of affairs (NC II, 483, fn1; WdW II, 418 fn1). B. Gegenstand We have seen that Dooyeweerd distinguishes the three temporal directions of acts from the central religious act of self-knowledge. And we have observed a similar idea is in Kuyper, who also refers to knowing, willing and imagining as powers of the soul, but distinguishes this from “the pondering soul in its totality.” This kind of meditative self-reflection is not of a theoretical nature. But there is a temporal counterpart to this self-knowledge. And this is the theoretical Gegenstand-relation (the “over-against” relation). The Gegenstand-relation is the entering of our supratemporal selfhood into its own temporal functions: The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions (1946 Encyclopedia, 12). Our supratemporal selfhood thus enters into its temporal functions, the functions in which it expresses itself. The WdW speaks of a “turning within,” [tot mij zelve in te keeren] (WdW I, 8-9). The ‘Gegenstand,’ which is set over against the analytical function of meaning in the synthesis of meaning, is the product of a willed reduction [aftrekking] from out of the full temporal reality (WdW II, 402). For Dooyeweerd, the Gegenstand-relation therefore involves a willed movement of the selfhood into the temporal. Since all acts of the will depend on the imagination, we can readily see the importance of the imagination for theoretical thought. This movement of our selfhood into its temporal functions of consciousness is also described as a ‘penetration’ of temporal reality. The supra-theoretical knowledge of the heart must “penetrate the temporal sphere of our consciousness” (NC I, 55; added to WdW). Dooyeweerd contrasts this penetration with pre-theoretical thought.
But what does Dooyeweerd mean by ‘penetrate’? I find Baader very helpful in understanding Dooyeweerd here. Baader says that just as God is able to be immanent in temporal reality, so we are to penetrate temporal beings and structures. Dooyeweerd says that the Gegenstand-relation involves the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into its temporal functions of consciousness. Does that mean that our selfhood becomes temporal? Baader says that the penetration to the temporal does not involve a mixture of identities–he refers to Boehme’s saying that Spirit can penetrate nature just as light penetrates fire (Fermenta IV, 14). There are different ways of penetrating the animal, plant and mineral realms (Fermenta I, 13; note m). Baader says that all understanding or knowledge is a penetration [Durchdringung] of an intuition, and that in our penetration of the temporal object, we understand its structure:
After entering into the temporal functions of our own consciousness, we intentionally split apart the modal aspects in which our consciousness functions. This splitting apart of the aspects involves setting them against our temporal function of thought. We analyze the aspects; they become the Gegenstand of our analysis. The Gegenstand that is set over-against our temporal logical function is merely intentional and not ontical (NC I, 39; added to WdW). By this, Dooyeweerd means that the Gegenstand is purely an inner image, a “figure” that we behold by our intuitive vision (schouwen). When we behold or intuit such a figure, we see the anticipations that may be opened up within the modal structure. The figure is merely a potential reality that then needs to be realized within the temporal world. To understand this, we need to examine separately the ideas of theoretical intentionality, the meaning of ‘figure,’ the meaning of intuitive vision (schouwen) and the nature of realization. C. Theoretical intentionality We have already discussed naïve intentional objects, such as aesthetic projects. But such objects must not be identified with the intentional Gegenstand of our theoretical thought. So there is another kind of intentionality, one that we experience in theory. This intentional relation is one that abstracts from the continuity of cosmic time, in order to epistemologically split apart the aspects. Intentional objectivity involves our imagination (NC II, 425; WdW II, 356). Dooyeweerd’s view of intentionality is that it is a purely inner act. It is not directed to external objects. Thus, as we have seen, Dooyeweerd’s idea of intentionality differs from that of Husserl, who said that we must look to the objects themselves. Dooyeweerd refers to the idea in Scholasticism of a purely intentional logical object. As such, it is no part of reality; it is only the intentional content of thought (NC II, 388; WdW II, 319). ). [160] For Dooyeweerd, the intentional abstraction from time cannot be done by our logical function of consciousness itself:
Dooyeweerd’s rejection of a logical basis for theoretical abstraction must therefore be distinguished from current reformational epistemology (See ‘Gegenstandsrelatie’). J.A.L. Taljaard has investigated the idea of intentionality in Brentano and Durandus de St. Porçain. Taljaard says that intentionality assumes a mind-immanent object, and he correlates it with the idea of nous in Greek thought. Taljaard finds this idea of intentionality in Dooyeweerd. But Dooyeweerd expressly rejects the idea that intentionality is a matter of the mind. Taljaard also sees Dooyeweerd’s idea of relating the whole temporal cosmos to the heart as the religious root in terms of seeking the ratio of things. That is not Dooyeweerd’s view. Nor is Taljaard correct that the act-structure is a duplicate of the heart, “the Ratio enlarged to include time.” Taljaard’s reasoning here seems to be that the heart is transcendent to time, and no scientific knowledge of the heart is possible. Taljaard calls the act-structure a “transcendental duplicate of the heart,” and he says that scientific knowledge about the act structure is possible (pp. 182-183). Taljaard’s argument fails to understand the whole idea of the expression within time of our supratemporal heart, and how the act-structure is the temporal expression of this supratemporal heart (See Grenzen). Dooyeweerd specifically opposes Brentano’s view of intentionality as an inner directedness that is divorced from temporal reality altogether:
Although our theoretical intentionality is not related to individuality structures, it is directed to the temporal functions of our body. Dooyeweerd says that our acts are never independent of our body (although they proceed from out of our supratemporal selfhood, they are expressed within the temporal body). Faivre points out a similar incarnational emphasis for intentionality in theosophy:
D. Figure 1. Finding the figure within created reality We have seen that for Dooyeweerd, the intentional Gegenstand-relation involves the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into its temporal functions. The Gegenstand of theoretical thought is purely intentional, and not ontical (NC I, 39; added to WdW). We examine the modal aspects as if they were split apart, when in fact they are not, and we then in our imagination, form Ideas in which we make a synthesis of meaning with our supratemporal selfhood, making the Gegenstand “our own.” The Gegenstand-relation, which is merely intentional, and not ontical, is nevertheless related to finding structures within the temporal world, including those anticipatory structures, which have not yet been realized. These potential anticipatory structures are the “figure” within the temporal world. They have not yet achieved a meaning whole. This figure is found in our intentional act of turning inwards and having our selfhood enter its temporal functions of consciousness. But how is it possible for us to find the figure within temporal reality if the Gegenstand-relation is not ontical? Why does my merely intentional Gegenstand help to find the structure of external reality? Are we not merely creating fantasies within ourselves with which we then use to attempt to construct temporal reality? By ‘figure,’ Dooyeweerd certainly does not mean a mere metaphor or “figure of speech.” A figure is a potential reality that needs to be discovered and actualized in the opening up process. Nor is a figure merely a subjective fantasy with only a contingent connection to the outside world:
There is a correspondence between the epistemological Gegenstand, which is internal and merely intentional, and the aspects in the external world that need to be unfolded. Our theoretical Ideas, based on our own temporal functions (into which our supratemporal selfhood has entered), are not fantasy, but correspond to the real image or figure. And the real figure is given by God’s Wisdom, or Law. That is why what we explore in the theoretical Gegenstand-relation as exists in the external world. It is God’s law that provides the correspondence. We are able to find that figure in the Gegenstand-relation, since our functions of consciousness are themselves temporal. The intentional object is bound to our temporal horizon of experience. And it is because of so being bound that this “fancied” structure, a structure that is merely intentional, can be represented in a real thing. Note the use of ‘represented’ here. Just like the artist’s internal aesthetic structure can be represented externally, so our internal fancied structure can be represented in a thing. And the last sentence of the above quotation is really most remarkable: “And it is essential to the reality of the latter hat it be a representation of the fancied thing-structure.” For the external thing, or individuality structure to be real, it must be a representation of what we have fancied internally! What does Dooyeweerd mean, that the reality of the individuality structure depends for its reality on its corresponding to our fancied thing-structure? Let’s look at this idea of realization in more detail. 2. Realization, actualization In theosophy, it is only when the image is embodied that it is truly real or actualized. Only then does it achieve “reality” in the theosophical sense [Faivre, 145 referring to Baader’s Werke 8, 93]. I believe that this is what Dooyeweerd means when he says that the temporal world has no reality except in man:
I believe that this is also what Baader means when he associates magia and imagination. “Imaginatio macht Wesenheit” –everything that man imagines (sich ein-bildet), he can make real (Faivre, 106). I understand Baader to mean that we use our imagination to discover the real potentialities or anticipations that lie in temporal things ready to be unfolded. In naive experience we see only the retrocipatory, in theory we also find anticipations. And this is done by our imagination. We actualize and make real temporal reality by perfecting it, by opening up the anticipatory aspects and realizing them historically. So when we find the figure, we are not inventing or
constructing the modal relations we investigate, but we are dis-covering
them. And when we apply the figure, and make it actual in an action,
we are positivizing it. Although Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is not based on propositions from the Bible, it does accord with the Biblical view[162]. The idea of a ‘figure’ within created reality, one that needs to be perfected and completed, is found in the following references.
There has always been a kind of Biblical interpretation that speaks of types and figures that foreshadow a future that we can only anticipate, and which is perfected in Christ. This anticipation is done by the “foretelling” of the prophets, who look into the future to say what can and will be. The theosophical view of imagination carries this view of figure into more than a technique for interpreting the Bible. This kind of anticipatory foreseeing of the future is the way that our temporal reality is opened up to its fullness of being. All cultural unfolding itself involves such anticipatory foreseeing. 4. Kuyper’s references to ‘figure’ Kuyper also uses ‘figure’ in this sense of that which is not quite real:
What is remarkable here is that Kuyper emphasizes the conformity, the “unity of thought divinely expressed in the spiritual and visible world.” There is a correspondence between the supratemporal spiritual world and the temporal visible world. And it is this same correspondence between what we imagine in the Gegenstand and the law-spheres in which the individuality structures function. 5. Boehme’s references to ‘figure’ For Boehme, the entire visible world is only a figure of the inner world: The whole external visible world with all its essence is a sign or figure of the inner spiritual world; all what is in the inner, and how it is in effect, also indeed has its character externally. [164] 6. Baader’s references to ‘figure’ For Baader, our imagination involves finding the figure in temporal reality. Temporal reality is temporary, and needs to be raised up to a higher level. It has a figure that can be raised to true Being (Sauer 39). The work of imagination is related to our inner sense. Whereas our outer senses only look to the passing being of things, our inner sense looks to the enduring figure in things (Werke 7, 131). But this figure must not itself be objectified or made into a hypostatized and isolated Gegenstand:
Dooyeweerd also warns against hypostatizing the Gegenstand. Such absolutizing is the source of the various –isms of thought (NC, I, 46). It is also interesting that Baader here says that our thought is directed to functions. This is also what Dooyeweerd says of the Gegenstand-Relation. In the Gegenstand-relation, our supratemporal selfhood enters into its functions. These functions are of course within the temporal modal aspects. Like Dooyeweerd, Baader also says that the images of our thought are not ontical. For Baader, this work of imagination is not real. Baader says that what is imagined is “magical.” Imagination must not be seen as something “merely subjective” in contrast to an objective world outside of our imagination. For the temporal world is in itself “magical.” This is a play on words ‘magic’ and ‘imagine.’ But as we have seen, this may be related to the nuclear meaning of power (macht) in the historical aspect. Baader uses the word ‘magic’ in the sense of St. Martin’s “apparent” (Werke II, 51-52; Susini 369). Everything in cosmic time, the Appearance-Time (Schein-Zeit), is merely apparent. These merely apparent things are all that which is still potentiality and has not arrived at its end, and has not yet achieved concrete existence. [165] For Baader, a figure is that which has not yet achieved its true being, but which possesses only an “Idea formatrix” (Werke 5, 83, note 1; also 2, 260). A figure is of something that is not quite seen, like when we are aware of the sun before it is actually appears over the horizon, or after it descends form the horizon (Werke 8, 94). For Baader, the temporal world as Inexistenz inheres in, dwells in, or subsists in our own existence. As existent beings, it is our mission to descend to the temporal world and to raise it up to its true existence. When we do that, the temporal world is eternally revealed to eternal creatures, such as the angels (Fermenta VI, 17). Baader relies here on Boehme, who says that the world was in eternal Wisdom as a figure invisible to intelligent creatures. The world reaches its true end only by man (Fermenta VI, 15). 7. Some examples of figures in Dooyeweerd Here are some examples of figures that Dooyeweerd says that we find: a) The figure of the legal object This is the economic analogy according to the law-side (normative side) of the juridical aspect. On the subject-side, this analogy reveals itself in subjective law and the figure of the legal object. The legal object is nothing more than the juridical objectification of an economic valuation (from which it follows for example that the free air cannot be a legal object) (See Tijdsprobleem). b) legal figure There are numerous references to legal figures in the Encyclopedia, but they have not been consistently translated [166]. c) good faith and equity The Ideas of "good faith" and "equity" are anticipatory meaning figures not found in a primitive system of law (NC II, 141; WdW II, 94). ). Thus, figures are found in the opening up of anticipatory spheres. A figure is a result of theoretical thought, and relates to theory’s intentionality. We find the figure in the Gegenstand-relation, when we turn inwards to examine the functions of our own temporal consciousness. This intentionality involves our imagination, to find the figure in things. The figure remains merely intentional and inward until it is acted on. d) logical prius and posterius Dooyeweerd says that the logical prius and posterius are “real figures of time” (Tijdsprobleem, 194 fn28). E. Intuitive Vision (schouwen/Schauen) 1. Meaning of ‘schouwen’ In a 1923 article Dooyeweerd says that the primary function of our consciousness is our intuitive vision (schouwen)[167]. Dooyeweerd uses this old Dutch word in many other works, too. Wolters comments on Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘schouwen.’ Wolters sees parallels with Husserl’s idea of intuition of essences (Wesenschau) [168]. But Dooyeweerd does not follow Husserl’s phenomenology. His use of ‘schouwen’ stems from a much older usage in mysticism and theosophy. I have variously translated ‘schouwen” as ‘intuition,’ ‘intuitive vision,’ or ‘beholding.’ Van Dale’s dictionary says that the word ‘schouwen’ means a kind of spiritual perception [een waarneming in de geest]. A ‘schouwer’ is a prophet, someone who sees into the future. See Isaiah 30:10:
And the KJV version is
The connotation of prophecy, beholding the future, is also a very accurate meaning for Dooyeweerd’s use, since in our turn inwards into the functions of our own consciousness, we are opening up the modal aspects of reality by examining the modal anticipations. And anticipations point forward in time in the temporal order of the aspects. 2. Intuition mediates between inner and outer We have discussed the importance of the correspondence between our inner, purely intentional Gegenstand-relation and the aspects in the external world. The correspondence between our inner and outer world is given to us by God’s Law or Wisdom. But we recognize the correspondence between our inner and outer world by our intuition. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between pre-theoretical and theoretical and theoretical intuition. He criticizes those who fail to recognize the difference (See ‘Gegenstandsrelatie’). a) Our pre-theoretical intuition relates our supratemporal selfhood to its expression in its temporal functions. In naive experience, our intuition shows us that our temporal functions are “our own.” We have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as our own (NC II, 479; WdW II, 414). Even the identification of a sensation such as a sweet taste would be impossible without this intuition (NC II, 478; WdW II, 413). This awareness of the temporal functions as “our own” is what Dooyeweerd calls ‘cosmic consciousness’ (NC II, 479; WdW II, 414). This intuition is the temporal bottom layer [tijdelijke dieptelaag] of the analytical aspect, and it keeps our analytical function of thought “fitted into” [ingesteld] within cosmic time. And it is through this bottom layer that our thought (an act from out of our supratemporal selfhood) is in contact with all of our other modal functions in time:
b) Our theoretical intuition mediates between the Gegenstand that we have theoretically isolated and our supratemporal selfhood (NC II, 479; WdW II, 414). In theoretical thought, the Gegenstand-relation is the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into its temporal functions. Our intuition of time allows us to “enter into the temporal cosmos” and to set apart and combine the modal aspects in theoretical thought. This is because our intuition is an intuition of time (NC II, 480; WdW II, 415). In theoretical thought, we epistemologically split apart the modal aspects. We create a Gegenstand which is not ontical, but merely intentional. Theoretical intuition moves to and fro between this intentional Gegenstand, and our real act of thought, which has been deepened in the opening process:
The last sentence indicates that the meaning-synthesis, which is accomplished in theoretical thought, is related to our supratemporal selfhood, in which we experience the coincidence of the temporal aspects (NC I, 106; WdW I, 71). The Dutch uses the term ‘elkander dekken,’ which means “are congruent with each other.” This coincidence or congruence is not a logical identity, but fullness. [170] The original Dutch refers to our “beholding intuition that moves to and fro” (de heen- en weder schouwende intuitie). Thus, it uses both ‘schouwen’ and ‘intuitie.’ The English translation does not adequately convey the visionary nature of intuition. If in naïve experience we have a cosmic consciousness that our temporal functions are own, in theoretical thought, we have a cosmological consciousness (NC II, 480; WdW II, 415), where there is an identity between our theoretical in-sight and the aspects of reality:
The NC translation (NC II, 480) does not make this clear, so I will re-translate:
The identity is the correspondence between our intuitive in-sight [171] and our theoretical thought about the meaning-sides of reality. In naïve experience, we have a cosmic consciousness of the identity of our selfhood with its functions. In theoretical thought we have a cosmological consciousness of the identity of the Gegenstand with the meaning-sides of reality. In both cases, we have an experience of the identity of inner and outer. 3. Correspondence between inner and outer Although our imagination proceeds from out of our supratemporal selfhood, it is expressed temporally within our body or mantle of functions. It is also expressed outwardly in the external world. What is the connection between this inner and outer? Between our imagination and the aspects of the world? The connection is given by God’s law, or Wisdom. We know God’s law both in its central sense in our supratemporal selfhood, and within our body, in a differentiated sense. This differentiated sense corresponds to the outer world. We should not regard this correspondence between inner and outer as some kind of psychic parallelism. For Dooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporal heart is more than the psychical aspect. The correspondence is due to the fact that our body, as a mantle of temporal functions, is the expression of our supratemporal selfhood, and that the aspects of temporal reality are also expressions from out of the supratemporal. These aspects are the same, and correspond to each other. In both cases, the aspects are expressions, images of something above them. They are expressions of the Wisdom of God, or God’s law in its central sense. This central law is refracted into the various modal laws by time. The law has both a central religious unity and a temporal diversity (NC I, 99; added to WdW). The law has both a religious fullness and a temporal diversity of meaning (NC I, 518; WdW I, 486). The idea of correspondence between inner and outer worlds is a prominent theme in theosophy. The same form of the lion is both created in nature and also projected in man’s imagination. There is in nature itself a kind of creative imagination, reflecting God’s Sophia (Faivre, 118). [172] Sometimes, the correspondence between inner and outer is explained in terms of man being a microcosm of the macrocosm (Faivre, 173). Dooyeweerd rejects the idea of microcosm and macrocosm. His reasons for rejecting it are interesting: it is because the idea is too individualistic and personalistic (NC II, 593; WdW II, 527-28). [173] But Dooyeweerd does maintain the important idea of a correspondence between inner and outer, between our internal imagined Gegenstand and the external aspects in which individuality structures function. For Dooyeweerd (and for Kuyper and Baader), the correspondence between inner and outer is given by God’s Law, or Wisdom. And within our own consciousness, it is our intuition, or intuitive vision (schouwen), which allows us to see this correspondence. 4. Aspects as modes of intuitive vision [schouwingswijzen] In Dooyeweerd's 1923 article ‘Advies,”
he describes the modalities as modes of intuition [schouwingswijzen].
He says,
Our intuitive vision in the sense of ‘schouwen’ is a conscious in-sight, a seeing within our own temporal functions that corresponds with the external meaning of concrete structures. Or as Dooyeweerd says elsewhere in the same article, they are subjective forms of giving meaning, and they must correspond to outer meaning:
When we examine the aspects within our own temporal functions, in the Gegenstand-relation, we are giving meaning to the corresponding areas of the external world. Dooyeweerd thus distinguishes between the aspect's subjective nature as a form of our subjective intuition, and its objective nature as an area category. Dooyeweerd later refers to area categories as ‘law-spheres’ [176] So the modalities are subjective giving of meaning–that is, the giving of meaning from within our supratemporal subjectivity. The law-spheres are within “objective” meaning reality. The last sentence of the quotation distinguishes between the modalities and our concepts. Dooyeweerd distinguishes in this article between intuition and thinking. Intuition [schouwen] is bound to the modalities. Thinking is bound to its categories. Modalities are restricted then to intuition; concepts are the form of thought (Verburg 54). But the correspondence between thinking and intuition gives rise to the issue of God, the giver of the law that makes this correspondence possible:
The passage is important, since Dooyeweerd here contrasts how this view of God’s law, which binds our thinking and intuition, is different from a view of autonomy. In autonomy, man sets his own law. But here, man has been fitted into [ingesteld], set into objective meaning. The passage also suggests that the law-Idea is required in order to explain the correspondence between inner and outer. We do not autonomously set our own meaning, but we are set or placed, fitted within everything. The other point to mention is that this early article emphasizes that the modalities are not properties of things. This is a distinction that Dooyeweerd maintained right up to his last article in 1975 (‘Gegenstandsrelatie’). 5. Boehme’s use of ‘Schauen’ As a student, Dooyeweerd was familiar with the work of A.H. de Hartog, who published in the journal Opbouw, to which both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven also contributed. Vollenhoven was the editor of the journal, under one of his pseudonyms. One of the books reviewed in that journal was de Hartog’s book on Boehme [178]. De Hartog refers to Boehme as the “schouwende denker,” the “intuitive thinker.” And in his introduction, he refers to how Boehme obtained a view of eternity by his intuitive beholding [schouwen] of light in a pewter plate, which gave him at once a wonderful, inner clarity by which he was able to intuitively see into [doorschouwen] the deepest and final principles of all things. 6. Baader’s use of ‘Schauen’ Baader also says that our thought is directed to the structure of things, a structure that we know intuitively: All understanding or knowledge is a penetration of an intuitive perception. To determine such a perception means to make a model of it. The concept of perception makes evident the sensory mediation of all knowledge; similarly, understanding is defined as the power to make the perception into a model, i.e. to understand its structure. [179] Baader uses the word ‘Schauen’ for this intuitive knowledge:
Our “inner sense” reaches for the Totality of all elements and factors of our intuitive vision (Anschauung), whereas outer seeing just gives us a composite of these elements and factors (Werke 4,100). From our initial intuition (Schauen) we move outwards in our theoretical abstraction; but we must return to this Schauen. Otherwise, our thinking becomes an enemy; it then destroys and deadens our Spirit. The mistake in theory is not in the antithesis involved in thought, but in failing to return to a synthesis. Like van Eeden and Dooyeweerd after him, Baader also emphasizes both thought and intuition. In a variant of Kant, Baader says,
Thus for Baader, it is our inward intuition that gives meaning. And we have seen this same idea in Dooyeweerd. The giving of meaning, zin-geving, is based on our inward intuition. For Baader, our intuition is a knowledge relating to the supratemporal center. And it involves a prophetic looking into the future, anticipating the future. He says that prophets see into the future; they show us that the future is already here. Others represent the past and show us (remember) that the past is still there (Werke 4, 117 fn). Baader prefaces his article Zeit by a quotation from St. Martin that man’s true state is the prophetic state. What the prophets see is “yet unborn in time”:
And Baader says that our knowledge comes through communication and entering into perfect and finished intuition and knowledge that exists above us. Our knowledge does not come from ourselves, as the rationalists believe, but through communication (not being part of) and entering into a relation with a complete and perfect intuition [Schauen] and knowledge [Wissen] that stands a priori above us. (Zwiespalt 60) Baader also links our intuition with God’s Wisdom or Sophia. It is Wisdom (Sophia) that is intuitive (anschauende) (Begründung, 133). Baader says that there are times that our anticipation manifests itself as a transient Silberblick, an eternal moment in time (Werke 4,114). This is when our intuition (Anschauen) moves in the anticipatory direction (Zeit p. 58, ft. 14; Fermenta I, 23). We can then see with a double light from out of the Center but also into the periphery. There is a coherence of inner and outer seeing. Ecstasy is an anticipation of this integrity. Similarly, Dooyeweerd speaks of times when The light of eternity radiates perspectively through all the temporal dimensions of this horizon and even illuminates seemingly trivial things and events in our sinful world (NC III, 29). 7. van Eeden’s use of ‘schouwen’ Frederik van Eeden was deeply influenced by Boehme, and some of the same themes are evident in his writing, including this emphasis on intuitive vision. In his student article on Frederik van Eeden, Dooyeweerd compares intuition to the dream state. Dooyeweerd refers to “the intuitive dream-life of our second ‘I.’” And he says that there are two basic structural needs; intuitive and reasoning. [182] Dooyeweerd also corresponded with Van Eeden. In a letter of November 14, 1914, Dooyeweerd asked what van Eeden meant by “zien met de meest mogelijke helderheid, die iemand vergen kan” [“to see with the most clarity possible that one can obtain”]. This letter was after van Eeden's book Paul's ontwaken.[183]. In this seeing, van Eeden said he had come to a fixed certainty about eternal matters. Dooyeweerd writes,
Van Eeden’s idea of intuition is related to lucid
seeing [heldere zien]. This kind of seeing is given to everyone,
in his innermost. And it is the source of all knowledge.
Intuition, source of all true wisdom, itself sees the direction. Understanding helps by distinguishing. And both are involved in inner self-examination [zelfschouw]. Van Eeden’s amazing poem, Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen [186] was written over a long period of time, and it contains a record of van Eeden’s movement from an initial monistic viewpoint to his conversion to Christianity late in his life. There are many beautiful passages in the poem, but the following expresses the relation of this inner self-examination to the unfolding of God’s law:
F. Theoretical synthesis and Ideas In the theoretical attitude, we distinguish and split apart the modal aspects. It therefore gives a more complete opening process. This theoretical splitting apart is not ontical (NC I, 39; added to WdW). The modal aspects which have been (epistemologically but not ontically) split apart must be brought back into relation with our supratemporal selfhood. We must make the theoretical Gegenstand “our own.” This is done by theoretical synthesis, aided by our theoretical intuition and by our imagination. Synthetical thought is done by our Ideas, as opposed to our concepts. Concepts are retrocipatory, but Ideas reach forward in anticipation. Our imagination is needed to anticipate moments in the aspects of our temporal experience that have not yet been opened or unfolded. Imagination is needed for the Ideas by which we anticipate. Dooyeweerd gives an example in imaginary numbers, which anticipate movement through the intermediary of spatial dimensionality and magnitude (NC II, 171; WdW II, 114). It is only because we both transcend time and are immanently
fitted into temporal reality that we can perform the theoretical act of
synthesis of meaning:
Dooyeweerd also states this in the Encyclopedia. It is only because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can form Ideas of the transcendental supratemporal conditions that make all thought possible, while nevertheless remaining bound to philosophy.
The importance of imagination for the theoretical synthesis appears in Dooyeweerd's discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. He refers to to Kant’s idea of the synthesis of imagination as "indeed a dark point in Kant's argument" (NC II, 497; added to WdW). Kant’s “figurative synthesis,” refers to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in contradistinction to the merely logical synthesis (NC II, 514; WdW II, 444). Dooyeweerd seems concerned that Kant's doctrine of the imagination might, as Heidegger suggests, provide a basis for Kant's view of theoretical synthesis. For Heidegger, Kant's transcendental imagination is the formative medium of the two stems of knowledge–intuition and thought (NC II, 525; WdW II, 455). After a lengthy discussion, Dooyeweerd concludes that imagination for Kant is still a logical act. It therefore cannot provide the basis for synthesis. G. Realization and the Re-Enchantment of the World If our imagination seeks to mirror the Wisdom of God, reading the hieroglyphics of His Wisdom in our own temporal mantle of functions, which correspond to the aspects in the external world, both those that have been realized and those that are still merely potential, does this not lead to a static view of science? What is the role of our creativity? The question is important, but in my view it betrays a substantialized view of the world. It presupposes that temporal reality is made of fixed substances responding to a fixed law that we then discover. Indeed, I think that the question more accurately reflects the prevailing views in reformational philosophy, and it is why students often find such reformational philosophy so boring. Vollenhoven’s idea of God-law-cosmos, where the cosmos responds to a law outside the cosmos, and where aspects are properties of things that are separate from that law, seems to lead to just such a deadening viewpoint. This leads to a rigid idea of things, with a subject-object relation restricted to functionalistic relations between things or entities. But Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, when understood in terms of the Wisdom tradition, results in a much more dynamic and creative view of reality. It overcomes a dualistic subject-object relation in favour of a nondual view of perception, imagination, knowing and action. The aspects are not properties of things, but modes of our intuitive vision, which correspond to law-spheres of structures that are still in the process of being individualized. In our imagination, we look forward in time, anticipating what may be. We play creatively with the aspects, making and forming temporal reality. To say that discovering and applying God’s Wisdom leads to a static view of reality is itself a failure of imagination in viewing God, self and cosmos. If the structure of our world, in its modal aspects and structures, reflects the Wisdom of God, then we must have creativity, for is not God creative in His Wisdom? I suppose it might be said that our creativity is limited to what God has already thought in His Wisdom. The only possible reply to this is, “But are you not then seeking to become greater than God? Where is your sense of dependence on Him?” The fact that God’s Wisdom is the temporal law-side of reality brings a dynamic relation to individuality structures. This dynamic does not exist when things are seen as merely responding to a law completely external to them. And to say that finding God’s law limits creativity is rather like saying complaining that the musical notes in our scales, which also have law-structures, somehow limit our creativity. The history of music, and particularly the improvisation of jazz show that the creative possibilities are endless. As Dooyeweerd says, our forming is “a free project of form-giving with endless possibilities of variation” (NC II, 198; added to WdW). Dooyeweerd’s modal scale is not a boring representation of what modernistic science is doing, but a Wisdom tradition. It is like a Glass Bead Game that is contemplative as well as magical in the sense of actually forming temporal reality and making it real. The idea of making temporal creation become real is something like the meaning of those stories that children love so much of inanimate objects becoming real, like the wooden puppet Pinocchio who becomes real, or the Velveteen Rabbit, who becomes real because the boy (properly opening up the normative aspects inherent in the toy), loves the rabbit. As Baader says, our understanding is an act of creativity and this is also an act of love [189]. In our creativity, we produce finite beings in their completed state. This producing love requires a denial of self; but there is an answer to this love by the reaffirmation of the producing being (Zeit 34 ft. 14). Fulfillment of the existence of a created thing can only be done through the reciprocal sacrifice of Creator and the created. But Baader says that this power of creation can also be misused; this misuse of power is the original sin. Dooyeweerd specifically rejects a rigid view of reality and of our imagination. We do not look for a fixed essence of independently existing things. An example of a totally fixed view of reality is that of Parmenides (Eleatic philosophy), who declared all becoming and change to be a sensory phenomenon that does not correspond to true Being. For Parmenides, the real origin of this Being is theoretical thought: “for thinking and being is one and the same.” Dooyeweerd says that Parmenides' idea of Being identifies theoretical thought with its product (NC III, 5; Cf. WdW III, 3). Dooyeweerd’s own view (like Baader’s), opposes a fixed or hypostatized figure:
But if we are searching for the figure in reality, is that not searching for a fixed eidos? I believe that the answer to this question is found in another significant passage, where Dooyeweerd says that all of our Ideas are inadequate. We move from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere until our thought finds rest in its religious root, and we realize the inadequacy of all our Ideas:
As I interpret this, all of our Ideas are only partial, pointing to a fulfillment that we strive for but can never fully attain. It is like the orthodox idea of epektasis [190]. Our theory is thus itself an act of worship, ending in apophatic wonder, opening up more and more of temporal reality, but with always more that can be discovered. Go to Conclusion Endnotes
[160] Although Dooyeweerd accepts this “important scholastic theory about the intentional logical object” he rejects the way that it was joined to the debate about universals in realism and nominalism (NC II, 388; WdW II, 319).
[162] See Linked Glossary, entry
for ‘Biblicism,’
online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/ [163] Kuyper: The Work of the Holy Spirit, 322. [164] “Jakob Boehme's Sämmtliche Werke,” ed. K. W. Schieber,” [“Jacob Boehme's Collected Works edited by K. W. Schieber”] (Leipzig, 1831-1846), Vol. IV, "De signatura Rerum", p. 346, cited by N. A. Berdyaev: Studies Concerning Jacob Boehme, online at [http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1930_349.html#9]:
[165] To say that
they are apparent does not mean they are illusory. they are merely not
yet fully real. See also Linked Glossary, entry for ‘maya,’
online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Maya.html].
[166] See J. Glenn Friesen: “Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia of the Science of Law: Problems with the Present Translation (2006), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Translation.pdf]. Some of these errors are (references to page and line number): 13:9 ‘rechtsfiguur’ is translated as ‘legal configuration.’ Similarly at 18:14 and 95:9. Elsewhere it is translated as ‘legal pattern’ or ‘juristic notion’ (18:12). Sometimes it is correctly translated as‘legal figure’ (15:16, 19:35) and sometimes as ‘jural figure’ (15:29).88:16 translates it as ‘pattern.’ And 99: 19 translates it as ‘legal patterns.’ Finally, 102:11 translates ‘rechtsfiguren’ as ‘legal phenomena.’ Because of this inconsistent translation, the English-speaking reader has no way of understanding the significance of ‘figure’ for Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia. [167] Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het Advies over Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionnaire Staatkunde,” (February, 1923, cited in Verburg, 47-61), at 53, from pages 38-39 of the article [‘Advies’] [168] Al Wolters: “The Intellectual Milieu of Herman Dooyeweerd,” in C.T. McIntire (ed.), The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985) [‘Wolters’], 14. [169] See 'shouwen' [http://www.vandale.nl/opzoeken/woordenboek/?zoekwoord=schouwen]. [170] See Linked Glossary, entry for ‘coincidence,’ online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Coincidence.html]. [171] See Linked Glossary, entry for ‘inner,’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Inner.html]. [172 Versluis discusses how this correspondence of image and original is related to the Hermetic idea from the Emerald Tablet: “as above, so below.”
[173] Versluis also says that the mystical unity between humanity, nature and God is not completely expressed by the idea of man as microcsom. Versluis cites Valentin Weigel for a more adeuate expression of the relation:
[176] See Linked Glossary, entry
for ‘aspects,’
at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/
[178] A.H. de Hartog: Uren met Jacob Boehme (edited selections) (Baarn: Hollandia-Drukkerij, 1915). De Hartog quotes extensively from Julius Hamberger: Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jakob Boehme. Hamberger was a commentator on Baader, and de Hartog also mentions Baader in connection with Boehme. Alles Begreifen oder Erkennen ist ein Durchdringen einer Anschauung. Eine Anschauung bestimmen, heisst sie zum Modell machen. Der Begriff der Anschauung macht die sinnliche Vermittlung aller Erkenntnis deutlich; gleichzeitig wird das Begreifen als das Vermögen bestimmt, die Anschauung zum Modell zu machen, d.h. ihre Struktur zu erfassen Es gibt ein inneres Schauen, welches nicht durch die äußeren Sinne vermittelt is, und ein diesem inneren Schauen entsprechendes inneres Tun (Wirken ad extra), welches ebensowenig durch das äußere Tun vermittelt ist. Schauen ohne Denken blind; Denken ohne Schauen sinnlos wäre [182] Herman Dooyeweerd: “Neo-Mysticism and Frederik van Eeden,” (Almanak van het studenten corps van de Vrije Universiteit, 1915), translated and online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Neo-mystiek.html]. [183] Frederik Van Eeden: Paul’s Ontwaken (Amsterdam, 1913). [184] Letter dated Nov. 14, 1914 from Dooyeweerd to Frederik van Eeden:
[185] Cited by H.W. van Tricht: Frederik van Eeden: Denker en Strijder (Amsterdam: Lankamp & Brinkman, 1934), 72:
[186] Frederik van Eeden: Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen, ed. H. W. van Tricht, Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk, 1954, originally published 1892-1922).
[188] Herman Dooyeweerd: De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, in het licht eener Calvinistische kosmologie en kennistheorie (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), 103: De mogelijkheid der zin-synthesis is slechts op te klaren vanuit de door ons vroeger summier aangegeven opvatting i.z. de structuur van het zelfbewustzijn. Het zelfbewustzijn transcendeert den kosmischen tijd, inzooverre de individueele zelfheid deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschengeslacht, van welks zinvolheid alle tijdelijke zin-functies (zoowel natuur- als geestesfuncties) slechts tijdelijke zinbrekingen zijn). Het is immanent aan den kosmischen tijd, in zoovere onze bewustzijnsfuncties in de kosmische tijdsorde zijn ingevlochten. De a-logische zinfuncties zijn niet vreemd aan het zelfbesuwtzijn. Ze zijn alle gezamenlijk eigen aan onze zelfheid. Alleen daarom kunnen wij ze in hare zin-wetmatigheid leeren kennen [189] See Ramón J. Betanzos: Franz von Baader’s Philosophy of Love, ed. Martin M. Herman (Passagen Verlag, 1998). Love is both a gift (Gabe) and a task (Aufgabe). See Faivre, Phil. de la Nature, 126. [190]See Linked Glossary, entry
for ‘epektasis,’
online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/ Go to Conclusion Revised Jul 13/06
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