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Imagination, Image of God and
Wisdom of God: by © 2006 Part 4 A .pdf version of the entire article can be downloaded here. Click here to go back to Introduction. Or select a different part of this article using the navigation bar at the left. IV. Imagination and the historical opening process A. Imagination and the opening process For Dooyeweerd, the opening process involves the “positivizing of principles.” In this positivization, the opening of the normative meaning-moments takes place (NC II 336; WdW II, 266). These principles are given only potentially and must be actualized (NC I, 105; added to WdW). These principles that are positivized are the normative aspects that until then have been only potentially within the individuality structures. Refer again to the quotation analyzed previously:
In the opening process, we disclose these principles and powers, which God enclosed within creation:
The unfolding of the anticipatory spheres is part of our anticipation in the fulfillment of all things:
We have already looked at the opening of the logical aspect in the sensory image. The remaining aspects can also be opened up within the sensory image. The post-lingual aspects require sensory symbolism in order to be objectified in the subject-object relation (NC II, 379; added to WdW). This is something that animals cannot do, because a genuine symbol has a cultural and logical foundation:
The normative aspects that are opened in the sensory image are also cultural anticipations:
But these cultural anticipations are only given to someone whose anticipatory perception in which the normative or axiological moments have been disclosed. Thus, this cultural opening up remains hidden from animals:
B. The historical aspect The opening process therefore opens up the normative aspects. The historical mode is the mode that is the foundation for this opening up of the normative aspects. Dooyeweerd describes the historical aspect as the “nodal point” for normative deepening of meaning (NC II, 190; WdW II, 137). In the historical mode, past, present and future meet (NC II, 192-193; added to WdW). Why does Dooyeweerd say that? Because the past is the retrocipatory direction. It is our pre-theoretical, enstatic resting in repose. The future is the normative, what temporal reality may be and will become in the fullness of time. All deepening of our experience is of an anticipatory character. The present is where we act, from out of our supratemporal center, but expressing our will temporally by forming temporal reality so that the potential normative aspects can be expressed. The historical aspect is needed for this temporal expression of forming. The historical aspect of our experience is the aspect of free forming. This forming, one of the aspects of all acts, can be either inward or outward. But unless the act of forming is realized in the outer world, it has no historical significance. Our acts, when expressed as actions in the temporal world, form the plastic [147] nature of the horizon of individuality structures. This forming is the basis of history. Reformational philosophers have frequently misunderstood the historical modality. It is not the same as history in the sense of a series of events. Events, like acts, function in all aspects, and not just the historical. History, in the sense of that which occurs must be distinguished from the historical modality of our experience, which is the aspect of forming [149]. Dooyeweerd emphasizes this:
The historical modality is therefore not an event. The historical aspect is that mode of our experience by which we give form to ourselves and to our world. And not all events are qualified by the historical aspect. The fact that I breathed yesterday is not history. Merely natural aspects of this event are not within scope of history (NC II, 193; WdW II, 140). The historical aspect determines the “how” of all phenomena of historical becoming (Encyclopedia 140). This “how” is mastery, control, a free productive forming in accordance with an imagined pattern:
Forming in the historical modality is a “free project of form-giving.” Man’s free forming is based on reflection and productive fantasy (NC II, 198; added to WdW). In other words, it is based on imagination. Thus, the historical aspect is a forming that depends on our productive imagination. We form in accordance with a pattern that we have imagined, as opposed to the forming by nature according to instinctual and automatic patterns. Dooyeweerd contrasts man’s freedom of formation with the animal, who lacks the free control of the material of its construction, for example in a bird’s building of a nest. C. Cultural forming as power Faivre says our forming is in accordance with an image. Our knowledge, which relies on imagination, is information, or in-form-ation. In Claudel’s language, the formation of an object is ‘information.’ This forming of the object allows us to name it. Baader also uses the terms imagination and information synonymously (Faivre, 120). The superior descends to the inferior and forms its foundation or support (Werke I, 44). It is a taking possession of the known object. There is a circumscribing (Umgreifen) of the object, a forming, fashioning or modeling of it (bilden, gestalten), just like an invisible vase imposing form on a liquid (Werke I, 42-45). D. Enkapsis We culturally form the world when we transform what is given in nature.
When realized in a culturally formed individuality structure, the cultural anticipations are realized. The cultural anticipations no longer exist merely potentially. Dooyeweerd sometimes calls the structure that is formed a ‘cultural thing’ (NC III, 109; Cf. WdW III, 77), or an ‘objective spiritual thing’ (1946 Encyclopedia). But this forming is not just the opening up of the anticipations in an existing structure. It is the creation of a new individuality structure that is then enkaptically interwoven with the first structure. These things involve an enkaptic interlacement of the physically qualified thing (like a no longer living tree) with a historically founded intentional object, like a chair, which has a specific cultural use:
There may be intervening individuality structures, such as semi-formed technical products. For instance, a tree may first be formed into planks. If we do not understand enkapsis, then we cannot understand Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures. For an individuality structure is qualified by its highest subject function. Without the idea of enkapsis, we mistakenly start talking about cultural objects being qualified by their object function [150]. For a more detailed discussion, see my article ‘Enkapsis.’ Sometimes, Dooyeweerd calls such a new individuality structure a “cultural thing” (NC II, 378; added to WdW). But it is evident from the rest of his work that this cultural thing is a new individuality structure that has been produced, and which is then enkaptically interwoven with the first individuality structure. E. Cultural forming as realization We have discussed Dooyeweerd’s idea of productive imagination. He gives a further example of this when he discusses the "productive objectifying function” in the cultural unfolding process (NC III, 115; WdW III, 84). We create another individuality structure that is enkaptically interwoven with the first. In theosophy, it is only when the image is embodied that it is truly real or actualized. Only then does it achieve “reality” in the theosophical sense [Faivre, 145 referring to Baader’s Werke 8, 93]. I believe that this is what Dooyeweerd means when he says that the temporal world has no reality except in man:
I believe that this is also what Baader means when he associates magia and imagination. “Imaginatio macht Wesenheit” –everything that man imagines (sich ein-bildet), he can make real (Faivre, 106). I understand Baader to mean that we use our imagination to discover the real potentialities or anticipations that lie in temporal things ready to be unfolded. In naive experience we see only the retrocipatory, in theory we also find anticipations. And this is done by our imagination. We actualize and make real temporal reality by perfecting it, by opening up the anticipatory aspects and realizing them historically. We open up the anticipatory aspects by imagining the figure within temporal reality. When we find the figure, we are not inventing or constructing the modal relations we investigate, but we are dis-covering them. And when we apply the figure, and make it actual in an action, we are positivizing it. Positivizing is related to Baader’s idea of active knowledge, or erkennen. Susini compares erkennen to Claudel's idea of ‘connaisance’ or ‘co-naissance.’ It is a giving birth to something, a constructive knowledge. But this constructive knowledge should not be confused with constructivism in today’s sense of the word. For Baader, erkennen is not a matter of inventing new principles, but of discovering them. It is a finding [finden], and not an absolutely original discovery [erfinden]. The knowledge that we find derives from a source that ‘dominates’ and founds this knowledge. [151] Faivre comments on how the goal of this intentional relation is not to create original images, but to find the correspondences between our inner world and the outer reality.
This incarnational emphasis is also found in Dooyeweerd, who rejected Brentano’s view of intentionality as a purely spiritual matter divorced from our body. Dooyeweerd thus agrees with the theosophical tradition in not fleeing into an empty spirituality that is separated from temporal life, but in seeking the incarnational structure within temporal life. But Dooyeweerd applies thisto our present life only (as supratemporal beings with a temporal body); what will happen in the next life is hidden to us (NC II, 561, WdW II, 493). It is not only individuality structures in the external world that need to be made real. In creation, we transform nature and so reveal and transform ourselves. Baader says that each self-revelation of Spirit only occurs through a transformation of nature (Werke 4, 367; Sauer 37). In the highest sense, we, as the image of God, also need to be made real. For Baader, imagination in the highest sense is “man’s entering into (elevation) into the image (imago) of God”[152]. Just as the temporal world is made real by entering into our productive imagination, so we are made real by fully entering into God’s image of us. Baader also says that the law needs to be fulfilled in the finite being. Man has the power to fulfill the laws for creatures (Elementarbegriffe, 553). This response needs the cooperation of the finite being (Zeit 32, 33). Man must organize and re-create the world; the laws are in the world but must be actualized. This is done by our perception (vernehmen, wahrnehmen) of the invisible laws that govern the earthly world. Nature is a book from which we decipher the divine characters or hieroglyphs in order to perceive the voice of God (Werke XI, 29, 149). F. Van Riessen’s mistaken view of technical forming Dooyeweerd’s idea of historical forming must also be distinguished from the idea of technique introduced by Hendrik van Riessen and his student Egbert Schuurman [153]. Dooyeweerd disagreed with van Riessen's view of technique and technology, as is shown by a 1961 letter from van Riessen to Dooyeweerd [154]. Dooyeweerd had reviewed a draft article by van Riessen. Dooyeweerd criticized van Riessen’s views regarding technology, but van Riessen rejected Dooyeweerd's criticism, and published his article anyway [155]. More research is required for this important issue. In particular, it would be important to obtain a copy of van Riessen’s draft article with Dooyeweerd’s suggested corrections on it. But let us look at some of the differences between van Riessen and Dooyeweerd: 1. For Dooyeweerd, technology is applied natural science. Van Riessen responds in his letter that there is a technology, and that technology is applied. 2. It is evident that Dooyeweerd replaced van Riessen’s references to ‘facts’ with the word ‘events.’ Van Riessen says,
There are serious disagreements evident here that need to be investigated further. Dooyeweerd seems to have questioned van Riessen’s very conception of the nature of facts. I suggest it has to do with van Riessen’s rejection of Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures, his consequent rejection of the idea of enkapsis, and his view of aspects as properties of things. 3. In proposing the technical as an aspect, van Riessen (and Schuurman) seem to have incorrectly identified the historical aspect with technical acts (which function in all aspects). For Dooyeweerd, the historical aspect is different from events that participate in all the aspects. We can see in the 1961 letter that Dooyeweerd’s view is that technique is an event (not an aspect, and not a fact). Acts and events function in all aspects. Dooyeweerd says that technical industry is an act:
And on the same page
4. Actually, for Dooyeweerd, technology involves a series of acts: a) There is the act of productive fantasy. Although van Riessen refers to productive fantasy (Struktuur, 126), he does not use it in Dooyeweerd's sense, which involves Dooyeweerd's view of intentionality and enkapsis. Since van Riessen rejected both individuality structures and enkapsis, and had only an outwardly-directed view of intentionality (as in phenomenology), he cannot share Dooyeweerd's ideas. For Dooyeweerd, the fantasy is only productive when the productive fantasy becomes enkaptically interwoven with another individuality structure. b) There are three more acts. NC III, 148 (WdW III, 121) lists them (I summarize):
5. Dooyeweerd sees the kernel moment of the historical sphere as free formative power. It is true that Dooyeweerd also uses the word ‘techne’ to refer to the positivized form of such formative control (NC II, 257; WdW II, 189). But there is a distinction. We can exercise technical formative control which nevertheless does not have historical force:
The formation of history is therefore different from an individual discovery or invention. Furthermore, as discussed below, for Dooyeweerd, technique is an act, not a modal aspect. 6. Technique is certainly not just finding new uses for a statically existing thing. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that things are dynamic.
7. Dooyeweerd also warns about excessive expansion of technical. activity.
and
8. A review of van Riessen's article shows other differences that need to be explored, such as: (1) van Riessen’s distinction between science as unfolding of the order of creation laws, and technique as the unfolding of creation according to its subject-side (2) his rejection of technique as a division of labour between God and man (for Dooyeweerd, man assists God in recovering sparks of God's goodness). (3) his distinction between technical things and facts (4) his view of science as the way of abstraction, always seeking a more universal formulation of the problem and a more universal application of the solution this is of course in contrast to Dooyeweerd's Gegenstand-relation (5) his corresponding view of individuation (6) his view of the three characteristics of all things-uniqueness, coherence and mutability (7) his view of technique as overcoming a resistance in the natural aspects. That is not Dooyeweerd's view of resistance, which is related to the Gegenstand-relation and the splitting apart of reality, (8) his view of laws for technical things or facts (as opposed to Dooyeweerd's view of law as one side of an individuality structure). In his recent history of the reformational movement, Stellingwerff has sharply criticized both van Riessen and Schuurman for their “stagnated” philosophy.” Stellingwerff correctly says that van Riessen spoke of entities and not aspects, and that he saw reality as only individual, and the law as universal. Stellingwerff says that van Riessen had too little historical and philosophical depth, he did not distinguish his views enough from current philosophy, and he improperly sought a compromise between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven–he had “the voice of Dooyeweerd, but the spirit of Vollenhoven” (Stellingwerff 133, 136-138, 158).
Go to Part 5: Imagination and Aesthetics Endnotes
[147] i.e. capable of being formed. It is interesting that Baader refers to plastic (Plastik) as an intermidiary between the spiritual imagination and that which is formed. Imagination is the creative and plastic faculty of forming images. See Faivre, Phil. de la nature, 99 and 105, citing Werke IX, 181, X, 11, XII, 483. More research is need on the relation between Dooyeweerd’s references to the plastic dimension of our experience and our imagination. There is no doubt, however, that the plastic dimension is culturally formed as a result of our use of our imagination. [148] Vollenhoven denied that there was a historical modality (See ‘Dialectic’). So did C.T. McIntyre: “Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of History,” in: C.T. McIntire (ed.), The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985) [‘Legacy’] [149] This would seem to have a bearing on McIntire's desire to see history as trans-modal. [150]As I have pointed out, this mistake occurs in the present Glossary to the Encyclopedia. [151]Weltalter 261. See Eugène Susini: Franz von Baader et le romantisme mystique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942), I, 432 [‘Susini’]. [152]“…die Sicheinführung (Erhebung) des Menschen in das Bild (imago) Gottes (Werke 13, 217) [153] Egbert Schuurman’s dissertation was entitled Techniek en Toekomst. Confrontatie met wijsgerige beschouwingen (dissertatie, 1972) [Technique and the Future: Confrontation between philosophical concerns] [154]Letter dated 6-3-1961 from Hendrik van Riessen to Herman Dooyeweerd (Dooyeweerd Archives, Lade I, 2). [155] Hendrik van Riessen, “De Structuur der Techniek,” Philosophia Reformata 26 (1961) 114-130 [‘Struktuur’]. Go to Part 5: Imagination and Aesthetics Revised Jul 13/06 |
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