Imagination, Image of God and
Wisdom of God:
Part 3: Perception
"We ever must believe a lie/When we see with, not through, the eye." 
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III. Imagination and Perception
A. Perception in Naïve experience
1. Naïve (pre-theoretical) experience versus theoretical experience
Dooyeweerd distinguishes between our naïve or pre-theoretical experience, and our theoretical experience. If we do not acknowledge the supratemporal selfhood, the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical experience becomes blurred (See ‘Gegenstandsrelatie’).
In our naïve experience, the horizon of individuality structures plays the dominant role (WdW II, 488; NC II, 557). Naïve experience grasps reality in its plastic structure (NC III, 36; WdW III, 15) . The individuality structure of which we become aware expresses itself in the sensory image without being itself of a sensory character . This determines the things and events experienced in the naive attitude. Note that this does not mean that naive experience is of the individual thing and that theory investigates the universal properties.
2. Naïve experience is not the same as a copy theory of reality
Dooyeweerd says that naïve experience is not the same as naïve realism. Naïve realism is a “copy theory of reality” (NC I, 43;Cf WdW III, 14, 'Abbildtheorie'). What does he mean by this? And how does his own view of naïve (or pre-theoretical) experience differ from this copy theory?
Dooyeweerd says that in the copy theory of reality, the real datum of naive experience is reduced to a theoretical abstraction of objective sense-impressions (NC III, 22; not in WdW). This real datum that is reduced is the givenness of our experience in all modal aspects . The datum is given, and not constructed by us. Nor is this givenness something that is abstracted by us from the continuity of all the aspects of our experience in time. And Dooyeweerd says that that is what the copy theory does: it reduces our full experience to an abstraction of the sensory aspect from the full continuity of our experience. Thus, a copy theory of reality is not the same as naïve experience, but rather a theory about experience. True naive experience comes before all theories.
As an example of the copy theory, Dooyeweerd points to Windelband, who assumed that the representing mind is placed in a surrounding world, and that the world must in some way repeat itself in this mind (NC III, 35; WdW III, 15). As we shall see, Dooyeweerd has his own Abbild-relation or copy relation in imagination, but it is distinguished from the copy theory of perception.
3. Perception is not of objects completely external to us
Dooyeweerd says that he rejects a view of images, if by image is meant a reproduction of the external world apart from us.
So one of Dooyeweerd’s objections to the copy theory is that it assumes it is copying an external world that is separate from man. He says that there is no such thing as a natural reality in itself. As already discussed, for Dooyeweerd, the temporal world has no existence in itself, but only in man. Any view of perception that regards the world as totally independent is therefore to be rejected.
According to the copy theory (Abbildtheorie), which Dooyeweerd rejects, our perception furnishes us with an exact image of an external object in reality; perceiving is like taking a photo of something external to us.
Dooyeweerd says that we are actively involved in our perception ofthe world. Our imagination plays a role in perception. And he refers to our sensory imagination as “productive.” We will come back to what he means by ‘productive.’ For the moment, it is sufficient to note that for Dooyeweerd, perception is not of things that are totally external to us. Rather, temporal reality has its existence and reality only in man:
4. Rejection of phenomenology
Since perception is not to be understood as perception of objects that are external to us, we must also distinguish Dooyeweerd’s ideas of perception from those of phenomenology, which seeks to perceive and understand the object external to us. Dooyeweerd says that phenomenology is one of the most dangerous philosophies for Christians (WdW II, 422; NC II, 487).
Some of the ways that Dooyeweerd's philosophy is different from phenomenology are:
a) The view of things and events as ‘phenomena’ reflects a view that these things and events exist apart from us–phenomenology seeks the eidos as a “Sache an sich.” But once we realize the self-insufficiency of all meaning, we realize that the phenomenological attitude is contrary to the truth (WdW II, 421-424; NC II, 485-89). For temporal things do not exist except in their supratemporal root. The idea of the supratemporal root is not found in Husserl. It is a theosophical idea.
b) Dooyeweerd does not accept phenomenology's view of consciousness. He says that phenomenology is still based on an abstraction. It lacks true self-consciousness. In seeking a “pure essence”, the “phenomenological reduction” lacks a radical transcendental self-reflection (WdW II, 424; NC II, 489). For Dooyeweerd, true self-consciousness is related to our supratemporal selfhood.
c) Dooyeweerd's use of the word ‘intentional’ must also be distinguished from Husserl's idea of intentionality. Dooyeweerd does not mean it in Husserl’s sense of “directed towards the object,” because Dooyeweerd does not share the same view of objects. For Dooyeweerd, there is no mere phenomenon for which we must find the essence. If we try to search for the essence of a thing, the aspects are torn apart into noumenon and phenomenon (WdW I, 68).
d) Dooyeweerd's use of the term ‘aspect’ must also not be understood in terms of phenomenology’s perspectivalism, which claims that we view a reality that exists apart from us from different angles or perspectives. Dooyeweerd's perspectivalism is not one of different angles, but of different levels or dimensions of an experiential horizon . And although Dooyeweerd does speak of aspects as modes of intuition (‘schouwingswijzen’), that is different from perceptual perspectives in phenomenology’s sense .
e) Dooyeweerd has a different view of “actuality.” The “actuality” referred to by phenomenology is the kernel of each subject function (WdW I, 78; NC I, 101). This is something that needs to be explored further, and is outside the scope of this article. I believe it has to do with Dooyeweerd’s view that the kernel of each function is central and supratemporal (See ‘EvQu’ and my article ‘Enkapsis’).
f) Dooyeweerd's use of the word ‘epoché’ to explain the theoretical attitude of thought is carefully distinguished from Husserl's usage. He does not use ‘epoché’ in the sense of the “bracketing” of our assumptions, but in the sense of a “refraining” from the coherence of cosmic time, an abstraction from full temporal reality .
5. Rejection of a functional analysis of perception
A functionalist analysis of perception is one that regards perception as a function between two independent entities. But in its view of entities, functionalism denies the individuality structures of our temporal experience, and views them as substances. Functionalism views an individuality structure as a
Dooyeweerd rejects a functional analysis of perception, because it distorts our naïve experience. This distortion is caused because functionalism bypasses the problem of a thing-structure. By abstract simplification, functionalism theoretically demolishes what is given in the pre-theoretical experiential attitude (NC III, 106; WdW III, 73). So functionalism does not have a proper view of things as individuality structures.
Dooyeweerd does say that these individuality structures have functions. But these functions are within the modal aspects. Our subjective act of perception also functions within the modal aspects. Dooyeweerd thus distinguishes between modal aspects and functions. We cannot regard the psychical aspect as itself a function. Our acts function within the psychical aspect, and that aspect is distinct from the function:
Similarly, the individuality structure of what is perceived functions in the psychical aspect. Objective perceptual images are formed that have an implicit object-structure within the aspect. We will analyze this in our discussion of the subject-object relation within the modal aspects, which is very different from a functional relation between independent entities. For now, the point to understand is that to analyze these object-structures in an aspect, we need to analyze the individuality structure that functions in that aspect:
So Dooyeweerd’s view of perception can only be understood in terms of individuality structures. Even to regard perception as a function of the eye is to understand the eye in terms of substance. This is confirmed when Dooyeweerd refers to the image on the retina as a sensory image on another sensory image. The retina of our eye, on which a sensory image is formed, is itself an individual objective perceptual image! (see below).
In contrast to a functionalistic view of an independent subject viewing an independent object by a psychical function, Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures and of the subject-object relation in the act of perception gives a much more interdependent relation of perception. There is not a dualism between subject and object, but a reciprocal back and forth relation of images in the subject-object relation. This will become clear as we continue, but it is a view of perception that is very different from the current understanding in reformational philosophy . Dooyeweerd specifically says that in our naïve experience (which includes our perception), there is no dualism between knower and known:
This is all very different from the “common sense” views of philosophers like John Searle. Searle seeks to defend the following propositions:
All of these propositions conflict with Dooyeweerd’s philosophy and view of perception. The strangeness of Dooyeweerd’s ideas of perception in relation to these common-sense views is why Dooyeweerd did not accept the suggestion that he translate his idea of naïve experience into English as ‘common sense’ . And those philosophers who have made comparisons of Dooyeweerd to common-sense philosophers like Thomas Reid (1710-1796) have not understood what Dooyeweerd means by the “givenness” of the data of naïve experience in all the modal aspects, nor his view of individuality structures and the subject-object relation, nor his underlying view of cosmic time. Dooyeweerd was aware of Reid, but criticizes his work for not understanding our sense of awareness of time, in what William James calls the “specious present.” 
Nor is naïve experience the same as our routine experience (NC III, 145; WdW III, 118). Dooyeweerd says that the routine view of modern daily life is not naive experience, because modern daily life is content with names. What does he mean by this? Our opened naive experience certainly includes a linguistic aspect. But if we stop at names, we have not experienced reality in its full inter-relatedness. And in our modern routine, by applying labels to what we experience, we miss fully experiencing our reality. 
Baader also specifically rejects the views of common sense philosophy (Philosophische Schriften II, 178).
6. Perception is much more than sense impressions
Dooyeweerd rejects the empiricistic view that our perception is based on sensory impressions, and he rejects the naïve realist view of sensation (NC III, 22; not in WdW).
For Dooyeweerd, our perception is based on all the aspects; the sensory-psychical aspect of experience has no experiential sense apart from the inter-modal coherence of meaning (NC II, 477; Cf. WdW II, 413). Empiricism tries to reduce perception to only one aspect:
The copy theory of perception gives too much weight to our sensory impressions. Dooyeweerd says that the sensory plays very little role in naïve experience. Sensory perception is not preponderant:
What does it mean that our naïve experience is an experience of all aspects? In naive experience, we certainly experience objective sensory qualities. But we experience these objective qualities in the concrete context of our plastic horizon. We don’t identify individuality structures with our subjective sensory impressions (NC III, 38). For example, we immediately notice that the tree is qualified by the biotic aspect. The objective sensory total image of a tree is qualified by the biotic aspect (NC III, 104; WdW III, 72). The tree expresses itself within the psychical object side of reality in the sensorily perceptible image familiar to us:
Similarly, our perceptual image of an animal qualified by leading psychical function. We could not know this merely on the empiricist view of sense impressions.
Dooyeweerd specifically rejects the empiricistic distinction between primary and secondary qualities. He discusses how modern science relies on the distinction to show that secondary qualities (sensory qualities such as colours, tones, temperatures, pressures, etc.) are merely subjective, and that the primary qualities are the supposed objective states of affairs investigated by science. Dooyeweerd points out that this distinction could not hold even within modern science:
This is because modern science restricted itself to a mathematical formulation of the physical functions. But Dooyeweerd says that these abstract mathematical formulae cannot exhaust the objective contents of human experience, and so the distinction between primary and secondary qualities cannot account for our experience. Rather, the so-called secondary qualities are object functions within the individuality structure itself, in relation to possible subjective functions which the things do not possess (NC I, 42; not in WdW).
His rejection of the idea of a thing in itself [Ding an sich] is related to the view of man as the temporal root:
Well, what about the theory of perception based on our reception of light waves? Dooyeweerd also rejects that commonly held view.
Dooyeweerd’s point here is that light waves are not just an aspect of our experience. They are events, and like all events, they function in all aspects. In order for these light waves to affect us biotically, these light waves must also function in the biotical aspect:
Baader also rejects an empiricist view of perception. He says that objects are not to be seen as the source of sensory impressions working upon a separate thinker (Weltalter 48, 364). Our sensations are not the source and cause of our thinking function (Werke V, 53).
7. Perception is not explained merely by inner and outer
We have already seen that Dooyeweerd views acts as inner, and actions as acts that have been realized in what is external to us. Our imagination is therefore related to our inner-ness.
But this inner and outer distinction does not help to explain perception. He says that psychology commonly distinguishes between sensory perception of the “outer world” dependent on “observation in space,” and our “inner” subjective experience of feelings, which do not give us a spatial picture of objective phenomena (NC II, 371; WdW II, 307). But Dooyeweerd rejects this distinction. The words ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ have a spatial meaning and are confusing if you try to contrast spatial perception with the use of the word ‘inner.’ For both our ‘inner’ and our ‘outer’ world have a sensory aspect. Dooyeweerd contrasts the sensory aspect of the imagination with the sensory perception of the objectively perceptible ‘outer world’ (NC II, 372; WdW II, 308).
Our sensory perception of space is not just a passive impression of something external to us. There is also an “inner” perception of space in which we are active:
So both our ‘inner’ and our ‘outer’ world also have a spatial aspect. Without the subjective feeling of extension we could not perceive any objective sensory image of space.
Baader says the same–all spatial perceptions are also within me (as represented). Therefore the subject is not just inner, and the object is not jut outer (Philosophische Schriften I, 43).
Dooyeweerd says that the terms ‘outer world’ and ‘inner sense’ [Sinn] cannot teach us anything with regard to a cosmological analysis of the psychical subject-object relation (NC II, 372; WdW II, 308). The issue should really be regarded as follows:
There is therefore a sensory image in which aspects are objectified (in the subject-object relation), and a subjective sensory perception related to those objectified aspects in the objective image. To understand this, we need to look at (a) Dooyeweerd’s idea of the subject-object relation, (b) the objectified sensory image, and (c) the subjective sensory perception. This last item–subjective sensory perception–exists in both a restricted and an opened form.
B. The Subject-Object relation
For Dooyeweerd, what is important in naïve experience is the subject-object relation. This relation provides the basis for the integral character of naïve experience. For our naïve concept formation is directed towards things and concrete events (NC I, 41-42; added to WdW). And the subject-object relation maintains our experience of the identity of a thing,even though that thing itself may undergo change (NC III, 3; WdW III, 1).
For Dooyeweerd, the subject-object relation occurs
within the modal aspects. The entire subject-object relation
depends on Dooyeweerd’s view that the aspects are given in a temporal
order of before and after. We objectify an earlier modality within a
later modality. Objective functions and qualities are unreflectingly
ascribed to things and natural events in modal aspects where they cannot
appear as subjects (NC I, 42; added to WdW).
Although the subject-object relation cannot be explained by universals, the individuality of the modal object is “indifferent” to the subjects that it is related to:
The only exceptions to this indifference are when (a) the object is the result of the formative activity of an individual subject or (b) when the individual subject has acquired the exclusive use of the object (NC II, 371; added to WdW).
To illustrate the subject-object relation, Dooyeweerd chooses the example of the subject-object relation within the modal aspect of feeling, which manifests itself in our sensory perception (NC II, 371; WdW II, 307). This example is helpful, since it directly relates to Dooyeweerd’s view of imagination. We will therefore look at this example in detail, to examine the subject-object relation as it occurs in our act of perception.
C. The Objective Sensory Image
Our act of perception relies on an objectification within the psychical aspect. The earlier aspects of number, space, movement, energy and organic life are objectified in the psychical modality:
This does not mean that original meaning of number, space, movement, energy and organic life are themselves sensory perceptible. But there are objective analogies of them that refer back to these original modal functions (NC II, 373 fn4; added to WdW).
This objective image is what Dooyeweerd calls the original image–the oer-beeld, translated as Urbild . This Urbild is the objective sensory image that is formed in the psychical aspect. This objective sensory image refers back to the actual pre-psychical subject functions that have been objectified in it (NC II, 375; WdW II, 311).
One of the pre-psychical subject functions that is objectified in the psychical aspect is the spatial aspect:
A sensory three-dimensional space is required for us to perceive images of motion (the aspect that succeeds the spatial aspect in the order of time):
There are two issues that complicate our understanding of the objective sensory image. The first is that this original image, or Urbild, may contain not only previous subject functions of an individuality structure, but it may also include prior subject-object relations that have been objectified. Dooyeweerd gives the example of perceiving a mother bird feeding her young. The objective sensory image includes the biotic subject-object relation of such feeding (NC II, 374; WdW II, 311).
The second complication is that the individuality structure that we are perceiving itself may contain other representations. For example, there may be drawings or designs on a piece of paper or cloth that we are perceiving. In that case, the original objective perceptual image of these designs must be sharply distinguished from its representation [afbeelding] (NC II, 375; WdW II, 312). If these designs are aesthetically qualified, then there is an enkaptic relationship of the representation within the objective image of the paper or cloth (see discussion of aesthetics below).
D. The subjective sensory image
The subjective sensory image is the correlate of the objective perceptual image of the Urbild. But the subjective sensory image exists both in a restricted form, which is a copy of the Urbild, and in an opened form, in which we perceive the anticipatory aspects in which the individuality structure that we are viewing may potentially function.
1. The Restrictive Sensory Image
a) Shared with animals
Our subjective sensory imagination forms a subjective sensory image in the psychical aspect. This is what Dooyeweerd also calls the restrictive sensory image.
The sensory function of imagination in this restrictive sense is also to be found in the psychical life of the higher organized animals (NC III, 115; added to WdW). Animals can have these sensory images or objectifications because they are temporal individuality structures qualified by the psychical mode. They therefore have a subject function in the psychical aspect. But animals cannot intentionally “act” in Dooyeweerd's sense, since they have no supratemporal center. They are ex-statically absorbed in time (NC II, 479-80; WdW II, 414-15). And our conscious experience of the psychical aspect is different from what animals experience:
Animals lack the inner human acts of experience; humans relate to the ego as the transcendent centre of human existence (NC II, 114; added to WdW).
This last citation is in the context of making sensory impressions our own (e.g. sweetness), something that we have already discussed in the context of the supratemporal selfhood.
The three directions of our acts–knowing, imagining and willing–are all directed temporally. And they all have a relation to this subjective sensory image. Dooyeweerd refers to this as the sensory [outer] correlation to all three directions of our acts. There is a sensory knowing, a sensory representation and a sensory striving and desiring [zinnelijk kennen, zinnelijk verbeelden and zinnelijk streven en begeren] (Grenzen, 77). He repeats this elsewhere, and again indicates that this is something that we share with animals. The three orientations of our act life
In itself, this objectification in a sensory image is not an act, because even animals form sensory images. And acts are necessarily related to a selfhood, which animals do not have: (Grenzen, 77).
This restricted sensory objectification is not at an act, but is only implicit:
Baader also refers to a kind of perception that we share with animals. Baader calls it ‘purely outer seeing.’ Animals do not share with us the inner seeing related to our central being (Zeit 56) . He contrasts outer seeing with inner seeing, which seeks the Totality of the aspects, which he calls “elements and factors” (Werke 4,98ff).
For a further discussion of Dooyeweerd’s view of animals, see Appendix B.
b) Restrictive sensory image as Abbild
Dooyeweerd speaks of this sensory image as a sensory representation (NC II, 375; WdW II, 312). This sensory image, as a representation, is a copy or Abbild. The restricted sensory image is “a merely natural “Abbild-relation” (such as is implied in the inverted image of a thing on the retina of the eye)” (NC III, 114; WdW II, 82). We optically perceive this inverted image:
The image that we optically perceive is different from the Urbild, the original objective perceptual image. So how does Dooyeweerd’s view of perception differ from that of the copy theory that he rejects? First, the original image or Urbild is not something that exists as substance independently of us, but is the objectification in the psychical aspect of an individuality structure functioning in all modal aspects. Therefore the Urbild, of which the subjective representation is a copy, is itself more than just the psychical aspect. It is a result of the subject-object relation in the aspects, something that occurs implicitly.
Second, the sensory copy, the Abbild of the Urbild, can be opened up. It is a dynamic image, and not a static “snapshot” of something existing “out there.”
Dooyeweerd says that the Urbild exists before the subjective copy or Abbild. Therefore the Urbild itself cannot be a representation of an image. Natural reality is not depicted in the sensory impressions (NC II, 581; WdW II, 516). The Urbild is the original image. The Abbild is its copy.
Both of these quotations are remarkable in pointing out that the optic copy on our retina is itself an image within another individual objective perceptual image. Our retina is itself an individual objective perceptual image! We have images within images, mirrors within mirrors. The other thing to notice is that a representation is not “originally” objective. A representation is a copy of that which is objective (in Dooyeweerd’s sense of objectification within the subject-object relation).
The restricted sensory image is a projected image of the Urbild. The optic objective picture of space on the retina is dependent on the impressions made by light. It is “a projective and limited spatial picture. Touch and movement are needed to make this image three dimensional” (NC II, 373; WdW II, 309). Dooyeweerd concludes from this that our sensory perception of space does not consist of merely passive impressions, as the copy theory claims.
c) Restrictive sensory image is only retrocipatory
This restrictive sensory image is of individuality structures in their natural, non-normative functioning in the aspects:
When Dooyeweerd speaks of the restrictive sensory image as being merely natural, he is referring to the natural aspects of our experience, with their subject-object relations, as opposed to the normative (logical and post-logical aspects). The normative aspects are found in the opened sensory image (see below).
Since this restricted image refers only to the natural aspects, it refers by retrocipation to the earlier aspects, and to subject-object relations in those aspects:
The restricted sensory image as such does not include even the logical aspect. In the modal sensory impression as such there is no logical identity (NC II, 450; WdW II, 381).
The post-psychical subject-functions and subject-object relations cannot be objectified in an objective sensory perceptual image (NC II, 376; WdW II, 310). In other words, we cannot form a perceptual image of the normative aspects.
2. The Opened Sensory Image
The opening process opens up the aspects of our experience, disclosing the anticipatory moments in the aspects. Sometimes Dooyeweerd refers to the opening process as an ‘unveiling.’ In other places he speaks of an ‘unfolding’ or a ‘disclosing.’ This implies that the full experience already exists in an enclosed or enfolded state.
It will be recalled that Dooyeweerd says that in our acts, under the leadership of normative points of view, we direct our self intentionally to states of affairs either in reality or in the world of our imagination. One such normative leading is when the sensory image is objectified in the logical aspect. Representations are required in order to logically compare one sensory image to another. This is the objectification of the psychical in the logical. The (objective) sensory image is in turn objectified by the logical aspect. Before we can make logical distinctions, there must be a sensory image. 
In the WdW, Dooyeweerd said that only retrocipations are expressed in the sensory object-function of the rosebush. But he corrects this view, acknowledging that what he said before comes into conflict with sphere universality. Dooyeweerd’s corrected view is that there must therefore be potential anticipations in the restrictive sensory image that can be disclosed. Until they are opened, these anticipations are merely potential. For example, there is an anticipation of the logical aspect that can be opened up in our concept formation.
But this naive concept formation, although it opens up the logical aspect in the sensory image, is entirely bound to the sensory image. It differs from our theoretical concepts formation (see below).
So the sensory image includes the logical aspect as an anticipation, but this is realized only after our naïve experience has been opened up. This is because our opened experience goes beyond the restricted sensory image, which we share with animals. Animals don’t experience the logical aspect. Dooyeweerd says that the animal mode of awareness of things cannot be called experience since it lacks any relation to a selfhood (NC III, 58; WdW III, 38). Animals lack the inner human acts of experience that are necessarily related to the ego as the transcendent centre of human existence. They lack subject-functions within the logical and post-logical modal law spheres. Within these spheres, animals can have only object functions (NC II, 114; added to WdW).
Human sensory perception differs from animal perception in that it includes post-psychical anticipations like the logical. It also includes the later normative anticipations, such as the cultural, linguistic (symbolic), juridical and aesthetic anticipations (Encyclopedia, 190). But these anticipations are not accessible in the restrictive sensory image, but only in the opened image:
An example of the unfolding process is given by our perception of a tree’s internal unfolding process (NC III, 59; WdW III, 40). The tree does not exist totally separate from us, but exists “for us”; it therefore has object functions in the post-biotic modalities. In the psychic modality, it is a sensorily perceptible image. In the logical modality, the object of a possible concept; in the historical modality, the object of possible culture; in the linguistic modality, the object of symbolical signification. In the social modality, it has a social object function (parks); in the economic modality, it is the object of economic valuation; in the aesthetic modality, it is the object of aesthetic appreciation; in the juridical modality, it is legal object; in the ethical modality, it is the object of our love or hate; in the faith modality, it is the object of our belief-that it has been created by God, or merely a product of nature, or inhabited by a demon or good spirit.
See the discussion of the opening process in Part IV, “Imagination and the historical opening process.”
E. Dreams, Phantasms, Hallucinations
As part of an act of knowing, a true perception is distinguished from a false perception. The subjective sensory image must correspond with the objective image. If it does not correspond, then it is a false perception, like a hallucination, fantasy or dream (NC II, 374-75; WdW II, 312). For example, Dooyeweerd says that we may mistake a tree for a man (See “Advies’). This is similar to the usual problem posed by Hindu advaitic thought, of mistaking a rope for a snake.
Furthermore, the dream image and hallucination lack a sense of identity on the part of the subject (NC II, 375; WdW II, 312;). The subject experiencing the dream or hallucination does not experience the image as his “own.” 
F. The Unconscious
We should also discuss the relation of imagination to our unconscious. In productive imagination, we consciously will the formation of imaginative images. But sometimes, images erupt in visions from our unconscious, in an event that we have not willed.
Dooyeweerd refers to our unconscious and to depth psychology. He says that there are two layers of the act-life, as shown by depth psychology (Freud and his school). There is an unconscious underlayer and a conscious layer above [bovenlaag]. But the unconscious substratum of the act life is hierarchically subordinated to the conscious superstratum. If that structure is broken up, as in schizophrenia, there are symptoms of a pathological split.
Dooyeweerd says that the unconscious functions in all aspects. It is that part of temporal reality that is still undisclosed, unopened. He gives examples of the workings of the unconscious: remembering a name, past impressions and post-hypnotic suggestion. In normal circumstances our unconscious is subordinated to consciousness; there is a harmonic working together of the different modal functions and a central relation to the I-ness. But in some cases the unconscious breaks through into consciousness (Grenzen, 83). These are all ideas that are very similar to Jung's view of the unconscious.
Let us look at his example of an unconscious process in remembering a name. He says that consciousness is not limited to the psychical and the later aspects:
To say that the conscious and the unconscious are two modes of revelation of one and the same reality suggests that “cosmic consciousness” is not a different level of reality that we have to attain; our consciousness is a given [gegeven] that we then analyze (WdW II, 405; Cf. NC II, 472). We just have to see reality differently. We have already looked at Baader’s reference to Eckhart’s views in that regard.
Elsewhere Dooyeweerd says that the personality ideal of the humanistic Nature/Freedom Ground-motive “received a death blow” from the findings of depth psychology (NC I, 214; added to WdW).
In another passage he refers to the "subconscious" in relation to the unopened psychical aspect:
This is a more restricted view of the unconscious than what he says in Grenzen. Perhaps this is why he calls it the sub-conscious. In relating it to the individual animal structure, this seems more like what Jung calls the ‘personal unconscious.’
Dooyeweerd gives a more collective view of the unconscious in respect to cognition:
But even that kind of collective knowledge was conscious at one time. The deeper meaning of unconscious is that which has yet to be unfolded in time.
In another passage, it is evident that the unconscious is not just repressed personal memories, but that it can include the post-psychical aspects. He says that the discovery of the so-called unconscious dealt another blow to the traditional dichotomistic conception of human existence:
If that is so, then the unconscious also includes anticipations
of aspects of experience that have not yet been opened.
From that quotation, it appears that Dooyeweerd is prepared to see the brain as the center of motor and sensory awareness, but not of an opened sensory awareness.
Dooyeweerd seems to have an idea corresponding to Jung's Idea of individuation. We become more and more individual as we bring more of the unconscious to consciousness. We experience our individuality in the various structures of temporal societal relationships. We become ever more individual:
The original Dutch is even stronger:
The development of our consciousness is a rediscovery “in abysmal depths” of our true selfhood and of God, brought about by the working of God's Spirit. Dooyeweerd says,
Baader also had an idea of the unconscious (and even of the shadow) long before Jung. Baader refers to the shadow and the unconscious in the same passage.
Baader says that the supernaturalists see the coherence between Nature and spirit (Geist) as contingent. They want to separate the will from its unconscious drives (Begründung, 34). Baader is using ‘spirit’ here in the sense of the undifferentiated supratemporal center. Spirit is conscious and nature is unconscious. Thus, the unconscious is in that part of temporal reality that remains undisclosed. It is temporal nature that is still separated from the Center.
In a very interesting commentary, Sauer says that for Baader, the movement from the self to the theoretical Gegenstand breaks the homogeneous but unconscious unity in which the subject finds himself; it is an emancipation from the Quasi-Totality of the factical, unquestioned and unconscious; instead, the Gegenstand is ordered in a conceptual world [Begriffswelt]. Separated nature is mute and dark [stumm und finster] and lacks fulfillment and grounding (Zeit p. 40 ft 21). Sauer also emphasizes that in making the Gegenstand, we are becoming more conscious of the Other, the Not-I. But this other is our other. 
Now this is somewhat similar to what Dooyeweerd says
about naive experience being unconscious as to the aspects in their
differentiation, and about theoretical thought explicitly distinguishing
the modal aspects. We become more aware of what is not ourselves, making
own.” And this is a deepening of our naïve experience.
Dooyeweerd says that our philosophy can no longer fall back [terugvallen]
into the bare [blooten] naive attitude (WdW I, 60).
That would be a return to naive experience without deepening.
G. Productive Imagination
Because the world does not exist apart from man, our perception is not of something that is totally external. Perception involves our sensory imagination, which is “productive” in its perception of the world. Dooyeweerd says that sensory imagination “really exhibits a productive objectifying function” (NC III, 115; WdW III, 84). What does he mean?
Some theosophical theories are magical in the sense that they believe that we can actually manifest external things by imagining them. A favourite example is to point to Jacob’s effect on the sheep that he tended. The white sheep, by looking at the coloured bark that Jacob placed before their eyes, were able to conceive speckled and spotted lambs (Gen. 30:31-42). People like Paracelsus put forward this magical view (Faivre, 102). Other theosophists regarded imagination as the Archimedean Point. Ritter wrote to Novalis’ brother: “The point claimed by Archimedes has been found. We will make the Earth really move” (Faivre, 116).
But I don’t believe that productive imagination for Dooyeweerd includes the restrictive image, since that would imply that all of temporal reality is a product of our formative imagination . I believe that the statement that sensory imagination “really exhibits a productive objectifying function” must be interpreted in the sense of bringing to reality those aspects that had previously been closed. It is the opening up of the restrictive sensory image. And in doing that, we are actualizing what was merely potential.
If productive imagination applied to the restrictive sensory image, then animals would have productive imagination, too, and that does not seem to be Dooyeweerd’s view, since he says that the objective sensory image is not due to an act, but occurs implicitly.
We can obtain some help by looking at Baader’s view of perception. We have already referred to Baader’s idea that the temporal world is a prism that reflects back the divine ray, but in a reengendered way. The passage by Faivre contains views on perception that are relevant to our discussion. It continues:
Faivre discusses Baader’s view of perception, particularly as these are set out in Baader’s article Towards a Theory of the Image . Faivre says that Baader was interested in theories of light and optics. For Baader,
Baader rejects any view of knowledge as a reproduction of things in themselves (Dingen an sich). So Baader, too, rejects ideas of perception of things existing independently of us as things in themselves. To hold to such a Reproduktionstheorie would be to remain bound to the standpoint of our outer senses (der äußeren Sinne) (Sauer, 39). Baader’s idea of the outer senses corresponds to Dooyeweerd’s idea of the restricted sensory image, which has not been opened up for its anticipatory and especially its normative aspects.
For Baader, true knowledge involves fixing something in an image, and giving form . Both the producer of the image and that which is produced play both an active and a passive role. The image mediates between us as the producer, and what is produced (Werke 8, 101) . There is a complex relation of knower and known; Baader relates it to the Biblical view of knowledge, connecting knowledge and sexual generation. Our perception involves imagination. But something in the object perceived also draws us to it. What we are drawn to is also found within us, and in what we imagine.
Baader gives the example of A wanting to produce the image of B.
1. First, there is a ray from B. B has implanted a seed in A. I understand this in terms of Dooyeweerd’s idea of objective image, Urbild. Both Baader and Dooyeweerd speak of this Urbild being ‘projected’ to us. We find a similar view of projection in Kuyper .
2. The projection awakens a return ray in A. I understand this in terms of Dooyeweerd’s idea of restrictive subjective sensory image, or Abbild.
3. The return ray can also be the moment of A’s desire for B. In his imagination, A obtains a power to generate a will to B. This is the spiritual image (Geistbild). Imagination generates this image as an Idea formatrix (Werke 2, 260). I understand this in terms of Dooyeweerd’s idea of opened image. There has been a formation of an image, but until it is actualized, it has no historical significance.
4. A gives the implanted seed back to B; then the Will of A is in B. We can say that the will of A is formed (gebildet) in B. Baader refers to this as the willed form, the essential image (Willensgestaltung, wesenhaftes Bild). I understand this in terms of the actualization of the act of imagining in an action.
5. When the formation is completed, it returns to A, and forms the body of the image, and the image is completed. The image has corporeality, or Leiblichkeit. This is the living form, the corporeal image (leibhafte Gestaltung, leibliches Bild). We find a reference to the corporeal image in Kuyper. Kuyper refers to the idea of Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782), that “Leiblichkeit ist das Ende der Werke Gottes” [“embodiment is the goal of the works of God”] .
In our productive imagination, we form a purely intentional object. It has no relation, except an intentional one, to the concrete object-side of temporal reality (NC II, 387). Dooyeweerd makes it clear that he is using ‘intentional’ in the sense used by the scholastics:
The intentional character of our acts is their inner nature. Acts only come to realization in the external world via a human action. Actions bring to realization the intention of the act in which the three fundamental orientations of the act-life (knowing, imagining, and willing), within the motivated process of taking decisions, are intertwined and decision is translated into action (Encyclopedia, 223). But even the formation of this intentional object is productive. The imaginative act is productive in itself. Thus, an artist’s aesthetic fantasy is a real productive act, even if it is not actualized or realized in an external individuality structure.
This productive view of imagination is very different from David Hume’s. Hume saw imagination as “the faculty that enables us to picture something not actually given in our sensory impressions.” Thus, Hume saw imagination as restrcited to psychical laws of association (NC II, 515; WdW II, 444). ).
The productive nature of our imagination, which is involved in this opening up process, is in a sense a construction of an opened reality. But it is not a constructivism that is based on our logical thought. That would absolutize the logical aspect. We can see this difference when we contrast Dooyeweerd’s (and Baader’s) view of imagination with that of Kant.
Productive imagination is not the same as Kant’s idea of the imposition of forms of intuition on a presumed sensory manifold. For one thing, Dooyeweerd disagrees with an empiricistic view of a sensory manifold. And on the other hand, Dooyeweerd does not regard the opening up process as the imposition of logical forms. He sees Kant’s view of the transcendental imagination as based on logic. For Kant “even the unconscious imagination can execute the synthesis only by means of the logical function of the understanding” (NC II, 497; WdW II, 430).
I. Reproductive Imagination (Memory)
Remembering and representation are also acts (NC II, 372; WdW II, 308). ). In memory, a past sensory representation is recalled. In the images of our memory, the actual reference to reality is therefore only of a reproductive nature (NC II, 375; WdW II, 312). ).
Memory merely reproduces that which has already been produced as a sensory image.
Insofar as our concepts refer to the retrocipatory aspects of our experience, our memory is needed. Imagination is used in the representations that we remember and incorporate in these concepts.
Baader distinguishes sterile imagination from the creative imagination (schöpferische Einbildung), which is really productive as much inside the subject as outside it. Active imagination involves active desire. A reactive imagination is mere nostalgia, Sehnen and Sucht (Faivre 117).
 Malcolm Muggeridge, paraphrasing William Blake’s “Auguries of Innocence.” Malcolm Muggeridge, A Third Testament, (Toronto: Little, Brown & Co, 1976) [‘Muggeridge’] online at [www.bruderhof.co.uk/e-books/downloads/ThirdTestament.pdf]. The actual quotation from Blake reads:
 By ‘plastic,’ Dooyeweerd means that new individuality structures can be formed. The idea of formation is linked to the historical aspect, discussed in Part IV below. See in particular Endnote 147.
A structural whole is made up of one or more enkaptic interlacements of individuality structures. A structural whole functions in or expresses itself in the aspect. In fact, every aspect is an expression of the structural whole (NC III, 116 fn2).
 See Linked Glossary, entry
online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/
[116A] See also Linked Glossary,
entry for ‘existence,’
 See Linked Glossary, entry for ‘levels,’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Levels.html].
 See discussion below regarding intuitive vision [schouwen]. And see Linked Glossary, entry for ‘aspects,’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/aspects.html].
See Linked Glossary, entry
online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/
 He maintained this distinction right up to the last article that he wrote. See ‘Gegenstandsrelatie.’
 Since Vollenhoven denies the intra-modal subject-object relation, and since he denies the idea of individuality structures, his view of perception is a functionalistic relation between different entities. See ‘Dialectic.’
 Vollenhoven denies this intra-modal subject-object relation. For Vollenhoven, the subject-object relation is only between things or entities, and not within an aspect (See ‘Dialectic’).
 Again, this must be contrasted with Vollenhoven. In viewing the subject-object relation between different entities of things, Vollenhoven reduces this relation to general laws between those things.
 NC III, 113, referring to NC II, 375. Note that the Dutch word ‘oer-beeld’ is not translated to English, but to German! Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is Germanic, and this must not be forgotten when we examine his ideas of perception.
 Cf. Baader: outward seeing is possessed by humans in common with animals and which seems to belong to the mechanical part of our knowing. It is the kind of knowing that the French call ‘exact’: a knowing that, as is said, comes and goes to a man without his will, and for which coming and going he is really not responsible (Zwiespalt).
 Insofar as Man is temporal, the three domains of mineral, plant and animal are matched in Man’s temporal being by body, soul and spirit, which correspond to the three outer senses, touching, hearing, and seeing (Werke IV, 153 and note 1). Baader refers to St. John who says, ‘that which we have seen, heard, and touched with our hands’ (Werke VII, 245). Our inner sense corresponds to our supratemporal center.
 Cf. Frederik van Eeden: In order to understand, in order to compare, we need an image [representation]. In the image we are mirroring. Frederik van Eeden: De Redekunstige Grondslag van Verstandhouding (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1975, first published 1897), 46 #37. See also Hanegraaff II, 607: The soul does not think without images, a view that goes back to Aristotle’s De Anima III, 7, 431 a 16.
 It is interesting that most discussion of Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘Archimedean Point’ refers to its fixed nature. But since Dooyeweerd also says that all acts come from out of the supratemporal selfhood, the dynamic consequence of what proceeds from this Archimedean point should also be taken into account.
 In the same way we have consciousness of ourselves only by intermediary of a thought engendered in us (an interior objectivation of ourselves or a reproduction of ourselves), and this image-thought serves as mediator for our consciousness of ourselves and of our activity directed outside, the activity realizing or accomplishing this image-thought (Werke 7, 35)
 Abraham Kuyper: The Work of the Holy Spirit (New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1900, Vol. II, Chapter I, IV, “Image and Likeness.”, “Image and Likeness,” online at [http://www.ccel.org/k/kuyper/holy_spirit/htm/TOC.htm]: