Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Studies relating to Herman Dooyeweerd

95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd

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Dooyeweerd
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List of Notes
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De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Volume I
Foreword
Introduction
Ground-Idea
Foundation
Law-Idea
Prism of Cosmic Time
Law and Subject
Philosophy/Worldview

De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Volume II
The Gegenstand
Dis-stasis/ Synthesis
Intuition and Time
Conceptual Limits
Horizon and Levels
God, Self and Cosmos

Other articles by Dooyeweerd
32 Propositions on Anthropology

Responses to the Curators (1937-38)

Dooyeweerd's 1964 Lecture, and Discussion

Dooyeweerd's last article (1975)

1974 Interview of Dooyeweerd, with mp3 audio files.

The last interview of Dooyeweerd (1975)

“The Problem of Time in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea” (1940)

The Idea of the Individuality Structure and the Thomistic Concept of Substance

Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946)

The Romantic Poetry of Herman Dooyeweerd 1912-13

Dooyeweerd's student article: “Neo-Mysticism and Frederik van Eeden”(1914)

Other articles about Dooyeweerd

Dooyeweerd's Encyclopedia of the Science of Law: Problems with the Present Translation

Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy.

J.H. Gunning, Christian Theosophy and Reformational Philosophy

Dooyeweerd's Philosophy of Aesthetics: A Response to Zuidervaart's Critique

The Religous Dialectic Revisited

Why did Dooyeweerd want to tear out his hair?

Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and the Quest for an Ecumenical Orthodoxy

Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical Themes in Dooyeweerd's Philosophy

Dooyeweerd versus Strauss: Objections to immanence philosophy within reformational thought.

Dooyeweerd and Baader: A Response to D.F.M. Strauss

Dooyeweerd, Spann and The Philosophy of Totality

Revised notes regarding aevum

Individuality Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism

Monism, Dualism, Nondualism: A Problem with Vollenhoven’s Problem-Historical Method

Vollenhoven's disagreements with Dooyeweerd; translations of three of Vollenhoven's articles.

Johann Stellingwerff: History of Reformational Philosophy (review)

 

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Kuyper
Vollenhoven
Franz von Baader
Frederik van Eeden
Ramana Maharshi
Abhishiktananda
C.G. Jung
Paul Brunton

 

 

 

95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd
by

Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

© 2007

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This article has been published in Philosophia Reformata 74 (2009) 78-104.

Abstract

“95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd” summarizes the Christian philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). Because of its succinct form and extensive footnotes, the editors call it a ‘portable Dooyeweerd.’ It presents a unified and consistent view of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy; he himself criticized those who attempt to divide his work into different periods, or who allege that certain ideas are contradictory. It also seeks to rescue Dooyeweerd’s philosophy from previous misinterpretations by reformational philosophy, which has contested or rejected almost every one of the 95 theses, including those ideas that Dooyeweerd insisted are most essential. It therefore seeks to reform reformational philosophy.

Philosophy gives an account of our experience

1. Philosophy does not begin with rational propositions or presuppositions, but rather with our experience . Dooyeweerd begins A New Critique of Theoretical Thought by contrasting the continuity of our pre-theoretical experience with the way that theoretical experience splits apart this continuity [1]. He says later, “The apriori structure of reality can only be known by experience. But this is not experience as it is conceived by immanence-philosophy” [2]. Human experience is not limited to our temporal functions of consciousness [3]. Our experience is not an ‘Erlebnis’ of mere psychical feelings and sensations [4], but rather “a conscious enstatic [5] ‘Hineinleben.’”—the experience of our supratemporal selfhood entering into and living within all aspects of temporal reality.[6]

2. Our theoretical Ideas (whether in philosophy, theology, or in any science) “give an account of” [7] our pre-theoretical experience. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between subjective theoretical propositions [vooronderstellingen] and the supra-theoretical ontical presuppositions on which such propositions are based [de vooronderstelde—“that which is presupposed”] [8]. In other words, our world and its structure are given [9] and not constructed [10]. Dooyeweerd opposes what is “given” in pre-theoretical experience with the product of theoretical analysis in the Gegenstand-relation [11]. Theoretical Ideas are not themselves the ontical conditions, the ‘ontic a prioris’ [12] of which Ideas give an account [13]. We must not confuse the ontical with the epistemological [14].

3. Our philosophical Ideas point towards the ontical conditions that make both pre-theoretical and theoretical experience possible; these ontical conditions are “infinitely more than Idea.”[15] This is what Dooyeweerd means by calling his philosophy ‘transcendental.’[16] Ideas relate the diversity of the modal aspects to their central and radical unity and to an Origin.[17]. By so anticipating [18] the concentric identity [19] of our temporal and supratemporal experience, Ideas approximate what cannot be comprehended in a concept [20]. The theoretical Idea is always a philosophical Idea of the totality and unity of the modal aspects, which have been split apart in theory. In contrast, the theoretical concept is oriented to distinguishing the various aspects. [21]

The horizons of our experience

4. There are four dimensions or horizons [22] of our experience: (1) the religious or supratemporal horizon, (2) the temporal horizon of cosmic time, (3) the modal horizon of the temporal aspects, and (4) the plastic [23] horizon of individuality structures.

The religious (supratemporal) horizon

5. By religious (i.e. supratemporal) self-reflection, we obtain “cosmic consciousness” [24] of our supratemporal selfhood and its relation to the temporal world, including our temporal body [25]. Our supratemporal selfhood recognizes the modal functions as “our own in cosmic time”[26]. Modern thought often dogmatically rejects the possibility of religious self-reflection because it wrongly believes in the autonomy of theoretical thought [27]. But self-reflection is the only way to discover the true starting-point of theoretical thought [28], and all human experience is rooted in the transcendent unity of self-consciousness [29]. This self-knowledge cannot be proved theoretically, since it exceeds the limits of theoretical thought and is rooted in the heart, the religious center of our existence [30]. Furthermore, this central self-knowledge can only be the result of the Word-revelation of God operating in our heart [31]. Our selfhood, as the religious concentration point of our entire temporal existence) stands in immediate relationship to God as the absolute origin of all things. Religion is immediately related to the absolute origin [32].

6. Our selfhood transcends cosmic time [33]. Man is “able to not only relatively but radically go out above all temporal things” [34]. We are therefore aware of a distinction between cosmic time and our selfhood that transcends time. We do not have any experience of ourselves as merely a temporal pre-functional unity [35]. We could not have any consciousness of time unless our selfhood were above time [36]. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Idea of cosmic time is the basis of his philosophical theory of reality [37]. The religious or supratemporal horizon of experience is different from the temporal horizon. Dooyeweerd avoided using the term “central trans-cosmic time,” because that still refers to cosmic time; it would be a duplication of the temporal horizon [38].

7. The transcendence of time in our supratemporal heart is not just a future reality after death, but a present reality. Even now we are both supratemporal and temporal beings [39]. We live in both cosmic time and the supratemporal aevum, which is the created intermediate state between eternity and cosmic time [40]. In fact, Dooyeweerd says that this is what it means to be the image of God: “…it is just this possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the essence [wezen] of man, to the “image of God” in him…” [41]. In the body, we are universally bound to time. But our selfhood is not in time. So our experience is limited by, but not at all to time [42].

8. We pre-theoretically experience our supratemporal selfhood as restless, and the temporal world as restless in our heart [43]. Our heart in turn refers beyond itself to an eternal Origin that transcends it. We are therefore aware of a distinction between the temporal cosmos, our supratemporal selfhood, and God’s eternity.

9. Our selfhood stands under a law of religious concentration, which makes it restlessly search for its own Origin and that of the whole cosmos [44]. “It is this tendency towards the origin which discloses the fact, that our ego is subjected to a central law.” [45]

The temporal horizon

10. We pre-theoretically experience the relation between our supratemporal selfhood and the cosmic temporal coherence as a relation of enstasis [46]. “In pre-theoretical thought our I-ness enters entstatically by means of its intuition into the cosmic temporal coherence of experience”[47]. This is an experience of resting [48]equilibrium and coherence. The experience is immediate and integral, and in concentric relatedness to our selfhood. [49]

11. Theoretical experience is not a resting experience of enstasis but an act of dis-stasis, the entering of our selfhood into temporal reality [50] and the setting apart of our experience of temporal reality [51]. Theoretical thought makes our previously given experience into a “problem” [52]. But it also deepens [53] or opens [54] our pre-theoretical experience by focusing on its deeper identity with the central totality of our selfhood that transcends time [55]. Only our selfhood, as the undivided concentration point of our temporal existence, can give this concentric direction to our though [56].

The modal horizon of our experience: the aspects or modes of consciousness

12. Aspects are modes of consciousness or experience, not modes of being or properties of things [57]. “A modality is a primary form of the intuiting consciousness [schouwend bewustzijn]” [58]. These aspects of our experience and existence within the order of time are related to the central unity of our consciousness, which we call our I, our ego. We could not have any experience at all without this central ego [59]. In pre-theoretical experience, we experience our temporal modes of consciousness as a coherent unity, but we do not distinguish the modes of consciousness [60]. It is in theoretical experience that we distinguish and analyze the modes.

13. Dooyeweerd distinguished fifteen different aspects, or modes of consciousness, each mode irreducible to the other modes and yet also related to the others. These modes are: the numerical, spatial, kinematic, the mode of physical energy, organic life, psychical feeling, analytical-logical, historical, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, moral and the mode of faith [61]

14. Theoretical thought gives an account of each mode of our consciousness, not by reducing one mode to another mode, but by explaining the modes as temporal refractions from supratemporal totality. Cosmic time acts like a prism to differentiate supratemporal totality both on its law side and its subject side. Temporally, each modal aspect has sphere sovereignty and cannot be reduced to another modal aspect, just as one colour in the differentiated white light cannot be reduced to another colour [62]. The modal aspects, in their modal structure of analogies with other aspects, are the ontical foundation of individuality structures, which function within these modal structures. The temporal individuation of individuality structures therefore depends on the prior differentiation in time of the modal structures [63].

Theoretical thought gives an account of each mode of our consciousness, not by explaining it in terms of another mode, but by deriving it from supratemporal totality, as refracted and individuated in time. The modal aspects are the first temporal individuations from out of supratemporal reality Cosmic time acts like a prism to break up the supratemporal totality both on its law side and its subject side. Temporally, each modal aspect has sphere sovereignty and cannot be reduced to another modal aspect, just as one colour in the differentiated white light cannot be reduced to another colour

15. Each of the modal aspects is given to our consciousness in an order of succession of cosmic time, in an order of before and after, or earlier and later, and this temporal order is also expressed in the internal modal structure of every aspect [64].

16. The irreducibility of each modal aspect in time is based on its nuclear or kernel moment. Yet the mutual irreducibility of the law-spheres and their mutual irreducible reciprocal meaning-coherence “are not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence” [65]. And “it is not possible to form a concept of a particular aspect without having this concept led by an idea of their [the aspects] mutual coherence and deeper root-unity” [66]. “What in the totality of meaning has no meaning is the sovereignty in its own sphere in the particularity of meaning” [67]. So, although no modal aspect can be reduced to any other aspect, all of these modal aspects or law-spheres coincide in a unity of meaning in the supratemporal center. This is just like one colour not being reducible to another after being refracted, and yet all the colours have a common unity in the white light before refraction. The prism of cosmic time guarantees sphere sovereignty within time [68]. The distinction between the concept and the Idea of a specific aspect is based on the distinction between the primary modal meaning (nucleus with its retrocipations) and the deepened meaning, which anticipates the later analogical moments in the modal aspects [69].

17. We cannot conceptualize such a nuclear moment, but we know it only in its analogies with other moments [70]. These analogical relations either point forward in time to a later aspect, in which case they are called anticipations, or backwards in time to an earlier aspect, in which case they are called retrocipations. Anticipations are complex, for each modal anticipation points forward to a law-sphere that has a retrocipatory sphere of its own [71]. Thus, each anticipation includes further retrocipations from the anticipated sphere! These are different from the retrocipations of the sphere that one started from. In the retrocipatory direction, we look back towards our Origin. In the anticipatory direction, we look forward to the later aspects, and ultimately, to our supratemporal fulfillment beyond the highest modal aspect, that of faith, the “opened window of time through which the light of God’s eternity should shine into the whole temporal coherence of the world” [72]. For “in the faith aspect of reality, time takes on a specific meaning of the revelation of the supratemporal, of what lies hidden beyond time” [73]. Faith is the only aspect that of itself points beyond time, and not merely via anticipatory moments of meaning. We misconstrue the faith aspect if we do not see it “in its immediate relatedness to the transcendent root and origin of the creation” [74].

18. The nuclear moment, together with its temporal analogies, constitute a law-sphere. All law-spheres are related to each other because the analogical moments in one law-sphere refer to the other modalities that were refracted from the same totality. And every modal aspect points beyond its own limits to a central totality [75]. The philosophical idea of totality is completely different from the idea of the cosmos or the universe [76].

19. Dooyeweerd says that his theory of the modal aspects is one of the “least understood” parts of his philosophy [77]. Aspects are not entities or “whats” but they are “hows” of our temporal experience, or “modes of consciousness.” Modes are not properties abstracted from laws or things. Dooyeweerd says this is a “serious misunderstanding” by reformational philosophers [78]. “We cannot obtain true structural concepts of individuality by means of the procedure of gradual abstraction. Nor can we obtain theoretical insight into the modal structures of the law-spheres by gradual abstraction” [79].

20. In theoretical thought, we find that our modes of consciousness correspond in a relation of identity to the modes in which individuality structures function [80]. The horizon of experience is the same horizon of existence for man and for the world [81]. Our inner acts (i.e., those occurring within our body) can be theoretically studied because they have a modal structure of a universally valid character [82]. Sometimes Dooyeweerd uses ‘inner’ in an even deeper sense, to refer to the supratemporal selfhood apart from its expression within our body, as when he speaks of the soul as the root-unity, the “inner person” in the Pauline sense, which expresses itself in temporal, bodily life [83]. But that is not what is referred to here. This identity of our inner and outer experience gives rise to the law-Idea: the belief that our experience is subjected to a law outside of ourselves that sets or provides for this identity and harmony [84].

The plastic horizon of individuality structures

21. The final temporal realities to differentiate from out of supratemporal totality are individuality structures, which we experience in the plastic horizon. The modal aspects have an ontical priority to these individuality structures, and are not derived or abstracted from the individuality structures. “The modal structures lie at the foundation of the individuality structures, and not the other way around.” [85]

22. Our pre-theoretical or naïve experience is primarily of individuality structures in the plastic horizon of our experience [86]. But we do not experience them as completely separate entities [87]. And we do not theoretically analyze the nature of those structures, but we engage in a subject-object relation with them [88].

23. In the pre-theoretical subject-object relation, we recognize that different temporal structures are members of different realms. Thus, we recognize that a tree is qualified by its functions in the biotic aspect of reality, and that it does not subjectively experience sensation. We recognize that animals do experience sensation, and that they are therefore qualified by the psychical aspect of temporal reality [89]. Object functions are real functions, and should not be regarded as secondary qualities (sensory qualities such as colours, tones, temperatures, pressures, etc.) that inhere only in the perceiving subject. The subject-object relation does not rely on any distinction between primary and secondary qualities [90].

24. The temporal order of succession of the modal aspects gives rise to the subject-object relation of pre-theoretical experience. The subject-object relation is not just between individuality structures, but also within the aspects in their relation of before and after in cosmic time [91]. The earlier aspects are objectified in the later aspects [92].

25. The nature of the pre-theoretical subject-object relation explains why Dooyeweerd says that our pre-theoretical experience is not based nearly as much on sense perception as current philosophy believes [93]. The role of imagination is crucial, since perceiving the object can be the result of the formative activity of an individual subject [94].

26. An individuality structure is a “relative unity in a multiplicity of functions,” [95] an architectonic grouping [96]of the modal aspects, “typical structures of cosmic time” with a subjective duration in time [97]. Individuality structures have no substance, nor do they have any reality at all apart from man, their religious root [98].

27. An individuality structure functions within the modal structure of all aspects. It does this in accordance with its architectonic grouping of subject and object functions within those aspects. Thus a ‘function’ is not the same as ‘aspect’ [99]. Concrete things function within all of the modal structures. The modal aspects first make things possible; they form their foundation in an apriori ontical sense [100]. The aspects within which individuality structures function have a structure of a relative unity in a diversity of moments [101].

28. Individuality structures are qualified by their highest subject function within the modal aspects. That function is called the ‘qualifying function’ of the individuality structure [102].

29. On the law-side, these individuality structures are called typical structures, giving rise to subjective correlates of a certain type. Typical structures determine the subjective (or objective) temporal duration of these individuality structures. An apple tree differs from a stone not because it functions in different aspects, but because, in whatever aspect it functions, it displays a different typical structure. A thing endures only as long as its typical structure [103].

30. On the subject-side, or factual side, individuality structures are correlated to an enkaptic whole. Enkapsis means a relation where two individuality structures each retain their own characteristics [104]. In other words, each continues to be qualified by its highest subject function. In this regard, enkapsis is different from the relationship of a part to the whole. What is part of a whole is determined by the individuality structure of the whole. Whole entities are not something in addition to the duration of such enkaptically interwoven structures in time. When the enkaptic relation fails, the existence of the enkaptic whole (or thing) comes to an end.

31. A thing is an enkaptic interlacement of two or more individuality structures [105]. There is no simple thing, because no single structure of individuality can be realized except in inter-structural intertwinements with other individuality-structures [106]. It is not correct that a thing has an individuality structure, for that would make a thing independent of its law-side, and would lead to a view of reality based on substance.

32. Within the enkaptic whole, the qualifying function of the more encompassing individuality structure is called the ‘leading function.’ It qualifies every individual totality belonging to the same kingdom (mineral, plant, animal). The qualifying function of the encompassed individuality structure is called the ‘foundational function.’ [107]

33. Our own body is an enkaptic interlacement of four different individuality structures: the physical, the biological, the psychical, and the act-structure. These structures are not parts of a whole, but are rather enkaptically interwoven with each other [108].

34. In our pre-theoretical experience, we form concepts, but these concepts are directed to structures of individuality. This is because enstatic logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception [109]. But every use of a logical syllogism shows that we are already engaged in theoretical thought [110].

35. We also pre-theoretically experience the coherence of the temporal world. There is a coherence of the modes of our consciousness as well as the modes in which individuality structures function. Dooyeweerd calls this temporal coherence a systasis, by which he means “the factual immediacy of our integral experience of reality” [111]

Ground Motives

36. All philosophy must answer these three problems [112] : (1) What is the origin of reality? (2) What is the totality of meaning from which reality unfolds, the supratemporal unity beyond all modal diversity? and (3) What is the basis for the coherence of temporal reality?

37. In answer to these problems, we give different transcendental Ideas, depending on whether our supratemporal heart is directed towards God in an integral and radical [113] way, or whether our heart is directed away from God. These two directions are called the “religious antithesis” [114].

38. This religious motivation towards or away from God is a supratemporal act of our will. ‘Motive’ comes from the Latin ‘movere,’ meaning “to move, to propel.” It is a dunamis or “spiritual power” that drives all human activity forward and sets its direction, even though the individual may not be at all conscious of it [115]. Ground-Motives are not themselves the cause of this act of will, but only an attempt to give a theoretical account of it.

The Christian Ground Motive of creation, fall and redemption

39. Christian philosophy provides these three transcendental Ideas as answers: (1) God is the Origin (2) Our supratemporal selfhood is the original totality, but since the fall, the totality is Christ in whom we participate and (3) Temporal coherence is given by cosmic time.[116]

40. These three transcendental Ideas correspond to three ontic levels: (1) God’s eternity (2) the created supratemporal realm (the “aevum”), which includes our selfhood and (3) the realm of cosmic time, which includes our temporal body and the temporal cosmos, into which our supratemporal selfhood was “fitted” [ingesteld]. [117]

41. Our Ideas of God, man and cosmos are all related [118]. They are related because they correspond to the three transcendental Ideas, and to the three ontical levels (eternity, supratemporal and temporal).

42. Dooyeweerd’s Christian philosophy is not based on propositions from the Bible or on theological exegesis of texts. Dooyeweerd criticized Groen van Prinsterer’s method of Scripture reading, using Scriptures as a final guide for temporal life [119]. He also criticized Vollenhoven’s use of Scripture as a source for philosophy, on the grounds that this was theology and not philosophy [120]. He criticized Van Til’s idea of revealed concepts in Scripture; he says that this shows Van Til’s “rationalist tendency.” Van Til wrongly identifies the words of Scripture with concepts, and Van Til is wrong to say that man has to “think God's thoughts after him.” For nowhere does the Bible speak of obeying the voice of God in terms of subjecting every human thought to divine thought [121]. The Scriptures speak to our supratemporal heart, but they are not to be understood in a propositional way. The Scriptures do not use theoretical scientific concepts [122]. The Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption cannot be determined by theoretical exegesis [123]. Nor is the meaning of the religious centre of life, the root of man’s whole existence, the fall into sin, rebirth or the incarnation of the Word to be determined by exegesis [124]. We recognize that Scripture “accords with” [125] our experience. But there is no theology or philosophy that can give us true knowledge of God and self; this is the fruit of God’s Spirit in our heart, and has a “religious enstatic character” [126]. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between the Scriptures and God’s Word. He disagreed with a young theologian who claimed that the Bible was “inspired by God word for word” [127].

43. Any truly Christian view of anthropology and of temporal society must begin with the Idea of our supratemporal selfhood [128]. This was the “great turning point” in Dooyeweerd’s thought [129], the beginning and end point of his philosophy [130]. Sometimes he says it is the key of knowledge [131], although at other times he says that the key is the Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption [132]. But even there he says that the “radical unity of meaning” of this central theme of creation, fall into sin and redemption “is related to the central unity of our human existence.” So the ideas are related, and it is clear that, without the idea of the supratemporal heart, we cannot understand the radical meaning of creation, fall and redemption [133]. Nor can we understand the working of God’s Word in our hearts, or the doctrine of the incarnation [134].

44. Any philosophy that does not accept the Idea of the supratemporal selfhood is called ‘immanence philosophy,’ because it seeks totality and coherence within time. Even a Christian philosophy that acknowledges God as eternal Origin is still making a synthesis with immanence philosophy if it denies the supratemporal selfhood. It may acknowledge God as Origin, but it adopts an immanent view of totality. Dooyeweerd says that his philosophy makes a radical break with immanence philosophy in its idea that it understands that our whole temporal human existence proceeds from out of the religious root, the heart [135]. Immanence philosophy seeks the Archimedean point of philosophy within theoretical thought itself instead of relating it to our “I-ness”—the “undivided center of all temporal human existence” [136]. Because it begins with the assumed autonomy of theoretical thought, immanence philosophy denies any non-theoretical presuppositions, or what Dooyeweerd calls ‘ontical conditions’ of thought [137].

45. By seeking totality and coherence within the temporal world, immanence philosophy necessarily elevates or absolutizes one part of temporal reality above the other parts. The other parts are then “reduced” to or subordinated to the part that is elevated. An example is seeking the unifying element of the temporal world within the rational aspect. This results in antinomies, and a polar dialectic or dualism between the absolutized aspect of reality and the remaining aspects [138]. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is resolutely opposed to all such dualisms within temporal reality.

46. Apostasis or apostasy is falling away from our true center and the absolutization of the temporal. We then cannot experience temporal things and events as they really are. Instead, we experience the emptiness of a world that seems to be shut up in itself. But in the Biblical attitude of naïve experience, the light of eternity breaks in, illuminating even the most trivial things, and showing the dynamic relation of self, others, cosmos and God [139]. True knowledge of God and self involves a turning of the personality, and a restoring of the subjective perspective of our experience [140]. The religious antithesis of apostasy runs through the heart of everyone, including Christians; it is not a line to be drawn between groups of people [141]. Even Christians are sometimes apostate. But when we stand again in the truth, we are brought into a relation of anastasis [142]. So resurrection is also a present reality.

47. The Christian answer to the three transcendental Ideas is governed by its religious Ground-Motive of “creation, fall and redemption in Christ.” This Ground-Motive of creation, fall and redemption sees created reality in an integral and radical [root] way: there is a coherence of temporal reality that refers to a supratemporal created totality or religious root, which in turn refers to the eternal Origin, God. But Dooyeweerd warns that this Ground-Motive is not correctly understood unless creation, fall and redemption are all understood as occurring in relation to the supratemporal religious root. Many people use the terms “creation, fall and redemption” in what appears to be an orthodox way, but they fail to understand theses doctrines in their radical meaning, in their relation to the supratemporal heart as religious root [143].

God and creation

48. God alone is Being [144].

49. Nothing in creation is being or substance; created reality exists only as meaning, restlessly referring back towards God as Arché or Origin [145]. But although temporal reality is not Being, Dooyeweerd does speak of the “ontical” [146]. By ‘ontical’ he means that which is grounded in the order of reality itself, and not in our theory about reality [147].

50. God expresses Himself in His creation, and created reality refers back to God [148].

51. The idea of the expression of a higher reality in a lower reality is essential in order to understand the nondual relations of (a) God and creation (b) man’s supratemporal heart and temporal body and (c) man and cosmos.

52. All creation is “out, from and towards” God as Arché or Origin [149]. Kuyper expressed a similar idea: “God alone is here the goal, the point of departure and the point of arrival, the fountain, from which the waters flow, and at the same time, the ocean into which they finally return” [150]. Dooyeweerd was aware that the words “out, from and towards” were associated with panentheism [151]. Panentheism does not mean pantheism, but rather a nondual relation—neither dualism nor monism—between the Creator and His creation.

53. God’s eternity is distinct from created eternity (the aevum) and from cosmic time. Supratemporality is dynamic [152]. So is God’s eternity; a static eternity is a Greek idea [153].

54. Created reality is divided into supratemporal created reality (“the heavens”) and temporal created reality (“the earth”) [154].

55. The supratemporal created reality exists in the aevum, intermediate between God’s eternity and cosmic time. The aevum includes man’s supratemporal heart as religious root and totality [155], and the angelic realm.

56. The cosmos or “earthly” reality exists in cosmic time; it includes man’s temporal body, or mantle of functions [functiemantel] [156]. For although man is a supratemporal being, man also functions in time in his body, the free plastic instrument of his selfhood [157]. Dooyeweerd refers to the full human selfhood, man’s heart in the meaning of the center of his whole existence, of which the “body” is the temporal instrument [organon] [158].

57. All of creation is subject (sujet), sub-jected to God’s law or Word (Wisdom). Dooyeweerd uses the French word ‘sujet’– the created being is subjècted to a law that does not originate from this subject itself [159]. The religious root, as supratemporal undifferentiated subjective totality [160] is subject to God’s law in its central and undifferentiated sense. Law has both a central religious unity and a temporal diversity [161]. The law in its central meaning is love [162]. Both central subject and central law are differentiated by cosmic time [163]. The central commandment of love is differentiated by cosmic time into the various temporal law-spheres, or modal aspects [164]. And the central subject or religious root is differentiated into individuality structures. All individuality comes from out of the supratemporal root, which differentiates and unfolds itself [165]. The factual side of reality also has a relation of totality, diversity and coherence of meaning [166].

58. The differentiated and unfolded temporal reality has both a law-side (as a differentiation of God’s central law) and a subject-side (as man’s temporal “modes of consciousness” and the aspects within which other individuality structures function).

59. Creation was completed [167] by God when man was created as the supratemporal religious root—an undifferentiated [168] totality. This undifferentiated totality is the central subject-unity that Dooyeweerd refers to as the “subject-Idea” [169]. But this completed creation is temporally worked out or unfolded in the process of becoming [170].

60. Creation of the supratemporal root was “before” cosmic time. The days of creation, and "in the beginning" are to be understood as occurring beyond the limits of cosmic time [171]. God’s creative act and the “days of creation” are beyond the limits of cosmic time [172]. The supratemporal creation and the temporal unfolding or becoming are described in Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 respectively; these are not two accounts of the same creation. Dooyeweerd makes a sharp distinction between the creation of man (Gen.1:27) and the temporal process of becoming (Gen. 2:7) [173]. The second stage—becoming a “living soul”—is not a creation, but giving form to “an already existing material present in the temporal order.” This distinction between creation and becoming is wiped out by a historicistic interpretation that sees creation as a temporal event [174].

61. God’s law is a boundary between God and His creation, but this boundary is not to be understood in a spatial sense; it refers to created reality’s deep dependence on God. “The boundary is not to be understood as a separation [scheiding] between God and creature, which would be in conflict with the community with God in Christ” [175].

62. There is an unfolding, differentiation and individualization within cosmic time of both the central law (law-Idea) and the supratemporal central religious root (subject-Idea). The totality of meaning, both as to its cosmonomic side and its subject side, is refracted by cosmic time into meaning-sides of temporal created reality [176]. This unfolding is expressed as (1) a differentiation of modal aspects, which are a refraction of God’s central law, like colours refracted in a prism and 2) a similar differentiation or individuation of individuality structures. Individuality comes from out of the supratemporal root [177]. All temporal individuality can only be an expression of the “fullness of individuality in this center.” The “fullness of individuality” is also refracted prismatically by cosmic time. Both the law-side and subject-side are determined in their structural meaning by the cosmic order of time [178].

63. The expression of aspects and of individuality structures from out of a central unity does not imply monism, for a real individuation has commenced, although it has to be fulfilled and perfected. Dooyeweerd speaks of “the ultimate individual,” “the fullness of individuality” which has been saved by Christ [179].

Man as Image of God

64. Man’s creation as body and soul was completed at creation, but is being worked out by means of “generation.” There is a difference between creation and temporal generation (becoming, wording). We were first created as an undifferentiated supratemporal unity, and thereafter formed, and placed within, or “fitted within” temporal reality [180]. This generation has both (1) a temporal bodily side and (2) a spiritual side. According to the bodily side, humanity was formed from one blood. According to the spiritual side, we are the “spiritual seed” of Adam, and we share in his fall. But by regeneration this natural line of spiritual generation is broken [181].

65. To be the image of God involves living simultaneously in both the supratemporal aevum and the temporal world [182]. Man, as the image of God, expresses or reveals [183] his supratemporal selfhood in the lower ontical realm of the temporal cosmos. Just as God expresses and reveals himself in creation, so man expresses himself in the temporal world [184]. The human ego transcends all modal functions, but expresses itself in the entire temporal human existence. These temporal psychological phenomena manifest themselves in a concentric direction to the ego [185]. Expression is from out of the supratemporal center to the temporal periphery. Dooyeweerd sometimes calls this expression within time the ‘revelation’ [openbaring] of our selfhood in time, the same word he uses for God’s revelation. Our heart is “the root and centre of our temporal life-revelations” and he refers to “the temporal revelations of the heart in the distinguished life-spheres.” He mentions “the whole Scriptural view of the heart as the religious root and centre of all temporal revelations of life” [186].

66. Man, as the image of God, also concentrates temporal reality in himself. Just as man’s supratemporal selfhood has no existence in itself and refers to God [187], so temporal reality has no meaning or reality apart from man’s supratemporal selfhood, which was created as the religious root of creation [188]. Just as the meaning of our selfhood is found only in God, so its entire temporal existence is concentrated in the radical religious unity of our selfhood in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon its Origin [189]. Inorganic nature, the vegetable kingdom, and animals do not have any existence apart from this religious root [190]. “Since God has created the ‘earthly’ world in a concentric relation to the religious root of human existence, there cannot exist an ‘earthly’ ‘world in itself’ apart from the structural horizon of human experience” [191]. The concentration of the temporal world in man is analogous to God as the absolute origin of all that exists outside of Himself:

In an indissoluble connection with this self-revelation as Creator, God has revealed man to himself. Man was created in the image of God. Just as God is the absolute origin of all that exists outside of Himself, so He created man as a being in whom the entire diversity of aspects and faculties of the temporal world is concentrated within the religious centre of his existence which we call our I, and which Holy Scripture calls our heart, in a pregnant, religious sense. [192]

67. Our supratemporal heart is the center of all of our temporal functions; it is not to be identified with any one of these functions. It is the concentration point of all our cosmic functions, a subjective totality lying at the basis of all the functions in time [193]. It cannot be identified with a merely temporal center of these functions. Dooyeweerd rejects Vollenhoven’s view of the heart as a temporal pre-functionality; we have no experience of such an idea [194]. Man’s heart may be called his ‘soul,’ but this is not to be identified with the rational function; the heart is the supratemporal source of all functions [195].

68. Man’s temporal body, or “mantle of functions” [‘functiemantel’] [196] is the free plastic instrument [197] of his supratemporal selfhood. Our supratemporal selfhood expresses and reveals itself within temporal reality by means of this mantle of functions. This is what Dooyeweerd means when he cites the Bible’s reference, “Out of the heart are the issues of life” [Prov. 4:23] [198]. Our temporal modes of consciousness issue from out of our supratemporal selfhood.

69. Our body is not a substance in the sense of something that exists under the mantle of functions, for this very idea of ‘under’ is the ‘hypo’ in ‘hypostasis,’ which Dooyeweerd rejects. This also rules out any monistic reduction of soul to body (as in materialism) or of body to soul (as in a world-denying kind of spirituality). Dooyeweerd avoids any spirituality that tries to separate itself from temporality, or our mantle of functions [199]. His philosophy is not world-denying, but fully incarnational [200].

70. The body or mantle of functions is not something foreign to man’s selfhood, but is man himself in the structural whole of his temporal appearance [201]. And the a-logical functions are not foreign to our self-consciousness. All functions are owned by our selfhood [202]. The supratemporal selfhood and the mantle of functions constitute the only fundamental dichotomy, a dichotomy that is really a nonduality [twee(een)heid] [203]. In a nondual experience of ourselves, our selfhood is the root unity or totality of all of our temporal functions, and not one temporal function elevated over the others.

71. The relation between our supratemporal selfhood and this temporal mantle of functions is what Dooyeweerd refers to as ‘enstasis.’ In enstasis, our supratemporal selfhood expresses itself within temporal reality. Through enstasis, man in his supratemporal selfhood is able to enter into the temporal cosmos. Animals have no supratemporal religious center, and so do not have this ability [204]. Animals are ex-statically absorbed by their temporal existence [205]. Human experience is fundamentally different from animal awareness of sensations because it is related to the human selfhood, which transcends time [206]. In animals there is only a subjective undergoing of sense-impressions, not a conscious experience of the sensory in its subject-object relations [207].

72. Man’s own existence becomes more and more individual, both temporally [208] and supratemporally. Just as the original supratemporal root was the source of all temporal individuality, now Christ is the transcendent root of individuality. In Christ the “fulness of individuality” has been saved [209]. But no individuality is ever absolute. It always remains a nondual unity together with its center, just as our temporal body is a nondual unity with its center, the heart.

73. After man’s death, the entire mantle of functions, including our rational function, is left behind; only our supratemporal selfhood remains. At death, all individuality structures that make up our body are dissolved. All functions of cosmic time are gone. Our total temporal existence is “laid down at death.” But the “soul” of human existence is not affected by temporal death; it continues to exist even after the putting off of the body. There is in reality only one fundamental dichotomy [principieele caesuur], that between the whole temporal existence and its supratemporal religious root, a dichotomy that comes into effect in the temporal death of man [210]. Our temporal body disintegrates at death because it loses its connection to our supratemporal center, the integral religious root. Death is the unbinding of all earthly bonds [211].

Fall

74. Man was created as both a supratemporal and temporal being in order to unfold the powers that God had placed in temporal reality [212]. The powers and potential which God had enclosed within creation were to be disclosed by man in his service of love to God and neighbour [213]. Man was “destined to concentrically direct all the powers that God had placed in the temporal world” [214].

75. A further purpose in man’s creation was to help redeem the temporal world. Through man “the entire temporal world is included both in apostasy and in salvation” [215]. Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper's Lectures on Calvinism: Just as the whole creation culminates in man, its glorification can only first find its fulfillment in man, who was created as God's image [216]. Inorganic materials, plants and animals have no independent spiritual or religious root. Their temporal existence first becomes complete [fulfilled] in and through man [217]. We do this by illuminating the reality of things from within [218]. This task of redemption implies that the temporal world had fallen prior to man’s own fall (The fall of Lucifer and his angels preceded that of man.) Kuyper makes reference to the idea of a double fall; he does not dismiss it as unorthodox, but only says it cannot be proved [219].

76. Man failed in this task of redemption, and fell into the temporal horizon [220]. This was also a falling away [af-val] from man’s true selfhood [221].

77. Because temporal reality had no root or existence in itself, but was concentrated in mankind [222], temporal reality fell [again] with man, the religious root of temporal reality [223]. Thus, it is not only man’s moral direction that must be redeemed, but also all of temporal reality. The fall must be interpreted as a fall in the religious root of temporal reality; there was a falling away of the heart from its Creator. That is the cause of spiritual death [geestelijken dood]. This spiritual death cannot be confused with bodily [lichamelijken] death nor with eternal death [eeuwigen dood]. The acknowledgement of spiritual death as the consequence of the fall is so central that if it is denied, no single part of the Dooyeweerd’s philosophy can be understood [224]. The fall was in the supratemporal root, which was still an undifferentiated unity. In the religious fullness of meaning there is only one law of God, just as there is only one sin against God, and only one mankind that has sinned in Adam [225].

Redemption

78. Because temporal reality was concentrated in man as its religious root, and because man failed in his task, Christ’s incarnation was required as the new religious root [226]. Christ’s incarnation as the New Root effected redemption of the whole temporal cosmos, although this is still being worked out in time [227]. Sin was thereby “really propitiated” [228]. “Christ Jesus is the “second Adam,” in Whom nothing of God’s creation can be lost.” This “particular” grace bears a radical-universal character [229]. God's common grace is shown to his fallen creation “as a still undivided totality” [230].

79. In order to have insight into the full horizon of our experience, we must participate in Christ as the New Root [231].

80. Since supratemporality is dynamic [232], there will after death be a new nature in which our selfhood can express itself. From Dooyeweerd's view that the need to express ourselves is given at creation, I believe it is reasonable to infer that we receive a new body or nature in the afterlife. This seems to be confirmed by his statement affirming the resurrection of the flesh, and “the identity in principle of the mantle of functions after the resurrection” [233]. And Dooyeweerd indicates that there is supratemporal individuality. “But man has an eternal destination, not as an abstract “rational soul” or spiritual “mind”, but in the fullness of his concrete, individual personality” [234].

Acts of the selfhood

81. All of our acts proceed from out of our supratemporal selfhood [235], but each act is expressed in all of our temporal functions within the modal aspects [236]. Acts are inner activities by which humans orient themselves intentionally to situations in reality or in their imagination, and make these their own by relating them to the “I” as the individual religious center of the person’s existence. Inner acts, when expressed within the human body or in the external world, become actions [237]. But not all inner acts are expressed as actions. There are three kinds of acts: knowing, willing and imagining [238]. Different aspects are associated more with some acts than with others. For example, the jural aspect is associated with the will-orientation, whereas the lingual and the aesthetic aspects are related to the contemplative orientation of knowing and imagining. But no act of will is possible apart from acts of knowing and imagining [239].

82. We are conscious of our acts originating in our supratemporal selfhood and being expressed within time. The two are always found together, so it is wrong to speak of a pure consciousness that is not expressed in time (at least in this dispensation). It is also wrong to speak of pure sensation, for apart from relating our experience of eating something sweet to our supratemporal selfhood, we would not know that it was sweet [240].

83. We are able to relate the temporal to our supratemporal selfhood by means of our intuition, which moves to and fro between our selfhood and temporal reality. We relate sensory impressions to our selfhood by our intuition. Intuition makes temporal reality “our own” [241]. In pre-theoretical intuition I have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as my own [242]. Our theoretical intuition enables cosmological consciousness, which is transcendental [243]. But cosmological consciousness is founded on cosmic consciousness [244].

Imagination and the Opening Process

84. Because it is directed only to individuality structures, our pre-theoretical experience is ‘naïve.’ It is an experience in the foundational direction of time, as opposed to the transcendental direction of time of philosophic theoretical thought. It needs to be deepened by the process of “opening up” of the modal spheres. The earlier modal spheres (i.e. earlier in the order of cosmic time) are the foundation or substratum of all the later modal aspects; the foundational direction begins with the first modality (the numerical). The transcendental direction points toward the selfhood that transcends time, the religious fullness of meaning; this direction begins with the last sphere (faith) and follows the modal spheres in the reverse order toward the fullness that is the foundation of all modal refractions [245]. So for Dooyeweerd, faith does not escape or flee from the earlier temporal modalities by ascending, but it goes back through the earlier modalities, deepening their meaning to obtain an Idea of the ontical foundation of all modalities, including those that are the foundation of the later ones. In the transcendental direction, every concept is dependent on an Idea [246].

85. Naïve experience is generally restricted to retrocipatory moments. The modal subject-object relation is indissolubly connected with the modal retrocipatory spheres of an aspect [247]. For example, the possibility of objectification in the modal aspect of feeling is primarily bound to the retrocipatory structure of that aspect [248]. This opening up depends on our imagination to open up the anticipatory moments, it is a looking forward in time to what may and ought to be. Pre-theoretical experience is naive because it is a "resting." It is not free in the sense of being opened out beyond the natural aspects to the normative aspects [249]. Another example is in pre-theoretical thought, where the logical aspect is only actualized in its retrocipatory structure [250]. Such enstatical logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception and can only analytically distinguish concrete things and their relations according to sensorily founded characteristics [251].

86. The historical aspect is the law-sphere in which the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres gets started. It is the nodal point of the entire normative meaning-dynamics within cosmic time [252]. But Dooyeweerd distinguishes between history as the course of concrete events (what has happened) and the historical aspect in which these events function [253].

Theoretical Experience of the Cosmos

87. Theoretical thought splits apart the coherence of our experience, and distinguishes the different modes or aspects of our consciousness. Instead of an enstasis, we experience a dis-stasis, or splitting apart of the modal aspects by which we first distinguish them from each other [254].

88. This splitting up is done by the Gegenstand-relation, in which we intentionally abstract from the continuity of cosmic time [255]. This kind of abstraction must not be confused with the idea of abstraction of properties or universals from things; such a view of abstraction is a “serious misunderstanding” [256]. The abstraction from time is an epoché or suspension of time; this use of epoché must not be confused with Husserl’s idea of bracketing [257]. And intentionality must not be understood in the sense of Husserl’s directedness towards concrete reality; Dooyeweerd’s intentionality is an inner process directed to a non-ontical Gegenstand [258]. The Gegenstand as such is not real, but only a theoretical abstraction [259].

89. The Gegenstand-relation is only possible by means of our supratemporal selfhood, which stands above the temporal aspects that are split apart. In the act of theoretical thought, our supratemporal selfhood enters into its own temporal functions:

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions [260].

By means of an act of thought, our selfhood (from which that act of thought originates) opposes our deepened logical function [261] to the other functions. Our full act of thought—like all of our acts—functions in all modes, but it is able to analyze each mode of consciousness, including the logical mode [262].

90. After the dis-stasis in theoretical thought, we require a synthesis back to the unity of experience our supratemporal selfhood. “In this intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence” [263]. “Synthesis also presupposes an idea of the deeper root-unity of the distinguished aspects, an idea which can be obtained only if we choose our standpoint above the theoretical diversity” [264]. Meaning-synthesis can only be explained on the basis of the structure of self-consciousness [265]. The theoretical synthesis is determined both by cosmic time as well as by the supratemporal transcendent selfhood [266]. The synthesis back to the unity of our selfhood is done by Ideas, which go beyond what we can conceptualize in time, and which anticipate what is not yet temporally realized. We can reflect on the limits of philosophic thought only because in our supratemporal selfhood we transcend them [267]. This allows us to relate our Ideas to that which transcends theory:

Therefore by maintaining the Gegenstand-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought [268].

If we do not accomplish this synthesis, our naïve experience can be impaired [269] by a wrong use of theory. Wrong theory can rob us of the many-sided richness of things that we experience [270]. The demonic overdevelopment of the cultural power of science leads to an atomizing and technicizing of legal life and economics [271].

91. The synthesis is accomplished by our intuition, which moves back and forth between the unity of our selfhood and the diversity of temporal meaning. In the transcendental direction of theoretical intuition, by the transcendental leading of faith, our selfhood, in its transcendent unity as the religious root of our whole temporal existence, becomes cosmologically conscious [272] of itself within the temporal coherence and temporal diversity of meaning of all its aspects. Contrast this cosmological consciousness with pre-theoretical cosmic consciousness.

92. This movement to and fro between the unity of our selfhood and the temporal diversity of meaning gives a circularity to thought. Dooyeweerd refers to the meaning of ‘encyclopedia’ which is derived from the Greek enkyklios paideia, meaning “learning in a circle” [273]. But it is not a vicious circle like logicism, which remains wholly within the temporal. Rather, the movement is from the supratemporal central to the temporal peripheral. Philosophy relates from out of the center, for philosophy is a “science of totality” [274]. If, on the other hand, we begin on the temporal periphery, with merely conceptual knowledge, then that conceptual knowledge is deepened by Ideas that relate to the center [275]. The relation of center to periphery is found right at the beginning of the WdW, where Dooyeweerd relativizes the whole temporal periphery by the central, supratemporal center, although the New Critique fails to properly translate it:

From out of this central Christian viewpoint [the heart, the religious root of human existence], it appeared to me that a revolution was necessary in philosophic thought, a revolution of so radical a character, that, compared with it, Kant’s “Copernican revolution” can only be qualified as a revolution in the periphery. For what is at stake here is no less than a relativizing of the whole temporal cosmos in what we refer to as both its “natural” sides as well as its “spiritual” sides, over against the religious root of creation in Christ. In comparison with this basic Scriptural idea, of what significance is a revolution in a view of reality that relativizes the “natural” sides of temporal reality with respect to a theoretical abstraction such as Kant’s “homo noumenon” or his “transcendental subject of thought?” [276] [my translation]

93. If peripheral temporal reality is relativized by the central religious root, then we can no longer believe in the religious neutrality of theoretical thought, since theoretical thought is part of temporal reality [277]. In other words, the rejection of the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought is related to the supra-theoretical a priori of the heart as religious root. Conversely, to reject the idea of the supratemporal heart is to necessarily become involved in immanence philosophy [278].

Theoretical thought as a religious act

94. Theoretical thought, in its concentric relatedness to our selfhood (the religious root, the religious concentration point of our entire temporal existence) and to God (as the absolute Origin of all things) is “an act of an unmistakably religious character [279]. It is a process of driving on from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere until we arrive at the transcendental terminal sphere of our cosmos and reflect on the insufficiency of the modal Idea [280]. The foundational concepts, which provide a provisional resting-point for our thinking, must be resolved into the essential unrest of meaning, and we must go on to an inter-modal meaning synthesis [281].

95. None of these ninety-five theses may be regarded as an isolated axiom, or as part of a syllogism, or as a proposition that can be analyzed on its own. They are ideas that are known to be insufficient, but are part of the process of “driving on from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere.” The ultimate destination of a transcendentally directed reflective journey is the living God of religious self-reflection, in Whom our thought finally finds rest [282]. Only after the raising of questions ceases to be meaningful, does philosophic thought attain to the Origin, and is it set at rest [283].

Endnotes

[1] Dooyeweerd’s A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997; first published 1953) [‘NC’], I, 3. This work is an English translation and revision of Dooyeweerd’s De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935) (‘WdW’).

[2] NC II, 7 fn2.

[3] NC II, 561.

[4] NC II, 111-115, especially II, 113, fn1.

[5] See Theses 10 and 71.

[6] NC II, 474-79; WdW II, 410 (“wetend beleven of in-leven in de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid”). He criticizes a merely psychical view of Erlebnis at NC II, 113 fn1.

[7] WdW I, 47 (“rekenschap geven”); NC I, 83; II 579.

[8] “Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Jerusalem and Athens (Presbyterian & Reformed, 1971), 75. Also, Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, (original 1967 Dutch SRVU version, 42-44). The distinction between ‘vooronderstellingen’ and ‘de vooronderstelde’ is improperly translated in the 2002 edition). See also “Het transcendentale critiek van het wijsgeerig denken,” Philosophia Reformata 6 (1941), 1-20 [‘Transcendentale Critiek’], at 5 for the distinction between theoretical and supra-theoretical presuppositions [voor-oordeelen].

[9] NC I, 3; II, 579.

[10] The inter-modal coherence of meaning is not a construction (NC I, 507). The Humanistic science-ideal improperly ascribes a creative logical function to human consciousness. And the synthetic a priori is not to be understood as a constructive creation of the human mind (NC II, 7 fn2, 555, 593).

[11] “Het dilemma voor het christelijk wijsgeerig denken en het critisch karakter van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936), 1-16 [“Dilemma”], at 7. See Theses 88-90 for the Gegenstand-relation.

[12] Encyclopedia of the Science of Law (Mellen Press, 2002), 95.

[13] “Transcendentale Critiek,”14: “ontische voor-onderstelden” of which we can “give an account” only by our Ideas, not by our concepts.

[14] Dooyeweerd’s last article, “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101 [‘Gegenstandsrelatie’], 91, online [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/ Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html]. The a priori should not be regarded as a conceptual axiom or subjective presupposition. It is an ontical condition of all knowledge. They are ‘ontic a prioris’ (Encyclopedia of the Science of Law (2002), 95.

[15] NC I, 88.

[16] NC I, 37. “Transcendentale Critiek,” 4. Encyclopedia (1967 SRVU Dutch edition), 80-81. And “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 83.

[17] NC I, 57.

[18] For the meaning of ‘anticipate,’ see Theses 19 and 94.

[19] See Theses 9, 11, 66, 87, 90-91, 94.

[20] NC I, 57, 88.

[21] Encyclopedia (2002), 80.

[22] NC II, 560-61.

[23] ‘Plastic’ in the sense of capable of being formed (NC II, 557-58). And recall that for Dooyeweerd, the historical aspect is the aspect of forming.

[24] NC II, 479, 594.

[25] NC II, 562 (related to the human selfhood qua talis).

[26] NC II, 474. See also Thesis 83.

[27 NC II, 491.

[28] NC I, 51.

[29] NC II, 560.

[30] NC I, 55, 57; NC II, 4.

[31] In the Twilight of Western Thought (Craig Press, 1968) [‘Twilight’], 185.

[32] Encyclopedia (2002), 44.

[33] NC II, 535.

[34] Dooyeweerd’s Second Response to Curators (Oct. 12, 1937), 34, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html]: man is “able to not only relatively but radically go out above all temporal things.”

[35] NC I, 31 fn1.

[36] NC I, 32. Also “Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939), 1-2 [‘Tijdsprobleem’].

[37] NC I, 28.

[38] The religious horizon is different from the temporal horizon. Dooyeweerd avoided using the term “central trans cosmic time,” because that still refers to cosmic time; it would be a duplication of the temporal horizon (NC I, 32-33).

[39] NC III, 784. Also Propositions 5 and 9 of “De leer van den mensch in de W.D.W.” Correspondentie Bladen 5 (1942), translated as “32 Propositions on Anthropology,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/
32Propositions.html].

[40] The aevum is the created intermediate state between eternity and cosmic time. “Tijdsprobleem,” 4-5.

[41] Dooyeweerd’s Second Response to the Curators, 34.

[42] NC II, 561.

[43] NC I, 11.

[44] “Dilemma,” 14. “It is this tendency towards the origin which discloses the fact, that our ego is subjected to a central law.” (NC I, 11). Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1967 SRVU edition), 22: “Wij kunnen deze wet de religieuze concentratiewet noemen.”

[45] NC I, 11.

[46] WdW II, 401; NC II, 468. “In pre-theoretical thought our I-ness enters entstatically by means of its intuition into the cosmic temporal coherence of experience.”

[47] NC II, 479.

[48] NC II, 474; WdW II, 414.

[49] NC I, 33.

[50] Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946), 12. Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/
Encyclopedia.html].

[51] NC I, 3; II, 467-474; WdW II, 405-406, 409. Also Twilight, 126.

[52] NC I, 18, 84. It is different from what is “given” to us in experience. “Tijdsprobleem,” 1-2.

[53] NC II, 184-185.

[54] NC I, 29.

[55] NC I, 4 fn1; II, 479-80 (“experience in identity, only deepened”).

[56] NC I, 51. Encyclopedia (1967 SRVU Dutch edition), 21 (mistranslated in the 2002 edition).

[57] See Magnus Verbrugge’s 1974 Interview of Dooyeweerd, which refers to “modes of experience” [ervaringswijze], online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/ 1974Interview.html].

[58] “Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde,” February, 1923 (excerpts in Marcel Verburg: Herman Dooyeweerd: Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989) [‘Verburg’], 53.

[59] Twilight, 180.

[60] NC I, 3, 34; II, 479. And “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 93.

[61] NC I, 3.

[62] NC I, 102.

[63] Gegenstandsrelatie,”90: “the modal structures lie at the foundation of the individuality structures, and not the other way around.”

[64] NC I, 29. See Thesis 17 regarding anticipations and retrocipations.

[65]Gegenstandsrelatie,” 99. The mutual irreducibility of the law-spheres and their mutual irreducible reciprocal meaning-coherence “are not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence.”

[66] Encyclopedia (2002) 80: “it is not possible to form a concept of a particular aspect without having this concept led by an idea of their [the aspects] mutual coherence and deeper root-unity.”

[67] WdW I, 71.

[68] NC I, 105-106.

[69] NC II, 186, 485-86.

[70] Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought," Evangelical Quarterly 19 (Jan 1947), 51: “What in the totality of meaning has no meaning is the sovereignty in its own sphere in the particularity of meaning” (WdW I, 71)

[71] NC II, 170.

[72] NC II, 302. Encyclopedia (2002), 32: “in the faith aspect of reality, time takes on a specific meaning of the revelation of the supratemporal, of what lies hidden beyond time.” Pages 174-75: We misconstrue this aspect if we do not see it “in its immediate relatedness to the transcendent root and origin of the creation.” It is the only aspect that of itself points beyond time, and not merely via anticipatory moments of meaning.

[73] Encyclopedia (2002), 33: The philosophical idea of totality is completely different from the idea of the cosmos or the universe.

[74] Encyclopedia (2002), 174-75.

[75] NC I, 3.

[76] Encyclopedia (2002), 33.

[77] Dooyeweerd’s1964 Lecture to the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy, “Centrum en Omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een veranderende wereld,” Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) 1-20 [‘1964 Lecture’]. This comment comes from page 2 of the Discussion following the lecture, which has only been published online. See also p. 8. A translation of both the talk and discussion is available online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ 1964Lecture.html].

[78] Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.[ernstig misverstand].

[79] NC II, 417: “We cannot obtain true structural concepts of individuality by means of the procedure of gradual abstraction. Nor can we obtain theoretical insight into the modal structures of the law-spheres by gradual abstraction.”

[80] There is a deepened “experience in identity” (NC II, 480).

[81] The horizon of experience is the same horizon of existence for man and for the world. “Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorisch Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de grondslag der Vrije Universiteit,” Philosophia Reformata 31 (1966) 3-15, at 7.

[82] NC II, 113 fn2. The same page says that inner acts encompass the whole horizon of modal aspects. External acts are the expression of the intentional direction of the inner act, and relate to the same modal laws. NC II, 111-115. (NC II, 113 fn1). Sometimes Dooyeweerd uses ‘inner’ to refer to the supratemporal selfhood even apart from its expression within our body, as when he speaks of the soul as the root-unity, the “inner person” in the Pauline sense that expresses itself in temporal, bodily life.

[83] Encyclopedia of the Science of Law (2002), 59. So there are two levels of the “inner” that need to be distinguished. Page 192: Inner acts of human life are realized in the “external world” by our actions.

[84] “Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde” (February, 1923, cited by Verburg), 60:

[85] “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.

[86] NC II, 557.“In veritable naïve experience, things are not experienced as completely separate entities (NC III, 54).

[87] NC III, 54.

[88] NC I, 42. See also “Gegenstandsrelatie, 88ff."

[89] NC I, 42; III, 55.

[90] NC III, 37-38.

[91] NC II, 369-374.

[92] NC II, 374ff.

[93] The sensory aspect of perceiving does not at all play that preponderant role in naive experience that the current epistemological opinion ascribes to it (NC III, 38).

[94] NC II, 371. That does not mean that we construct the object. See my article “Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical Themes in Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy” [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ Imagination.html].

[95] NC III, 65. The aspects within which individuality structures function have such a structure of a relative unity in a diversity of moments. Encyclopedia (2002), 94, 102.

[96] “Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought,” Evangelical Quarterly 19 (1947) Vol. 1, 42-51.

[97] NC III, 79.

[98] NC I, 100. And see Theses 75, 77.

[99] “Transcendentale Critiek,” 7. Concrete things function within the modal structures, which first make them possible, and which form their foundation in an apriori ontical sense. “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 87: our analytical thought functions within the logical aspect of our horizon of experience. Page 90: Individual entities function in all modal aspects of human experience.

[100] “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.

[101] Encyclopedia (2002), 94, 102.

[102] NC III, 56. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 42.

[103] NC III, 79. Encyclopedia (2002) 205-206.

[104] Grenzen van het theoretisch denken (Baarn: Ambo, 1986), 69. Also “Het substantiebegrip in de moderne natuurphilosophie en de theorie van het enkaptisch structuurgeheel,” Philosophia Reformata 15 (1959), 66-139 at 33 fn60.

[105] NC III, 55.

[106] There is no simple thing, because no single structure of individuality can be realized except in inter-structural intertwinements with other individuality-structures (NC III, 627).

[107] NC III, 90-91, 696ff.

[108] NC III, 781, 784. And Proposition 10 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[109] WdW II, 403; NC II, 470.

[110] “Tijdsprobleem,” 171.

[111] The word ‘systasis’ means “the factual immediacy of our integral experience of reality.” NC III, 36 fn1. WdW II, 395 (systatisch in-gesteld). “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 87, 91-94, 98. Also De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), 90 [‘Crisis’].

[112] NC I, 89, 99, 111, 502-508.

[113] ‘Radical’ in the sense of ‘radix’ or root. NC I, 31, 60. For Dooyeweerd, any radical philosophy must accept the idea of the religious root.

[114] This religious antithesis passes transversally through the existence of every Christian personality (WdW I, 492; NC I, 524).

[115] Encyclopedia (2002), 48.

[116] NC I, 89, 99, 502-508.

[117] WdW I, 6, 22, 36, 64; II, 395, 401 (ingevoegd, ingesteld); NC I, 24; II, 468, (translated as 'inherent' and 'fitted into'); 470-471, 473 (translated as ‘embedded’); Encyclopedia (1946), 9. Encyclopedia (2002), 28, 32, 102 (inconsistently translated as ‘incorporated’ or ‘enmeshed’). Crisis, 87, 102.

[118] NC II, 560.

[119] Vernieuwing en Bezinning [‘Vernieuwing’], 242. This is not included in the partial translation Roots of Western Culture (Toronto: Wedge, 1979) [‘Roots’].

[120] Verburg, 90.

[121] “Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Jerusalem and Athens, 83-84. At p. 84 Dooyeweerd says,

In your [Van Til's] train of thought the matter seems to be quite simple. The Word-revelation results from divine thought. It is mediated to man through ordinary language. Its content is thought-content expressed in words (wrongly identified with concepts). Consequently, listening to Scripture, obeying the voice of God speaking through Christ in Scripture, means making every human thought subject to divine thought expressed in scriptural concepts, so that man has to “think God's thoughts after him.” Is this really a biblical view? I am afraid not. Nowhere does the Bible speak of obeying the voice of God in terms of subjecting every human thought to divine thought.

[122] NC II, 52.

[123] Twilight, 134. Second Response to Curators, 27.

[124] Second Response to Curators, 31:

But there should be no difference of opinion among us that overall, where Scripture refers to the ‘heart’ (or the soul) of man in connection with sin or redemption, and in general in connection with the fundamental religious attitude toward God, only the religious centre of life, the root of man’s whole existence is in issue. That may above all not be made into a free, academic question of “exegesis,” no more than the question of what the Scriptures mean by sin, rebirth, incarnation of the Word, etc.

[125] “Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Jerusalem and Athens, 86.

[126] Dooyeweerd’s 1964 Lecture, Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) at 17. Also NC II, 562.

[127] See the 1975 interview of Dooyeweerd by Pieter Boeles in Acht Civilisten in Burger, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ Interview.html], 56. Dooyeweerd refers to a discussion with a young theologian. Dooyeweerd said that not everything in the Bible is inspired:

But my interrogator was of a completely different opinion. According to him the Bible was “inspired by God word for word” and he therefore found my distinction between the Bible and God’s Word to be an insult to God’s Word. With that of course there was no point in any further dialogue.

[128] Crisis, 113. Also “De Zin der Geschiedenis in de ‘Leiding Gods’ in de Historische Ontwikkeling” (Publicaties van de Reunisten-Organisatie van N.D.D.D., 1932). Also Proposition 5 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[129] NC I, v.

[130] WdW III, 627; NC III, 783.

[131] Dooyeweerd’s farewell lecture, October 16, 1965, “Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorish Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de grondslag der Vrije Universiteit,” Philosophia Reformata 31 (1966) 3-15 at 8: “Dr. Abraham Kuyper has rediscovered the biblical revelation of the religious root of human existence, which is the key to true self-knowledge.”

[132] Twilight, 125.

[133] Twilight, 124-25, 135-36, 145.

[134] Dooyeweerd’s 1964 Lecture in Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) at 7, 9, 17. And 1964 Discussion, published only online, at 5.

[135] Dooyeweerd says that his philosophy makes a radical break with immanence philosophy in its idea that it understands that our whole temporal human existence proceeds from out of the religious root, the heart (First response to the Curators of the Free University, April 27, 1937, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html]).). Crisis, 113. Encyclopedia (1946), 14-15. Encyclopedia (2002), 36-37, 41: Immanence philosophy seeks the Archimedean point of philosophy within theoretical thought itself instead of relating it to our “I-ness”—the “undivided center of all temporal human existence.” And page 84: Immanence philosophy denies any non-theoretical presuppositions, or what Dooyeweerd calls 'ontical conditions' of thought.

[136] Encyclopedia (2002), 36-37, 41. Also NC I, 15.

[137] Encyclopedia (2002), 84.

[138] NC I, 64.

[139] NC III, 29-30.

[140] NC II, 563.

[141] WdW I, 492; NC I, 524.

[142] WdW I, 80. Anastasis opposed to apostasis. Not in NC.

[143] Twilight, 125. "What is Man?" International Reformed Bulletin 3 (1960), 4-16, at 14.

[144] WdW I, 64; NC I, 73 (“Being is only to be ascribed to God”), 99 (Being of God). WdW 69, 74; NC 104, 108 (Being of the Arché).

[145] NC I, 4, 10.

[146] NC I, 39, 87.

[147] “Transcendentale Critiek,” 7.

[148] NC I, 4.

[149] NC I, 9; WdW I, 11 [uit, door en tot].

[150] Abraham Kuyper: “Calvinism and Religion,” Stone Lectures 53. [http://www.neocalvinisme.nl/ak/calv/
akstone2.html].

[151] From the debate between J.G. Ubbink and A.H. de Hartog in the journal Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren, 2 (1916), 169, a journal to which Dooyeweerd contributed, and edited by Vollenhoven.

[152] NC I, 32.

[153] NC I, 31 fn1 and I, 106 fn1.

[154] NC II, 53 fn1 (The ‘heavens’ means the “temporal world concentrated in man”). NC II, 52 (in man the whole temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos finds its religious root), 548-49 (‘earthly’ cosmos); 593 (man transcends the temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos in all its aspects; NC III, 88 (man as lord of the ‘earthly’ temporal world), 783 (man as “the personal religious creaturely centre of the whole earthly cosmos”).

[155] For meaning of ‘religious root’ and ‘Totality’ see my article “Dooyeweerd, Spann and the Philosophy of Totality,” Philosophia Reformata 70 (2005) 2-22, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Totality.html].

[156] For ‘functiemantel’ see “Tijdsprobleem,” 4, 5.

[157] NC III, 88.

[158] Third response to Curators, March 19, 1938, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/
Response3.html]).

[159] NC I, 110; WdW I, 76: ‘onderworpen zijn’.

[160] “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939), 193-232 at 211 and 218, citing Kuyper’s Stone Lectures. See also Proposition 9 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.” And Second Response to the Curators32.

[161] NC I, 99.

[162] NC III, 525.

[163] NC I, 99, 507, 518.

[164] WdW I, 57. NC I, 99.

[165] NC II, 7, 8, 418, 561.

[166] NC I, 96.

[167] Proposition 31 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[168] See Thesis 57.

[169] Encyclopedia (1946),13. Also 1964 Discussion, 14: “the law-Idea thus finds its correlate in the subject-Idea.” NC II, 418: The “ultimate individual” is correlate to the universal on the law-side, and both are correlated in the religious root. The ultimate subject is “the transcendent fullness of individuality.”

[170] “Schepping en evolutie,” 115-116, cited by Peter J. Steen: The Structure of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Thought, (Toronto: Wedge, 1983) [‘Steen’] at 61-62.

[171] NC I, 33.

[172] NC II, 41.

[173] Proposition 29 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[174] “Na vijf en dertig jaren,” Philosophia Reformata 36 (1971), 1-10 at 9.

[175] Second Response to the Curators10.

[176] NC I, 102.

[177] NC II, 418.

[178] NC II, 8.

[179] NC II, 418.

[180] See Proposition 29 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.” Also NC I, 100.

[181] “Calvijn als Bouwer,” Polemios 2/22 Aug. 23/1947. See also Proposition 32 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[182] Second Response to the Curators 34.

[183] WdW I, 6; NC I, 4.

[184] "What is Man?" International Reformed Bulletin 3 (1960), 4-16, reproduced in Twilight, 173-195.

[185] NC I, 16, 54; II, 115.

[186] Second Response to the Curators 26-27.

[187] NC I, 4; NC III, 6-7: “…a spiritual centre, which is nothing in itself, but whose nature is a “stare extra se”, a self-surrender to its true or its fancied Origin.”

[188] NC I, 100; WdW I, 65.

[189] NC I, 55.

[190] NC II, 52, 53.

[191] NC II, 549. Roots 30. Vernieuwing, 29. Encyclopedia (2002), 58.

[192] "What is Man?" 13; Twilight, 189.

[193] WdW I, 5; NC I, 4 fn1.

[194] NC I, 31-33, fn1; III, 784.

[195] NC II, 111.

[196] “Tijdsprobleem,” 4, 5. "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer," 204.

[197] NC III, 88.

[198] See 1964 Lecture in Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) at 7, 9, 16-17. Encyclopedia (1946), 14. “Tijdsprobleem,” 181.

[199] NC II, 561.

[200] Encyclopedia (2002), 62.

[201] NC III, 89.

[202] Crisis, 103.

[203] Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” 204.

[204] NC I, 32 (“lost in time”); not in WdW. NC II, 480.

[205] NC II, 480; WdW II, 415.

[206] NC II, 114, 477.

[207] NC II, 539; III, 58. Also “Tijdsprobleem,” 181.

[208] NC II, 594-595. Encyclopedia (2002), 181.

[209] NC II, 418.

[210] “Tijdsprobleem,” 4-5, 181, 204, 216.

[211] Third response to Curators, cited in Verburg 226-227. See also Proposition 5 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[212] Vernieuwing, 58.

[213] Roots 30. Also Encyclopedia (2002), 47, 152.

[214] 1964 lecture in Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) at 16.

[215] NC III, 783.

[216] “Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer,” 211.

[217] Vernieuwing, 30.

[218] Encyclopedia (1946), 28, 35.

[219] Abraham Kuyper: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, (Amsterdam: J.A. Wormser, 1894), I, 370.

[220] NC II, 564; WdW II, 496 [“viel de menschelijk zelfheid af in den tijdshorizon”].

[221] WdW I, vi.

[222] NC II, 53, 549. Also Thesis 66.

[223] WdW I, 65. NC I, 100; II, 33 52; III, 783. Encyclopedia (2002), 47.

[224] First response to the Curators of the Free University [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ Response1.html] (April 27, 1937), cited in Verburg, 212.

[225] WdW I, 67; NC I, 102.

[226] NC I, 175, 506. Also “Calvijn als Bouwer,” 6.

[227] NC I, 175; II, 33.

[228] NC I, 175.

[229] NC III, 524-25.

[230] Roots, 39.

[231] WdW II, 496 [‘deelhebben’]; NC II, 564, inadequately translated as ‘sharing.’ Also WdW II, 491, 527; NC II, 560, 593 (‘partakes’).

[232] See Thesis 53.

[233] “Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer,” 204 ft. 13.

[244] NC III, 783.

[235] NC I, 32. And see Propositions 14 and 20 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[236] See “Tijdsprobleem” regarding what it means “to proceed” from out of the supratemporal selfhood.

[237] Encyclopedia (2002), 192, 223. NC II, 113. Also Proposition 14 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[238] NC III, 88. Also Proposition 14 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[239] Encyclopedia (2002), 192, 225.

[240] NC II, 478.

[241] NC II, 474, 478.

[242] NC II, 479.

[243] NC II, 473.

[244] NC II, 594.

[245] NC II, 51-54.

[246] NC I, 187.

[247] NC II, 383.

[248] NC II, 373.

[249] WdW II, 409. Encyclopedia (2002), 178.

[250] NC II, 120.

[251] NC II, 470.

[252] NC II, 190.

[253] Encyclopedia (2002), 140. Also 1964 Discussion, 3.

[254] NC I, 3, 34; II, 467-472.

[255] “Tijdsprobleem,” 175.

[256] “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.

[257] NC II, 468 fn1.

[258] NC I, 39. Also Proposition 14 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

[259] “Transcendentale Critiek,” 9.

[260] Encyclopedia (1946), 12.

[261] NC II, 474.

[262] NC II, 462-63.

[263] NC II, 479.

[264] Encyclopedia (2002), 35. Also NC I, 45.

[265] Crisis, 103.

[266] “Tijdsprobleem,” 179.

[267] NC I, 88.

[268] Encyclopedia (2002), 80-81, re-translated by myself from the 1967 SRVU.

[269] NC I, 171; III, 145.

[270] Encyclopedia (1967 SRVU), 10.

[271] Encyclopedia (2002) 27, 164.

[272] NC II, 473, 478-79, 578.

[273] Encyclopedia (1946), 6.

[274] Encyclopedia (1946), 10.

[275] See Thesis 85.

[276] WdW I, vi; inadequately translated by NC I, v.

[277] NC I, vi.

[278] See Thesis 44.

[279] Encyclopedia (2002), 44. Also 1964 Lecture, Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) at 17.

[280] NC II, 284.

[281] NC II, 190.

[282] NC II, 284.

[283] NC I, 11.

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Revised June 17/09