Part 2 of Lecture 3

The Relation of Jung's Psychology
to Meister Eckhart and Jakob Boehme

by
Dr. J. Glenn Friesen
© 2008

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III. Jung and Jakob Boehme

A. Who was Boehme? (1575-1642)

Jakob Boehme is also known as the mystical shoemaker of Goerlitz. In 1600, Boehme observed a ray of sunlight reflected in a pewter dish. This gave Boehme an ecstatic vision of the Godhead as pervading all of existence. In 1612, Boehme wrote the book Aurora [12]. In that book, he says,

As a result of his publication of Aurora, Boehme was prosecuted by the local pastor.

In 1623, Boehme published The Way to Christ[13]. As a result of that publication, Boehme was banished from Goerlitz.

Boehme’s ideas emphasize the idea of development within the Godhead. In other words, God is not static, but there is development within God Himself.But as we shall see, both Jung and Dourley misinterpret this development within God Himself with the development in man. They confuse the divine quaternity with the human quaternity.

Two centuries later, Franz von Baader, whom we discussed in Lecture 2, transmitted Boehme’s ideas to the philosophers of his time. In particular, he transmitted these ideas to the philosopher Schelling, although he disagreed with Schelling’s pantheistic use of Boehme.And he also disagreed with Hegel’s use of Boehme.

For further information on Boehme, here are some other online resources:

1. The Works of Jacob Boehme online [http://www.passtheword.org/Jacob-Boehme/]

2. Boehme Resources [http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~janzb/boehme/]

3. N.A. Berdyaev: “Studies concerning Jacob Boehme” [http://www.berdyaev.com/
berdiaev/berd_lib/1930_349.html]. It should be noted that Berdyaev was influenced by Baader.
4. Edward A. Beach: Jakob Boehme: [http://users.erols.com/nbeach/boehme.html].

B. Boehme’s influence on Jung

Jung refers to Boehme even more than Meister Eckhart. Donivan Bessinger has compiled an index of citations of Boehme in Jung’s Collected Works, and this index is also available online [14].

In relation to our discussion in Lecture 2 of quaternity and mandalas, it is important to look at what Jung says about these ideas in relation to Boehme.

Jung refers to the the mandala in Boehme’s treatise XL Questions concerning the Soule. (Mandala Symbolism p. 5, para 717; reproduced in Study in the Process of Individuation, p. 297 in The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. [CW 9]).

Jung says that this is a symbols of the self and also an image of God. In Jung’s own reproduction of the image, the following appear at the four corners of the circle: Law, Gospel, Selfe and Resignation.

This is not a diagram that can be easily simplified. Note the dark half and the light half of the circle. Note that the light part of the circle also again contains Father, Son and Holy Spirit as the Divine Mysterium. There is a double quaternity.

Also note the heart as the place of intersection, the center of a cross. The top part is death, no elements, heaven, Son, Abgrund. The lower part is mysterium, four elements, earth, earthly man, miracle [Wunder] and Abgrund.

The left side is Father; all-powerful, fire, the Tincture, demons, and at the lowest point, the eternal hell of the demons. The right side is Soul, Spirit, Image.

In relation to this mandala, Jung cites Boehme:

The flash is the “birth of the light.” It is a liberating flash. Boehme also associates lightning with the quaternity:

Note that Jung himself emphasizes the center as a heart. Jung also refers to Boehme’s mandala in Commentary on the Secret of the Golden Flower, para. 31. “An unmistakable and very interesting mandala can be found in Jakob Böhme’s book XL Questions concerning the Soule.” Boehme calls it the “Philosophical Eye” or the “Mirror of Wisdom.” This mandala a quaternity. It is related to the Trinity, and to the experience of light in the mystical experience of Hildegaard of Bingen (CW 13, para. 31).

Jolande Jacobi refers to another Jung mandala:

Here is the mandala she is referring to:

But Boehme says that the Uroborus is not something that we are to imitate Dialogue of Two Souls, 140, s.11). He calls it “the essential fire-wheel, a serpent-image, Mercury in Vulcan.” To imitate the Uroborus is to fall into sin.

Boehme says that when Eve fell, she attracted to herself the four elements with their essences (s. 17).

C. Issues in Jung’s Interpretation of Jakob Boehme

Did Jung interpret Boehme correctly? And has Jung in turn been interpreted correctly in what he says about Boehme?
In his article “Revisioning Incarnation: Jung on the Relativity of God,” [16] John P. Dourley argues that Jung used Boehme in support of these ideas:

We will look at each of these ideas in detail. In each case, we need to ask whether Jung right in his interpretation of Boehme.

(1) Identity with God

Dourley says that Boehme refers to a moment of identity with the divine, preceding a return to the “very grossest and meanest matter of earth” (Dourley, 18, citing Boehme, The Forty Questions of the Soul and The Clavis, sec. 8).

But Boehme denies that Man is identical with God or even Christ:

In his introduction to Boehme’s The Way to Christ, Rufus M. Jones says,

Jones says that for Boehme, fire is not just an agent, but a symbol for the urge for life at the centre of all living reality (p. xxv:). We may draw an analogy to Jung’s idea of libido. The Ungrund is the state of being antecedent to reality and to all duality. It is the coincidentia oppositorum (xxvi).

So for Boehme, man is not identical to the state of being antecedent to reality.

As we discussed in relation to Meister Eckhart, Jung cannot, if he follows his Kantian principles, speak of God in Himself. We can become identical with the image of God, which is what we were intended to be when we were created in the image of God.

Boehme emphasizes that we are the image of God, the temple of the Holy Spirit which dwells with us, and a member of Christ.. (The Way to Christ p. 41, “Of True Repentance,” II, para. 1). And Boehme does speak of being in God and God in him. “Christ within us! I yield myself completely to Thee! Do Thou with me as Thou wilt! Amen! (“Of True Repentance,” section 43). But being in Christ and Christ in us does not mean identity with Christ. To say that we are in God implies that God is not identical with us but always exceeds and transcends us. And if we are the instrument of Christ, that does not mean that we are our own instrument. “I do not want to go anywhere else than where Thou mayest lead me as an instrument. Do Thou in and with me as Thou wilt.”

And as discussed in relation to Eckhart, even Jung does not accept an identity of Self and God, except in the sense of God-image.

(2) Evil and God

Jung sees evil as part of God, part of the divine Quaternity. In Answer to Job, Jung sees the figure of Satan complements Christ.

Jung saw the alchemical figure of Mercurius as a compensation for the one-sideness of the symbol of Christ [Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 210] That is why Jung believed that "It is possible for a man to attain totality, to become whole, only with the co-operation of the spirit of darkness..” (“The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairy Tales,” CW 9, para. 453).

But in making these statements, Jung is exceeding his own Kantian principles He is making metaphysical statements about what transcends humanity as God-image or reflection.

It is certainly true that man as he presently reflects the God-image contains evil. That is what is meant by the fall into sin. But Jung sees evil as equally ultimate with good, and that is a metaphysical statement that is not warranted.

As we saw in Lecture 2, Jung had an interest in the evil side of reality even from a young age. Later, his ideas of evil took form around the idea of the privatio boni—that evil is merely an absence of the good. Jung rejected that doctrine, and wanted to emphasize the reality of evil:

But these statements go far beyond man as image of God, and make metaphysical statements of God in Himself in relation to evil. Towards the end of 1949 Victor White (a priest who was a close friend of Jung’s) criticized something that Jung wrote about the privatio boni that was later included in Aion. White criticized Jung's “quasi-Manichean dualism” and his “somewhat confused and confusing pages.”

Jung actually included a reference to White's criticisms in a footnote in the text of Aion. And in a letter to White, he attempted to clarify the problem:

Jung was afraid that if evil is looked upon as non-being. In the same letter, he says “nobody will take his own shadow seriously. The future of mankind very much depends upon the recognition of the shadow. Evil is - psychologically speaking - terribly real. It is a fatal mistake to diminish its power and reality even merely metaphysically. I am sorry, this goes to the very roots of Christianity.”

I agree that there is a shadow within humanity, and that that shadow relates to the selfhood (in its fallen state). But that is not reason to place evil within God.

At times, Jung seems to acknowledge this. He says that he contested the validity of the privatio boni only in the empirical realm. “My attitude to this problem is empirical, not theoretical or aprioristic.” For “in the metaphysical realm…good may be a substance and evil non-existent (me on).”[18] Jung seems to suggest there that perhaps God in Himself is pure good and that it is only the God-image that contains evil. And yet other statements that Jung makes seem to go well beyond his empirical principles.

Baader is of assistance here. He interprets Boehme differently. God has a dark side, Ungrund. When Boehme speaks of ‘Ungrund,” he means what Kabbalah refers to as Ein Soph [19]. But although God has a shadow side, it is eternally kept under God’s control by his will. But God is not responsbile for Man’s misuse of this, and creating temporal evil.
Baader’s interpretation of Boehme seems correct, for Boehme denies that God wills evil:

Boehme says that man’s soul and the angels come out of the eternal ground from which Light and darkness arise. Darkness lies in the employment of ego-centric desire, so Light consists in a similar willing with God (Way to Christ, p. 129, “Of the Suprasensual Life,” s. 43). Therefore, it is correct to say that light and darkness both arise from God. But evil is not realized in God, since God wills only love. And the love of God transforms the fire into love:

Boehme does say that God is Darkness and Light, Love and Wrath, Fire and Light. But he calls Himself Light only, according to the Light of His Love (Way to Christ, p. 63, "Of True Resignation," II, s. 9).

Boehme says that mere knowledge of sin and of Christ on the Cross does not make one a Christian (Way to Christ: p. 96, “Of Regeneration,” V, s. 1). He emphasizes importance of experience, and we can see some similarities with the three stages that Jung mentions. When the will surrenders itself into God’s Ground then it sinks beyond itself, beyond all grounds and points of view, into the only place where God is revealed, where He works and wills. Then it has become a no-thing to its own ego-centric will. (Way to Christ, p. 126, “Of the Supersensual Life,” s. 38). So there is an abandoning of our ego, and a letting go, letting God’s will take over.

And so on this point, I believe that Dourley is correct in his interpretation of Jung, but that both Dourley and Jung have misinterpreted Boehme. Baader provides a better interpretation, that still has the psychological power of Jung’s stages of individuation, but preserves the transcendence of God, and avoids finding evil within God.

(3) Does God require humanity in order to become conscious?

This is the other major point where both Dourley and Jung misinterpret Boehme. As discussed above, it is true to say that God in the sense of God-image “becomes” when God is born in our soul. But it does not follow that the transcendent God “depends” on man for consciousness. That idea, which Jung does seem to hold, derives from Hegel, and not from Boehme. Jung says,

Dourley correctly finds Jung’s idea to be similar to Hegel’s view of God’s self-realization in history. Jung acknowledged affinities with Hegel. [21] Baader opposed that viewpoint, and tried to show Boehme’s actual ideas.

Baader, who introduced the ideas of Eckhart to Hegel, specifically opposed Hegel’s views and also interpretation of Boehme. Hegel himself comments on this [22]. He speaks of Baader’s Gnosis, not philosophy. Hegel both criticizes and praises Baader. He praises Baader for bringing Boehme’s depths to forms. And for setting out Boehme’s idea of creation in accordance with the trinitarian God. But he criticizes Baader, since Baader does not develop his ideas from logical propositions but from images and from given absolutes, like the Trinity, and quaternity. Hegel opposes Baader’s Ternar and pythagoreanism, but also opposes Schelling’s polarity. Hegel says that for Baader, a distinction is not an opposition. For Hegel, everything finite must sublate itself. But, says Grassl, for Baader, everything finite can only sublate itself in something ontologically higher or lower.

It is beyond the scope of this lecture to go into this in the detail it deserves. But it is important to realize that there are different interpretations of Boehme, and that Baader provides an alternative to what Jung says. Unlike Hegel and Schelling, Baader is not monistic. His theosophy is also not Gnostic, so it is not world flight, but an active working in the world. With respect to evil, Baader says that there are two quaternities: the divine and the human. We must not confuse the two if we want to avoid pantheism. And for Baader, teleology is not just a logical category, but a purpose for creation. If we understand our center in the ground, we take part in the continuing creative process of God.

Dourley interprets Boehme to refer to an unconscious God creating consciousness in order to Himself become conscious in it. He thinks that Boehme speaks of a divinity that cannot reconcile opposites and is forced to create consciousness as the sole way of perceiving the divine contradicition and respond to divinity’s plea to resolve its conflicted life in humanity. Divinity is then dependent on ego. Dourley sees this as the opus of alchemy. Alchemy makes God progressively more conscious or incarnate in humanity But this confuses the God –image with God in Himself. It confuses the human quaternity with the divine quaternity.

Jung and Dourley are wrong in their interpretation. Boehme specifically denies that God needed to create in order to perfect himself:

There is thus no pantheistic identification of God and world in Boehme.

Baader, who is known for his interpretation of Boehme, opposed pantheism.

In other word,s we can assert panentheism (that all is in God) without asserting pantheism (that everything is God). Baader says that pantheism results when we confuse the dynamic relation in God with the act of creation (Werke 12, 154 and 339). He says that the sum of all creation does not constitute a creator, as pantheists think. The Center is not the sum of all the periphery-points [Peripherie-Punkte], but stands as essence [Inbegriff ] over them ( Begründung 63 fn. 7). There is to be union and not confusion between creature and Creator (Werke I, 203). The immanence or inexistence of all things in God must not be understood as a pantheistic identity of all things with God (Werke 8, 241; 14, 31, 70). The Christian doctrine of immanence, in contrast to the pantheistic doctrine of identity is a teaching of acting, willing and knowing in God (Werke 5, 252).

The joy before creation shows that there is embodiment even within God. There is a difference between the Center of God and God’s expression in the divine nature. Boehme does say, “In his depth [Ungrund], God himself does not know what he is. For he knows no beginning, and also nothing like himself, and also no end. . . .” (Aurora, ch. 23, s. 17). But Baader makes Boehme’s meaning clear: this embodiment and divine knowledge is within the divine quaternity. It does not depend on the creation of man or the world.

Grassl says that for Baader there is no becoming in the Godhead but only the birth, and no pantheism, because the Ternar is completely fulfilled in itself. and can only be thought in analogies, in relation to human self-consciousness.

Both Jung and Baader quote from Angelus Silesius (1624-77), but with different interpretations regarding this issue of the dependence of God on man. Jung says,

Baader quotes the same passage from Silesius in Fermenta Cognitionis II, 22 (Werke II, 229):

Baader says that this refers not to the immanent life of God [God as He is in Himself], but to the common life that he leads with the creature [God as present in our lives, our nature as image of God]. This can be interpreted along the lines of what Jung says about the relation being with the God-image, and not God in Himself.

IV. Philosophy, Empiricism and Metaphysics
Some people may object that these lectures have been too philosophical. Wasn’t Jung really only concerned to show the empirical results of his investigations, and the dreams and images that he found to be healing for his analysands?

It is true that Jung wanted his psychology to be regarded as an empirical science. He was reluctant to refer to his mysticism for fear of jeopardizing his reputation as a scientist [25]. And he denies that his ideas are philosophical:

Now there are many objections that could be made to what Jung says here about philosophical statements referring only to themselves. We would usually classify such statements as ‘analytic.’ So if Jung’s point is that non-analytic statements must refer to something in reality besides logic, his statement would be unobjectionable. But he wants to distinguish his work from a speculative kind of metaphysics that does not relate to empirical reality. Although it might have been possible to make the distinction between empiricism and metaphysics when Jung was writing, many would challenge that distinction today. My own view is that any science, and any empirical or analytic work, is not possible without some philosophical assumptions. For science depends on ideas about the nature of reality, of being, of how being relates to value, of ideas about the nature of time, of the nature of our true selfhood, and the nature of ultimate reality, of God. The real issue is whether or not we are conscious of our assumptions. Jungians should not be afraid to admit the metaphysical, and indeed the religious basis of their work.

In fact, Jung himself acknowledged the importance of philosophy—particularly that of Kant.[27] Jung was influenced by Kant’s ideas of numinosity and of the thing in itself. He took over Kant’s idea that we cannot know the thing in itself, but only the phenomenon; in his psychology, this means that we do not directly know the unconscious or the Self, but only by their effects [28]. “Since we cannot possibly know the boundaries of something unknown to us, it follow that we are not in a position to set bounds to the self,” (CW 12, s. 247). And “Nothing is known regarding the self, because it is a transcendental hypothesis,” (CW 7, s. 405).

Now I personally believe that Kant’s philosophy causes more problems than it solves. Baader gave a strong critique of Kant, and argued strongly against Kant’s autonomous use of reason. [29]

Arraj says that Jung’s adherence to Kantianism was the basis for his belief that we cannot know the archetype in itself. This is why Jung seemed to have a huge need for examples of archetypes in alchemy. His works are full of far too many examples for the points he wants to make.

James Heisig says the same thing in reference to Mysterium Coniunctionis:

In any event, Jung was not consistent in his Kantianism. He spoke of a plurality of noumena–that there are many things in themselves (See Kundalini, 10).

But my point here is that Jung himself sometimes refers to philosophy, and so his distinction between empirical facts and philosophy is not a watertight distinction.

Furthermore, Jung’s own ideas are related to metaphysical concepts. We can see this in his ideas of synchronicity, enantiadromia and the guidance of the Self, Christ, the God-image within us. Jung’s idea of the Self was derived in 1921 from the Hindu Upanishads (Psychological Types (1921), CW 6, para 330-357). And in 1929 he said that science should not be over-estimated: “Science is not indeed a perfect instrument, but it is a superb and invaluable tool that works harm only when it is taken as an end in itself.” (“Secret of the Golden Flower,” CW 13, para. 2).

In his later work, Jung was less concerned about empirical investigations of the dreams and images of his analysands. He turned to explorations of philosophical themes. Bair says that even if his theory began empirically, the work that ultimately emerged was far more philosophical than scientific:

Bair says that Joseph Henderson was among the first to recognize that, by 1934, Jung’s seminars

We therefore must conclude that Jung is much more philosophical than he sometimes claimed to be. And if he refers to philosophers and mystics like Boehme and Eckhart in support of his psychology, then we need to examine whether he has interpreted his sources correctly. An examination of these sources will also help to counteract some of the false popularizations of Jung. For example, those who claim that Jung was a Gnostic fail to distinguish Jung’s very different views from Gnosticism’s attempt to flee from the world. And those who claim to follow Jung’s ideas of individuation when all they are doing is advocating individualism and eccentricity will be helped by an examination of the philosophical underpinnings of Jung’s ideas.

V. Conclusion

We have worked backwards from Jung’s ideas, to Franz von Baader’s Christian theosophy, and to the source of these ideas in Western mysticism, alchemy and to Jakob Boehme and Meister Eckhart in particular. Lecture 1 dealt with the issue of individuation in relation to the philosophy of totality. Lecture 2 dealt with Jung and Franz von Baader, whose Christian theosophy encouraged this interest in totality, as well as in keeping alive the traditions of Boehme and Eckhart. And Lecture 3 has dealt with Jung in relation to both Boehme and Eckhart. In making these comparisons we also saw how theosophy differs from Gnosticism.

So where do we go from here?

• These lectures have shown the relation of Jung’s psychology to the Western mystical traditions. My other lectures have shown the relation of his psychology to certain Eastern mystical traditions. Jung’s psychology is mystical, although not in a world-denying sense.

• Without the idea of the selfhood as transcendent and supratemporal, it is not possible to understand Jung’s psychology. The philosophy of totality is helpful in interpreting what Jung means by the Self as a totality of conscious and unconscious.

• Individuation is not individualism, but a relation to our true Self.

• Individuation involves moving from our individual ego to a transpersonal “being lived by” the Self.

• The archetypes can be interpreted as either a movement towards the instinctual or as a progressive movement towards goals that fulfill our true selfhood. Jung is unclear on this very important point.

• Although Jung uses Gnostic terminology, his psychology is not Gnostic. He does not seek to flee from temporal reality, but to transform temporal reality by relating it to the transcendent selfhood. It his helpful to see how Jung is more related to Christian theosophy and Christian Kabbalah, both of which also sought to transform temporal reality.

• Franz von Baader can help to show us the historical sources and meaning of many of Jung’s ideas, including his emphasis on alchemy and quaternity. Baader’s Christian theosophy is distinct from other kinds of theosophy, and it is also distinct from Gnosticism.

• Christian Kabbalah is also helpful in showing how Jung’s ideas are not Gnostic.

• Jung’s idea of quaternity varies between a 3 + 1 structure, which is more closely related to Baader and Boehme, and a structure of 4 equally important members. The second interpretation does not have as much depth, and misses the fact that the fourth is on a different level than the other three. This is important not only for Jung’s Theory of Types, but also for his interpretation of mandalas, and of religious dogmas like the Trinity. Boehme’s idea of the Godhead as the Center of the Trinity, which was taken over by Baader’s idea of a Center expressing itself in a periphery, helps us to understand the origins of the 3 + 1 structure.

• Meister Eckhart and Jakob Boehme and were important influences on Jung. Jung’s emphasis on the mystical “identity with God” must be interpreted not in relation to God in Himself, but rather in relation to the God-image, our own selfhood as image of God. Jung specifically rejects the idea that we are identical to God in Himself. He acknowledges a distinction between Godhead and God, and between God and God-image. But he is not always clear, and sometimes confuses God’s eternity with the supratemporality of the God-image, our true selfhood. Jung’s Kantian principles prevent him from speaking at all of God in Himself. Although such a Kantian attempt to avoid metaphysics is itself something that can be criticized, it does demonstrate that Jung did not believe he was making statements about God in Himself, or our pantheistic identity with God in Himself.

• But it is questionable whether Jung properly interpreted Eckhart and Boehme them regarding (1) his idea that evil is contained within God and (2) God’s dependence on man in order to become conscious. Both of these misunderstandings arise from Jung’s failure to distinguish the divine quaternity from the human quaternity. In any event, these misinterpretations are cases where Jung fails to live up to his Kantian ideas, and makes metaphysical statements–statements that I believe are incorrect.

• If we are to understand him correctly, a close reading is required of both Jung and of his mystical and alchemical sources.

Endnotes

[12] See The Works of Jacob Boehme online, at [http://www.passtheword.org/Jacob-Boehme/].

[13] Jacob Boehme: The Way to Christ, tr. John Joseph Stoudt (Harper, 1947).

[14] Donivan Bessinger: “Index of citations of Jakob Boehme in the Collected Works of Carl G. Jung,” online at [http://users.aol.com/DoniBess/boehjung.htm].

[15] Theosophische Werke, (Amsterdam 1682). It is referenced as Plate 9 by Jolande Jacobi in her book, The Psychology of C.G. Jung, (Yale University Press, London, New Haven, 1973).

[16] John P. Dourley: “Revisioning Incarnation: Jung on the Relativity of God,” online at [www.jungianstudies.org/publications/dourleyjp1.pdf].

[17] A.H. de Hartog: Uren met Jacob Boehme (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij, 1915) 170, citing Boehme’s Schutzschriften und Sendbriefe, Boehme’s Werke VII, 145.

[18] Cited from Foreword, Victor White: God and the Unconscious (Chicago, 1953; republished by Spring Publications, 1982). For the interesting relation between the two men see James Arraj: “Jungian Spirituality: The Question of Victor White,” online at [http://www.spiritualitytoday.org/spir2day/884035arraj.html]. The Correspondence between Jung and White has recently been published: The Jung-White Letters, ed. Ann Conrad Lammers and Adrian Cunningham (London: Routledge, 2007).

[19] De Hartog, p. 113. Boehme did have some knowledge of Kabbalah (See Grassl, and Lecture 2 of this series).

[20] One translation of this is online at [http://passtheword.org/DIALOGS-FROM-THE-PAST/darklite.htm]

[21] Dourley cites Jung’s letter to Joseph F. Rychlak, April 27, 1959, C.G. Jung, Letters, Vol. 2, 502.

[22] Hegel: Enzyklopädie der philospohischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), p. 16.

[23] Cited by de Hartog, p, 146. A translation of this is online at [http://www.sacred-texts.com/eso/sat/index.htm]. I have cited from the edition The Signature of All Things (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1912), p. 223.

[24] In a footnote, Baader’s editor Franz Hoffmann indicates that Baader must have been writing from memory, since he slightly misquotes it. The original reads

In his French translation of Fermenta Cognitionis, E. Susini translates this as

[25] In a discussion with Paul Brunton, Jung said in 1937 that he could not admit his mysticism in order to preserve his scientific reputation. See my lectures “Jung, Ramana Maharshi and Eastern Meditation,” [http://www.members.shaw.ca/cgjung/JungRamana.html].

[26] C. G. Jung im Gespräch mit Georg Gerster, in: Georg Gerster: Aus der Werkstatt des Wissens. (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Buch Nr. 73, 1962) 9-10.

[27] Jung was probably more influenced by Kant’s book on Swedenborg, Visions of a Poet Seer, than by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

[28] "I am not at all convinced that the unconscious mind is merely my mind, because the term "unconscious" means that I am not even conscious of it. ("Psychological commentary on the Tibetan book of the dead,"CW 11).

[29] See J. Glenn Friesen, “The Mystical Dooyeweerd: The Relation of his thought to Franz von Baader,” Ars Disputandi (2003), [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000088/ index.html]

[30] James Arraj: St. John of the Cross and Dr. C.G. Jung: Christian mysticism in the light of Jungian Psychology, Chapter 2, “ A Typology of the Sciences,” online at [http://www.innerexplorations.com/catjc/st.htm].

[31] James W. Heisig: Imago Dei: A Study of C.G. Jung’s Psychology of Religion (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1979), 108.

Sept 17/08