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The Religious Dialectic Revisited Part 1 by Dr. J. Glenn Friesen © 2006
This article first appeared on Theo Plantinga's Reading Room. For .pdf version click here.
This is a companion piece to my article “Why did Dooyeweerd want to pull out his hair?”[1] So read that first; it concerns the idea of the supratemporal heart. Dooyeweerd says that his whole philosophy depends on that idea, and that it is required for any truly Christian philosophy. In this article, I want to continue the argument that I made in 2005, in “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic in reformational philosophy.”[2] I want to show, from Dooyeweerd’s own words, how giving up his idea of the supratemporal heart has resulted in a religious dialectic within reformational philosophy itself. And to do that, I am going to look at what he says in a lecture that he gave in 1964, and then compare this with later events. What does a religious dialectic mean? It is the alternation between two polar views, resulting from an absolutization of different aspects of temporal reality. Examples given by Dooyeweerd are alternating between the ideas form and matter, or between nature and grace, or between nature and freedom. In other words, a religious dialectic results from a non-Christian Ground-motive. When Christians use such non-Christian Ground-motives, they are involved in synthesis. “Hold it, hold it!” I hear someone say. “Are you suggesting that reformational philosophy is itself a synthesis, that is uses the wrong Ground-motive? How dare you suggest that! We’re the ones that expose the wrong Ground-motives in other philosophies.” Well, yes, that is what I am saying. But it is not only my view. It is what Dooyeweerd said in his last article of 1975, directed against Danie Strauss [3]. He says that Strauss’s philosophy contains a logicism (which is an absolutization), that it contains genuine antinomies (which are always the sign of a religious dialectic, and a wrong Ground-motive), and that its epistemology does not differ from that of modern epistemology, whose presuppositions have “darkened its insight into the correct relation of the naïve or pre-theoretical to the theoretical, scientific attitude of thought and experience” (thus, it is a synthesis philosophy) [4] . And in that article, Dooyeweerd again mentions the importance of the idea of our transcendence of time. Not even the ideas of the irreducibility of the modal aspects or their mutual coherence can be understood apart from the idea of their root-unity in the religious center of human existence. So if a person doesn’t accept the idea of the supratemporal heart, he or she will also not understand the modal aspects. To what extent can Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of Strauss also be leveled against Vollenhoven? In “Dialectic,” I argued that the same ideas could be found in Vollenhoven, and that these ideas differ significantly from Dooyeweerd’s own philosophy. In North America, we have long been inclined to suppose that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven were pretty much in agreement, but this turns out not to be the case, as some reformational leaders in the Netherlands realized all along. The truth of the matter is that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagreed on almost every key idea. Here is a list of some of Dooyeweerd’s ideas that Vollenhoven rejected, at least in the way that Dooyeweerd understood these ideas: (1) only God is Being; created reality is only meaning (2) cosmic time and the aevum (created eternity), as distinct from God’s eternity (3) the place of God’s law (4) the supratemporal heart (5) religious (supratemporal) root of temporal reality (6) man as image of God (7) the nature of modalities or aspects (8) temporal succession of modalities (9) anticipations and retrocipations (10) subject-object relation (11) Gegenstand-relation (12) individuality structures (13) enkapsis (14) intuition (15) use of Scripture and theology (16) the meaning of the Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption (17) the possibility of direct, unmediated religious experience (18) the importance of ecumenism. To some readers, this list may seem strange. Bear in mind that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven both drew some of their terms from a common pool of philosophical terminology. Therefore, casual reading in Vollenhoven may create the impression that what is being said is roughly what Dooyeweerd said as well, for his terminology is reminiscent of Dooyeweerd. But he intends something very different. I would like to explain each of these points in more detail, but then I would be repeating what you can read in my earlier article. When I wrote “Dialectic,” I referred to Dooyeweerd’s January, 1964 lecture to the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy. For that lecture made public many of these disagreements between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. I relied on excerpts of this lecture and discussion, as cited in Marcel Verburg’s work on Dooyeweerd [5] . Dooyeweerd says in the lecture,
And Verburg reports that Vollenhoven, perceiving that these remarks were directed at him, responded:
Note that although Vollenhoven admitted that he disagreed on some points, he claimed to agree with respect to the modalities and the nature of religion. But based on the full 1964 lecture, and on subsequent events, that seems to be a very doubtful claim. We will get to that later. II. Reviewing the full text of the 1964 lecture Recently, I visited the Dooyeweerd Archives in Amsterdam. I located a copy of Dooyeweerd’s original 1964 lecture, and a transcript of the discussion that followed. My translation of both of these documents can be found on my website [6]. So now that we have the entire lecture and transcript, what further information is available to us about these disagreements between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven? I was surprised that these documents show an even greater divergence than I had supposed, although Prof. van Riessen, who was the Chairman of the meeting, tried to smooth over the differences. The complete transcript confirms that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven differed deeply in their ideas. The transcript is also very good in demonstrating the differences in their philosophical styles, and their different stances towards the ideas of others. Dooyeweerd seems much more passionate, but also much more open to others. Vollenhoven comes across as more closed, and directed inwards to the Reformed tradition; he wants to continue his detailed analysis of different theologies (he mentions 80 or 90 different kinds of theology) [7], before venturing into dialogue with others. Let’s look at a few of the differences, as highlighted by this 1964 lecture and transcript. A. The supratemporal heart Contrary to what has been asserted by Danie Strauss, the 1964 lecture and discussion do not in any way relativize Dooyeweerd’s distinction between the supratemporal and the temporal [8]. Dooyeweerd in fact affirms the importance of the idea of the supratemporal heart, the center of man’s existence, in which he transcends the cosmic temporal order. He says that the idea of the supratemporal heart is essential in order to understand the central operation of God’s Word in our hearts, and in order to understand Christ’s incarnation. The idea of the supratemporal heart also necessary in order to understand the whole distinction between what is religiously central, and what is temporally peripheral [9]. But in his answer to Peter Steen, Dooyeweerd is also careful to stress that the supratemporal heart is man’s center. He objects to Steen’s theological words relating it to Christ’s incarnation. But even in his answer to Steen, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that Christ’s incarnation affects both our own supratemporal center and our temporal body (1964 discussion, p. 5). B. Ecumenism and Theology I was surprised to learn that the reason that Dooyeweerd did not publish Volume II of Reformation and Scholasticism is that he thought the book had lost its point. He had directed the book against Roman Catholicism’s scholasticism. But he says in this lecture that recent developments in Roman Catholic theology had approached his own views to such an extent that there was no longer any point in publishing the book (1964 lecture, pp. 9-10). Dooyeweerd therefore makes a passionate plea for ecumenism. He expresses his view that the word ‘Calvinistic’ should be dropped from the Association’s name. The term is an obstacle to those who are otherwise attracted to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea. But Vollenhoven throws cold water on this idea. He says that Dooyeweerd is being really rather naïve here (he uses the word ‘guileless’), and that modern Roman Catholic theology may have changed a bit, but that it is really the same old stuff. And he says that before we venture a broader ecumenism, we should first try to patch up the differences within the Reformed (Gereformeerde) communities (1964 discussion, pp. 22-25).[10] Dooyeweerd responds to Vollenhoven. He says that Vollenhoven has not understood him. Vollenhoven has brought in theological issues here, the dissection of the 80 or 90 different kinds of theology that Vollenhoven has mentioned. But Dooyeweerd says that he was not talking theology at all, but about the religious center of our being. When we do not talk in theological terms, but focus our Christian philosophy on what is central, we will then find unity with others. He gives the example of a meeting of the heart with an Arminian (Remonstrant) woman preacher following one of his lectures. They did not let theology get in the way of their mutual understanding. Dooyeweerd compares the way that they were able to understand central issues with the charismatic idea of speaking in tongues. And this entire exchange is a most enlightening example of how much more theologically inclined Vollenhoven was than Dooyeweerd. Vollenhoven wanted to continue analyzing the various different philosophies and theologies, and labeling each position. But Dooyeweerd makes it clear that it is this very labeling that is getting in the way of real understanding. Dooyeweerd says that we can have the best confession of faith in the world, but if the Spirit of God is not within us, then any written confession of faith is worth nothing. He approves of the fact that Kuyper did not spell out the guiding principles for the Free University, but merely spoke of “Gereformeerde principles,” which were left undefined. For Dooyeweerd, theology is based on philosophy, and the basis of his philosophy is the idea of supratemporal heart. We do not have to wait for a perfect theology before engaging in dialogue. Dooyeweerd intended that his transcendental critique would allow dialogue even between those who did not share the same Ground-motives. But of course, followers of Vollenhoven have not accepted the transcendental critique, either. That is not surprising, since the transcendental critique is necessarily linked to the Idea of the supratemporal heart. The supratemporal heart is the answer to the second transcendental problem, that of Totality. The three transcendental ideas correspond to eternity (God as Origin), supratemporality or created eternity, the aevum (Totality), and cosmic time (the problem of temporal coherence). If you give up the supratemporal heart then the transcendental critique makes no sense. But let’s come back to the issue of ecumenism. In my view, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy will more easily lend itself to such broader ecumenism. In a 2005 lecture at Redeemer University College, I suggested how Dooyeweerd’s philosophy can be used in dialogue with the Orthodox Church [11]. And Dooyeweerd’s 1964 lecture shows that his philosophy is also very suitable for dialogue with the Roman Catholic church, particularly now. For Pope Benedict shares many of the same ideas that Dooyeweerd found so surprising in la nouvelle théologie. But I suspect that those who follow Vollenhoven will be less interested in this kind of project, preferring to continue to analyze and to label the differences that they might have with other religious denominations. Dooyeweerd warns against this, and says in this 1964 lecture that it turns reformational philosophy into a narrow-minded [geborneerde] clique that is an obstacle to dialogue with others. And it is clear from a recently discovered document that Vollenhoven did not favour Eastern Orthodox views, which he regarded as too mystical. Instead he favoured the Western Augustinian tradition. [12] C. Modal Aspects In the 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd says that his Idea of the modal aspects has been one of the least understood of his ideas (1964 discussion, pp. 2,3, 8). In the 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd refers to a misuse of the idea of aspects by certain people in South Africa. But the problems must go deeper than that, for it was not just South Africa that doesn’t understand the aspects; he says that it is one of his least understood ideas. How can this be? This 1964 lecture was given one year before Dooyeweerd’s retirement. Several books had been written about his philosophy, such as the book by Spier, describing the modal aspects [13]. It is widely assumed that the theory of the modal aspects has been properly understood. Dooyeweerd comments on this in the 1964 lecture:
He says that people think they know. But they know the only the word ‘aspect’ and not its meaning, “the name but not the nature of the beast.” But surely Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd agreed on the aspects? That does not seem to be the case, although they did use some of the same words, and both of them referred to a modal scale. In “Dialectic”, I have explored what some of these differences are. More than a decade after his 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd wrote his last article “Gegenstandsrelatie” (1975), where he maintained that it is a “serious misunderstanding” to believe that the modal structures can be deduced from the individuality structures:
But hasn’t this “serious misunderstanding” now become the commonplace way of viewing the aspects? In his 1974 Interview with Magnus Verbrugge, Dooyeweerd says that the aspects are often referred to as “modes of being.” But he rejects that view, saying that he reserves the term ‘Being’ for God [14]. For Dooyeweerd, aspects are both modes of our consciousness and modes in which individuality structures function. And there is an identity of those two modes, which is why the theoretical Gegenstand-relation, the entering into the temporal functions of our own body, can work. It is God’s law that gives the identity. I have dealt with these matters in greater detail in my article “Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical themes in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.” [15] Unlike Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd also distinguishes between the modal aspects and the functions of individuality structures and events in those aspects. In the 1964 lecture, he again says that the failure to appreciate that distinction is one reason that some people have misunderstood and rejected the historical modality (1964 discussion, pp. 3-4). Dooyeweerd also gives some very helpful clarifications regarding his view of how sociology relates to the theory of the modal aspects (1964 discussion, pp. 8-13). D. Individuality Structures Vollenhoven and many reformational philosophers following him, such as Van Riessen, did not accept Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures. One of the criticisms leveled against Dooyeweerd was that this theory reduced individual reality to law [16]. In the 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd says that this is a mistake, since he has always emphasized that reality has both a law-side and a subject-side, and that corresponding to the central law-Idea there is also a central subject-Idea (Discussion, p. 14). Unlike Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd does not view the modal aspects as universals that require a particular. Objectivity is not the same as universally valid law-conformity (NC II, 370). This misunderstanding of law (and modal aspects) as universals is something that Dooyeweerd says causes him to regret having used the term ‘Philosophy of the Law-Idea.’ Dooyeweerd says that, as in the case of the modal aspects, there is much work to be done for reformational philosophers to understand individuality structures:
E. Center and Periphery The very title of the 1964 lecture concerns center and periphery. And it is clear that Dooyeweerd regards this in terms of a religious, supratemporal center and a temporal periphery that is the expression from out of that center. The religious center is our supratemporal heart, our time-transcending selfhood. Dooyeweerd says that that idea is required in order to understand the central religious working of God’s Word upon our heart, and also to understand Christ’s incarnation within time. Dooyeweerd also uses center and periphery in relation to different philosophies. He was asked, “Can one develop different directions in Philosophy of the Law-Idea from out of the same center [kern]?” (1964 discussion, p. 1). His answer is that it is not very likely:
He then refers to Stoker’s philosophy as an example. Stoker has a different view of the religious center. Therefore, he cannot be regarded as an adherent of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea. Stoker disagreed on the nature of man’s central heart; he continued to hold to a dualistic anthropology. Dooyeweerd says that philosophers like Stoker who have a different view of this center cannot be regarded as adherents of his philosophy. “It is undoubtedly a different direction, and one that does not come from out of the same center” (1964 discussion, pp. 1-2). Dooyeweerd expands on this later in the discussion. He says that if philosophers remain faithful to the core, then we will not find the antinomies that we find in philosophies coming from out of a different Ground-motive:
Verburg maintains that Vollenhoven believed that these comments were directed at him (Verburg, 381). In the 1964 Discussion, Vollenhoven says that it was “perhaps by coincidence” that Dooyeweerd referred to Stoker. What does Vollenhoven mean? I think that it shows Vollenhoven’s sensitivity to the issue; he feels that Dooyeweerd could have referred in this context to Vollenhoven’s own philosophy. Does Vollenhoven’s philosophy come from out of the same center? For Vollenhoven also disagrees with Dooyeweerd on the question of the supratemporal selfhood. It is for that reason that Vollenhoven sets out his differences with Dooyeweerd, even though Dooyeweerd had not specifically named Vollenhoven in his lecture. But Vollenhoven says that Dooyeweerd should distinguish between central and peripheral only when talking about the difference between religion and philosophy. Within philosophy, Vollenhoven says that differences should be regarded merely as cardinal points and secondary points. Vollenhoven reframes what Dooyeweerd said about Stoker:
But that was not what Dooyeweerd said. Dooyeweerd did not use the word ‘secondary.’ He said, Stoker’s philosophy was “not a difference in the periphery [omtrek] but it is in fact a difference in the core [kern].” He maintained the distinction between centrally religious and temporally peripheral. But Vollenhoven wants his own differences with Dooyeweerd to be regarded as nuances, matters of secondary importance. He does not want Dooyeweerd’s criticism of Stoker to apply to him. After all, Vollenhoven was a Professor of philosophy at the Free University. There was something at stake here for him if Dooyeweerd was in fact criticizing his views, too. So Vollenhoven emphasizes that he and Dooyeweerd differed in certain philosophical ideas, or nuances, but that they agreed on the place of religion in philosophy. After summing up his differences with Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven says,
But do Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven agree regarding the place of religion in philosophy? For Dooyeweerd, the religious dimension or level of our experience is the level of the supratemporal [18]. As I have shown in “Dialectic,” Vollenhoven rejects that idea. He also rejects the idea that temporal reality refers beyond itself to the supratemporal and to the eternal [19]. And Vollenhoven rejects the idea of a supratemporal regeneration of the heart; he criticizes both Dooyeweerd and Kuyper for that idea [20]. Moreover, Vollenhoven does not speak of religious Ground-motives, since they also relate to the supratemporal heart. For Dooyeweerd, these Ground-motives operate out of our supratemporal heart, and they provide a driving force that we then express in our temporal lives. And as I set out in “Dialectic,” Vollenhoven also rejects the idea of God’s Word working in an immediate way on our supratemporal heart, or any idea of immediate religious experience. Is this really the same idea of religion? In the 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd expressly affirms the central operation of God’s Word on our supratemporal heart. After Vollenhoven’s comments in 1964, Dooyeweerd makes some further remarks. He says that he cannot let the matter rest there, or there would be serious misunderstandings. He does not say that he agrees with Vollenhoven. He says, “I will not discuss everything that Prof. Vollenhoven has brought forward, for we don’t have time for that” (1964 discussion, p. 26). Dooyeweerd restricts himself to the issue of ecumenism, and to the way that God is already working in the invisible church. From other writings, it is clear that for Dooyeweerd, this invisible church is also supratemporal [21].So Dooyeweerd does not address the issue of whether or not Vollenhoven’s philosophical disagreements are merely nuances. But as we shall see, the issue did not go away. III. Religious dialectic in reformational thought A. Synthesis and religious dialectic within reformational philosophy In the 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd says that there will be no genuine antinomies in reformational philosophy “if we remain faithful to the core of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea.” It is that word ‘if’ that is so interesting. If reformational philosophy holds to the central ideas, then it will not result in the kinds of antinomies that we see in other religious Ground-motives. There will not be a religious dialectic. But what happens when reformational philosophy abandons the center? What happens when it rejects the idea of the supratemporal heart? Will reformational philosophy itself then become involved in such religious antinomies? That is what Dooyeweerd says happened in reformational philosophy. Let’s look at these later developments in more detail. After the important public airing of their differences in 1964, Vollenhoven continued to emphasize his disagreements with Dooyeweerd. Take a look at his 1968 lectures, with an eye to this issue [22]. And Vollenhoven was not the only critic of Dooyeweerd’s ideas within the reformational camp. But Dooyeweerd did not accept these attempts to reform his philosophy. In his last article “Gegenstandsrelatie” (1975), he says that had listened to criticisms of Stoker, Conradie, Brümmer–these are all names that he also mentions in his 1964 lecture.In his last article, he also names other critics. Dooyeweerd says,
What caused Dooyeweerd to finally speak out was the publication of Danie Strauss’s thesis Begrip en Idee [23]. Dooyeweerd says that this thesis represented the provisional conclusion [afronding] of the criticism against him. Dooyeweerd says that in Strauss’s philosophy, there are genuine insoluble antinomies. There is a logicism that threatens the irreducibility of the other modal aspects (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 100). The antinomy is that, although Strauss wants to maintain such irreducibility, his logicism does not permit him to do so. And Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s epistemology does not differ from modern epistemology:
Dooyeweerd’s last article, directed at Strauss, is therefore a very sharp critique. And Dooyeweerd emphasizes the continued importance of our transcending time–“that human existence, although it is enclosed by cosmic time in its modal aspects and individuality structures, nevertheless transcends this time in its religious center” (pp. 83-84). He says that not even the irreducibility of the modal aspects can be understood apart from the idea of their root-unity in the religious center of human existence. (p. 100). But Strauss denies that our selfhood transcends time. For him, the selfhood is merely pre-modal or supramodal. In Dooyeweerd’s terminology, Strauss’s philosophy must therefore be immanence philosophy, a philosophy that is merely in the periphery, but that differs radically in its center. Using the terms of the 1964 lecture, we can say that Strauss’s philosophy, like Stoker’s, does not come out of the same religious center. It works with a different Ground-motive. It denies the selfhood, seeing it only in terms of supra-modality but not supratemporality. For although the supratemporal is also supramodal, the term ‘supramodal’ could mean merely a pre-functional selfhood, an idea that Dooyeweerd specifically rejects. And it is clear that Strauss uses ‘supramodal’ in a way that is not supratemporal.[24] Now the question arises to what extent Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of Strauss also apply to Vollenhoven’s philosophy itself. Strauss was a student of Van Riessen, who was in turn a student of Vollenhoven. I believe that the same ideas that Dooyeweerd objected to so strongly in Strauss are also found in Vollenhoven. But there are also interesting personal factors to be borne in mind. Vollenhoven’s wife was Dooyeweerd’s sister. This family connection made it a rather delicate matter for Dooyeweerd to speak out against Vollenhoven. Dooyeweerd was also aware that Vollenhoven had suffered a severe nervous breakdown in 1923, occasioned by considerations regarding the nature of the selfhood. Vollenhoven was hospitalized at that time for 10 months, and Dooyeweerd was probably cautious about publicly raising his disagreement with Vollenhoven on this central issue concerning the supratemporal selfhood (although Dooyeweerd does refer to this disagreement at NC I, 31 fn1). Furthermore, both men had gone through the investigation by the theologians at the Free University. Although their philosophies differed, they stood together in their opposition to scholasticism, and against the attacks of the theologians who wanted to maintain a scholastic anthropology [25]. But when Dooyeweerd saw how reformational philosophy was working his ideas out along the lines of Vollenhoven’s philosophy, he felt he had to speak out, although he directed his critique towards the ideas of Vollenhoven as they had been elaborated in Strauss’s thesis. B. A choice is required In “Dialectic,” I said that reformational philosophers are required to make a choice. We can choose to follow Dooyeweerd or Vollenhoven, but not both. Or we can strike out in a new direction. Some people will find it hard to accept that we now confront such a fork in a road. Within six months of the publication of my article “Dialectic,” and my November, 2005 lecture at Redeemer University College (Ancaster, Ontario), a mini-conference was convened at Redeemer. The conference was entitled “Dooyeweerd or Vollenhoven: Does it make a difference?” I did not attend, but I sent a note regarding the importance of Dooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporal heart. My note was distributed to those who attended the mini-conference. Three of the people who gave presentations at the conference have since placed written articles online. You can find these comments in “The Reading Room,” an online site maintained by Theo Plantinga [26]. I have already discussed Strauss’s article in connection with his misinterpretation of Dooyeweerd’s response to Peter Steen in the 1964 discussion. Dooyeweerd maintained the importance of the Idea of the supratemporal heart. Strauss is also wrong when he says that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven shared the idea of a pre-functional heart. Dooyeweerd specifically rejects that idea (NC I, 31, fn1 and NC III, 783-84). In his Redeemer presentation, Strauss does not refer to my article “Dialectic,” or to my citations of the acknowledged differences between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. He does make some suggestions of his own as to how he believes reformational philosophy should develop, but these ideas, however interesting, must be distinguished from Dooyeweerd’s own philosophy. For example, Strauss’s idea of concept-transcending knowledge is different from Dooyeweerd’s transcendental Ideas. Dooyeweerd speaks about this in the 1964 lecture. He distinguishes his meaning of boundary concept [grensbegrip] from that of Kant, and he observes:
What Dooyeweerd says here is very different from Strauss’s proposal of “concept-transcending knowledge,” which is related to things and events in their individuality (Strauss, 12). For Dooyeweerd, our Ideas are grensbegrippen, and they concern things that transcend time, the eternal, invisible things of which we nevertheless have knowledge. Ideas are central (i.e. supratemporal) and concepts are peripheral. Ideas seek the supratemporal fullness of meaning; concepts are temporal [27]. For Dooyeweerd, our Ideas can transcend temporal theoretical knowledge, and refer to transcendent things, only because of our supratemporal selfhood, which itself transcends time.[28] I was very interested to read what Jim Olthuis said about Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. Olthuis has supported my research into Dooyeweerd, encouraging me to publish my first article “The Mystical Dooyeweerd,” [29] even though my findings clashed with his own views. So for me, Olthuis is in many ways a model of the way that dialogue can continue to be carried on across different traditions. Olthuis rejects Dooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporal heart, and I therefore supposed that he was more in line with Vollenhoven’s ideas. But in his Redeemer presentation, Olthuis says that he finds Vollenhoven to be “boring.” I am also intrigued by how Olthuis contrasts Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven by comparing them to Plato and Aristotle respectively. I find it important that Olthuis expresses appreciation for the idea of panentheism (not to be equated with pantheism). Panentheism is an idea that I find in Dooyeweerd. But Vollenhoven misunderstands the idea as dualistic. I would have liked to see a more precise articulation of Olthuis’s own standpoint in relation to these differences between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. Lambert Zuidervaart has distinguished his own views from those of Dooyeweerd. He rejects Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique, and finds contradictions and circularities in Dooyeweerd [30]. I admire Zuidervaart’s honesty here, although I believe that he might have come to different conclusions had he not interpreted Dooyeweerd through Vollenhoven’s ideas. To give just one example, he might have come to different conclusions regarding Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique if he had discussed it in terms of the supratemporal selfhood, and the movement from supratemporal center to temporal periphery. Dooyeweerd makes it clear that is only because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can form Ideas of that which exceeds theoretical thought. I was therefore disappointed that Zuidervaart did not really explore these differences. Zuidervaart says that we must neither follow nor reject, but that we must “critically retrieve” parts of both philosophers. But this solution avoids asking the tough questions. For how can we critically retrieve ideas from two philosophers who contradict each other? It is not sufficient to say that we only need to look for the areas where they agree. For the whole point of this discussion is that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagree on the key ideas! Furthermore, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy must be viewed as a whole; his ideas just cannot be understood in isolation from the central Idea of the supratemporal heart. More importantly, what is the philosophic basis for such critical retrieval? How is critique possible at all? What are its basic presuppositions? This is really what Dooyeweerd is asking when he investigates the ontical foundations of theoretical thought [31]. Dooyeweerd says that a true foundation for theoretical thought depends on the existence of our supratemporal selfhood. So what is the philosophical anthropology that is presupposed in Zuidervaart’s proposal of critical retrieval? Does it acknowledge the idea of the supratemporal heart? I don’t think so. On the contrary, it seems to be associated with a temporalizing of our experience, and a temporalizing of all philosophical anthropology. And does not the emphasis on ‘critical’ betray that same autonomy of thought that Dooyeweerd opposed? The term ‘critical retrieval’ is often associated with the ideas of Paul Ricoeur. But Ricoeur’s idea presupposes that we first go through the process of a hermeneutics of suspicion before we get to this stage of critical retrieval. That idea cannot be squared with Dooyeweerd’s views of the transcendental critique. Zuidervaart says that we must neither follow nor reject, and that we must also not strike out in a new direction, for then we would no longer be reformational. But it seems to me that his advocacy of “critical retrieval” is itself based on a new direction that undercuts reformational philosophy, or at least Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Dooyeweerd himself says that many of his ideas can be developed further, but that the central ideas must be accepted or else the development is no longer within the same tradition [32]. It is not that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is beyond criticism. But surely Dooyeweerd is the most knowledgeable about which ideas are central to his own philosophy. And he stated that his philosophy must be interpreted as a whole, and in particular, in reference to the Idea of the supratemporal selfhood. But the idea of “critical retrieval” seems to be serving as a way to avoid grappling with the meaning of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy as a whole. Perhaps Zuidervaart's solution can fit better with Vollenhoven's philosophy, where philosophical differences are regarded as mere ‘nuances.’ But even there, if reformational philosophy wants to follow Vollenhoven and not Dooyeweerd, doesn’t it have the duty to spell out the philosophical bases and presuppositions of its philosophy, and the basis upon which it can decide to critically retrieve the philosophers of the past? The very idea of eclectically choosing only bits of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is troubling. It runs counter to what Dooyeweerd himself says about the ideas that are fundamental to his philosophy–ideas like cosmic time and the supratemporal heart. Dooyeweerd says that his philosophical anthropology is the basic idea in his philosophy, its beginning and its end point [33]. In his 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd indicates that he wanted to continue with the third volume of his Reformation and Scholasticism. That volume was to be devoted to philosophical anthropology. It has never been published, but the draft of this second volume was exhaustively analyzed in W.J. Ouweneel’s doctoral thesis [34]. A part of Ouweneel’s thesis was summarized in an article in Philosophia Reformata. Ouweneel correctly emphasizes the key nature of this idea of the supratemporal heart for Dooyeweerd:
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy must be read as a whole. Zuidervaart’s attempted solution of a critical retrieval of only parts of the philosophy cannot work. For as Dooyeweerd himself says in the 1964 lecture, problems arise when people accept the philosophy “only up to a certain point” (1964 discussion, p. 1). Go to Part 2 of this article. Endnotes [1] J. Glenn Friesen: “Why did Dooyeweerd want to pull out his hair?” (2006), also online at The Reading Room [http://www.redeemer.ca/~plant/rr/jgf-01.pdf]. [2] J. Glenn Friesen: “Dooyeweerd
versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy,”
Philosophia Reformata 70 (2005) 102-132, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ [3] Herman Dooyeweerd: “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101 [‘Gegenstandsrelatie’] Translation and discussion online: [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html].[4] ..[4] Gegenstandsrelatie, 97. For details of Dooyeweerd’s criticism, see my article “Dooyeweerd versus Strauss: Objections to immanence philosophy within reformational thought,” (2006), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Objections.html]. [5] Marcel Verburg: Herman Dooyeweerd. Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989) [‘Verburg’]. [6] Herman Dooyeweerd: Center and Periphery: The Philosophy of the Law-Idea in a changing world,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/1964Lecture.html] [7] Vollenhoven analyzed philosophers and theologians and classified them using what he called his “Problem-Historical Method.” For an introduction to this method, see Kornelis A. Bril: Vollenhoven’s Problem-Historical Method: Introduction and Explorations (Sioux Centre: Dordt College Press, 2005), as well as D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: The Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy, ed. Kornelis A. Bril (Amstelveen: De Zaek Haas, 2005). Bril has several other excellent works on Vollenhoven, which have so far not been translated. I find the following to be particularly helpful: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: Schematische Kaarten, ed. K.A. Bril and P.J. Boonstra, (Amstelveen: De Zaak Haes, 2000). [8] See my article, “Why did Dooyeweerd want to tear out his hair?” also online at [http://www.redeemer.ca/~plant/rr/jgf-01.pdf]. By failing to read it in its context, Danie Strauss has misinterpreted an excerpt from this 1964 discussion. What Dooyeweerd rejects is Steen’s theological use of the Idea of the supratemporal heart in relation to Christ’s incarnation. [9] Surprisingly, Strauss has denied
that Dooyeweerd ever made the distinction between a supratemporal
center and a temporal periphery. See the references in my article
“Dooyeweerd
versus Strauss: Objections to immanence philosophy within reformational
thought,” (2006), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ [10] ‘Gereformeerd’ means “Reformed”, but ‘Gereformeerd’ is also the name of a specific denomination that split off from the Hervormde Church in the Netherlands. The Gereformeerde Church itself then went through several splits, as Dooyeweerd mentions in the 1964 lecture. So it is unclear whether Vollenhoven wanted to first heal these later splits within the Gereformeerde Church, or whether he is referring to the broader Reformed community. In any event, he obviously had no interest in dialogue with Roman Catholicism. [11] On Nov. 15, 2005, I gave a lecture at Redeemer University College on the topic “Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and the Quest for an Ecumenical Orthodoxy.” See the handout for my lecture, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Ecumenism.pdf]. [12] See Propositions of D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, submitted to the Curators of the Free University, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/PropV.html]. [13] J.M. Spier: Een Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, fourth ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1950), translated as An Introduction to Christian Philosophy (Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1954). [14] Interview between Magnus Verbrugge and Dooyeweerd, Sept. 23, 1974. A tape of the interview is in the Dooyeweerd Archives. It has not been transcribed. [15] J. Glenn Friesen: “Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical themes in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy,” (2006) [‘Imagination’], online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Imagination.html] [16] See Kent Zigterman: “Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Individuality Structure as an Alternative to a Substance Position, Especially that of Aristotle,” (Master of Philosophy Thesis, Institute for Christian Studies, 1977). Zigterman argues that Dooyeweerd reduces things to structure. Lambert Zuidervaart follows Zigterman in that view, in his article “Fantastic Things: Critical Notes Toward a Social Ontology of the Arts,” 60 Philosophia Reformata, (1995), 37-54. [17] I have tried to set out my own understanding of what Dooyeweerd means by individuality structures in my article “Individuality Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism,” (2005) [‘Enkapsis’], online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Enkapsis.html]. In that article, I also explore the historical sources that Dooyeweerd used for these ideas. [18] See my discussion of ‘levels’
in my online Glossary, at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/ [19] This referring beyond itself is what Dooyeweerd means when he says that temporal reality exists only as “meaning.” [20] See Vollenhoven’s Divergentierapport 116, and his Isagoogè par. 123, note 2, as referred to in my “Dialectic” 40. Stellingwerff even regards certain ideas of Kuyper here to be Gnostic. See Johan Stellingwerff: Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte, (Stichting voor Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte, 2006), 64, 65, 90. Yet these are the very passages from Kuyper that Dooyeweerd praises! I do not believe that these ideas are Gnostic, but a similar opinion seems to have been behind Vollenhoven’s rejection of these ideas.
[22] D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: “De
Problemen van de tijd in onze kring”, (1968), in A. Tol and K.A.
Bril: Vollenhoven als Wijsgeer (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn,
1992), 199-211 [‘Kring’]. Online at [http://www.aspecten.org/vollenhoven/68b.htm].
See my
translation: [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ [23] D.F.M. Strauss, Begrip en Idee (Assen, 1973). Strauss’s doctoral supervisor was Hendrik van Riessen, who had himself done his own doctoral dissertation under Vollenhoven. [24] In an email on Thinknet dated April 3, 2003, Strauss said that Dooyeweerd “…(unfortunately) equated supra-modal with supra-temporal.” Although Strauss says that man has “an eternal destination,” he does not accept the present supratemporality of the heart. See the discussion in my article “Dooyeweerd versus Strauss: Objections to immanence philosophy within reformational thought,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Objections.html]. [25] See “Responses to Curators,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html]. [26] Theo Plantinga, “The
Reading Room,” online at [http://www.redeemer.on.ca/~tplant/rr/index.html].
See: [27] See also Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia of the Science of Law (1946), translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Encyclopedia.html], where he relates Ideas to what is central and supratemporal:
In the Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946), Dooyeweerd says that the Idea of Law is central, and, like all Ideas, can only be understood in relation to our central selfhood, which transcends time. The peripheral concepts are temporal, and practical, but they can only be understood from out of the central Idea. The synthesis of meaning achieved in the Gegenstand-relation occurs when our supratemporal selfhood enters into its temporal meaning functions:
[29] J. Glenn Friesen: “The Mystical Dooyeweerd: The relation of his thought to Franz von Baader,” Ars Disputandi 3 (2003) [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000088/index.html] [‘Mystical Dooyeweerd’]. [30] See Lambert Zuidervaart: “The Great Turning Point: Religion and Rationality in Dooyeweerd's Transcendental Critique,” Faith and Philosophy (January, 2004). Zuidervaart speaks of “circularity” and “logical slippage” in Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique, and that it seems
[31] These ontical foundations are not themselves theoretical presuppositions, but the foundation for any theory whatsoever. We form theoretical Ideas of these foundations, but the Ideas are not the foundations themselves. The Ideas only point to those ontical foundations. [32] The Institute for Christian Studies, where Zuidervaart teaches, used to describe itself as continuing in the reformational tradition begun by Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. I note with regret that such a statement no longer appears on its website. [34] W.J. Ouweneel: De Leer van de mens (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1986). Ouweneel’s own summary of this work is available in English, online at [http://www.reddmer.ca/~tplant/cp/SA-MO-HTM]. [35] W. J. Ouweneel: “Supratemporality in the Transcendental Anthropology of Dooyeweerd, ” Philosophia Reformata 58 (1993) 210-220, at 213. Go to Part 2 of this article.
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