Dooyeweerd, Marlet and the new Catholic theology:
From Baader to Pope Benedict

by

Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Part 2

IV. Other issues related to Marlet’s analysis

A. Substance, supratemporality and personality

Marlet is aware of Dooyeweerd’s repeated opposition to the scholastic idea of substance. But Marlet continues to use the word ‘substance.’ Marlet says that the question of the being of existing things is a question relating to the transcendent, supratemporal reality. And this supratemporal reality is the presupposition for the temporal (Marlet, 70). Thus, he interprets substance in terms of our relationship to the supratemporal [59]. He cites Dooyeweerd as saying something somewhat similar:

Based on this idea—that seeking the unchanging being can refer to the supratemporal ground of being—Marlet continues to use the word ‘substance.’ He says that it refers to our true selfhood or personality. Marlet refers to August Brunner in support of this view.

The passage from the WdW that Marlet cited in support of his idea of substance as personal does not appear in the New Critique. Dooyeweerd replaces it with several new pages, which include the following remarks:

Dooyeweerd says that Brunner’s view is “doubtless interesting, but it cannot be accepted as a serious interpretation of the metaphysical concept of substance.” (NC III, 6). This additional information in the New Critique was published after the appearance of Marlet’s dissertation, and it appears to be in response to Marlet. And so, despite the agreement that Dooyeweerd feels with Marlet, he is not ready to acknowledge that this is a valid interpretation of what ‘substance’ really means.

For Marlet, truth is ultimately personal (Marlet, 94). He sees the Thomistic idea of Being in terms of personal concreteness, directed to its Origin in Christ (Marlet, 111). Whereas Aristotle overvalued substance as a center of reality (Marlet, 112), Thomistic Aristotelianism sees substance as a structure of being, and distinguishes between essence and being. Thomism proclaims the proper reality of the creature [Eigenwirklichkeit des Geschöpflichen] (Marlet, 119). Man’s being is a responsive actuality [responsorische Aktualität]”

This responsive being is both in our heart and in our body:

Being is therefore the concrete fullness, personal structure of being (Marlet, 125). Man’s concentration is in his being personal. Marlet uses the word ‘heart’ in this connection (Marlet 122). Marlet emphasizes that God and creation cannot be reduced to Being as a common denominator (Marlet 128).

Berkouwer agrees that Marlet’s use of ‘substance’ is not the traditional abstraction of certain modal aspects. Marlet wants to avoid the kind of absolutization that Dooyeweerd criticized. Rather, Marlet wants to look at the “center” of the total human nature, which comes into contact with truth (Berkouwer 17). Berkouwer says that in this way Marlet wants to come to a philosophical thought that functions existentially, from out of the center of the person and directed to the divine Origin. Berkouwer correctly says that by ‘personalism,’ Marlet does not mean an irrationalist kind of personalism. By ‘existential,’ Marlet is referring to the Augustinian tradition, which he is trying to reconcile with the tradition of Aquinas. But instead of examining Marlet’s idea of the religious root and heart, Berkouwer then turns to an analysis of Schoonenberg’s theology, since Marlet also cites Schoonenberg. And Berkouwer concludes (p. 23) that Schoonenberg did not overcome the dichotomy of soul and body. While this analysis is an important theological task, it obscures the point of agreement between Marlet and Dooyeweerd regarding the religious root.

Although Dooyeweerd did not agree with Marlet’s use of the term ‘substance’ in terms of personalism, there are other passages in Dooyeweerd that support the kind of central personalism that Marlet refers to. For example, Dooyeweerd says that the ‘actuality’ spoken of by phenomenology is actually the kernel of each subject-function (WdW I, 78; NC I, 101) Our acts occur in the supratemporal and are expressed in the temporal. The kernel of each subject-function is therefore in the supratemporal. We cannot form a concept of the kernel because the kernel is in the supratemporal. [60]

B. Substance versus God’s sovereignty

Apart from his revised view of the meaning of ‘substance,’ Marlet's use of this term (in the sense of our subsistence in God), reflects theological differences from Dooyeweerd. He assumes that it is Dooyeweerd’s Calvinistic emphasis on God’s sovereignty—in the sense of God’s action alone [Alleinwirksamkeit]—that prevents Dooyeweerd from acknowledging man’s independent existence. Marlet sees in Dooyeweerd a late-Augustinian overemphasis on God’s sole activity [Alleintätigkeit], which causes man’s own capacity for action [Eigentätigkeit] to disappear. Being is then ascribed only to God (Marlet, 117).

This is also related to Marlet’s idea of substance in terms of response-ability. Marlet believes that there is a co-working with God, and that Dooyeweerd cannot accept this due to Calvinism’s emphasis on God’s sovereignty, which undercuts the own value [Eigenwert] and independence [Eigenständigkeit] of the cosmos. Marlet questions whether Calvinism, which emphasizes the sole activity of God, does justice to the ontical reality of the creaturely participation. Marlet says that Calvinism thereby denies the constitutive meaning of Being (Marlet 133-134). And Marlet says that this is the final difference between Dooyeweerd’s Calvinistic philosophy and philosophy in the Catholic church (Marlet, 130).

Berkouwer says that Marlet’s emphasis on personalism and synergism against Calvinism is a misrepresentation of Calvinism. Calvinism has never understood God’s sovereignty over all things [alwerkzaamheid] as God working alone [alleenwerkzaamheid] (Berkouwer, 27-28). And so Berkouwer defends the Calvinism that is presumed to form the basis of Dooyeweerd’s thought.

Whether or not Marlet has correctly interpreted Calvinism, it seems to me that there are a few points that could help to clarify the matter. First, Marlet fails to distinguish Dooyeweerd’s philosophy (which Dooyeweerd expressly distances from Calvinism) from the philosophy of Dooyeweerd’s brother-in-law Vollenhoven (whose philosophy continued to expressly connect to Calvinism). Throughout his dissertation, Marlet assumes that Vollenhoven’s ideas are shared by Dooyeweerd. But in fact, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagreed with respect to almost every major issue [61]. Dooyeweerd’s central idea of the heart does not appear to derive from Calvinism at all [62], but rather from Baader’s Christian theosophy, as mediated by J.H. Gunning, Jr., Chantepie de la Saussaye, Ab rhaam Kuyper, and others (Friesen 2011). Dooyeweerd expressly distinguishes between Kuyper's neo-Calvinism and traditional Calvinism. [63]

Second, Marlet fails to recognize that Baader, on whom these Catholic theologians rely, has a similar view of man’s total dependence on God. Thus, it is not Calvinism that is at the basis of Dooyeweerd’s assertion that Being is found only in God. The idea derives from Christian theosophy.

We can see this when we look at Baader’s ideas of substance. Baader rejects any view of matter as independent substance. He says that the apparent permanence of matter is like the apparent existence of a circle of light when we spin a lighted stick [64]. Baader says that the temporal is only a mode [Weise] of production of the Absolute; the temporal is a mode or quality of the inexistence of what has been ‘produced’ by the Absolute [65]. Substance, in the sense of integral existence, exists only in God:

Third, I think that Baader provides a solution to Marlet’s problem. Although the creature has no substantiality except that given to it by God, we are not left with a monism. Rather, Baader emphasizes that the temporal creation individualizes and achieves an independent reality of its own. [67]

C. Continuity with Aquinas?

Much of the previous discussion has centered on whether Marlet is correct in seeing a continuity with Aquinas, or whether these developments in Catholic theology are new developments which are counter to the 1870 encyclical as well as the 1950 encyclical Humani Generis. Berkouwer does not believe that this new Catholic theology can be reconciled with those encyclicals, which he regards as reaffirming a natural way of knowledge. He says that the 1870 encyclical affirmed a duplex ordo cognitionis, which added supernatural revelation to human reason (Berkouwer 13, 16, 34). Berkouwer concludes that these “new ideas” are also more in accordance with the Council of Trent than with Vatican Council’s Humani Generis.

But Marlet argues for a continuity of the new theology with Aquinas. He says that Aristotle’s idea of substance and essence left no role for the divine creation and sustaining of the world (Marlet, 118). But Aquinas went beyond that view. Dooyeweerd was much too influenced by R.K. Sertillanges’s work on Aquinas. Sertillanges incorrectly emphasized how Aquinas was inspired by Aristotle; he chose Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle, and early works. Marlet himself accuses Sertillanges of a tendency towards rationalism [leise Nachgiebigkeit gegenüber den Rationalismus], and says that Sertillanges’ analysis of Aquinas therefore seems to support Dooyeweerd (Marlet 126). But Marlet says that there is a difference between Aquinas and the later scholastic tradition, which did not follow Aquinas (Marlet, 85). Marlet says that Dooyeweerd knew only this late scholasticism (Marlet, 115). Marlet follows Brunner’s idea of a unity of substance and relation (Marlet, 115). He contrasts this view, which he sees as Thomistic, with late scholasticism, which looked only at the concrete individual, and missed the correlation between substance and accident.

Pope Benedict also distinguishes Aquinas from later Catholic scholasticism (which he rejects) [68]. As already mentioned, Pope Benedict is very much influenced by Hans Urs von Balthasar and Henri de Lubac, both Baader scholars, who make the same distinction between Aquinas and later scholasticism, and who also reject the distinction between nature and grace that was brought in by late scholasticism.

Marlet is certainly aware of Dooyeweerd’s view that Aquinas relied on a synthesis of the Christian Ground-Motive with the Greek Ground-Motive of form/matter. But Marlet denies that this is an accurate portrayal of Aquinas. Marlet agrees that a form/matter motive has a religious character. But it is an absolutization of the cultural forming that occurs through man’s temporal structure (Marlet, 108-109). This is in agreement with what Dooyeweerd says about the absolutization of cultural forming. [69]

Now if, as I have argued, Baader’s ideas are the common link between Dooyeweerd and the new Catholic theologians, what effect does that have on this issue of continuity? Do Baader’s ideas, which expand on the Protestant ideas of Jacob Boehme, really represent Catholic thought? Or are they a departure from the views of Aquinas? Emmanuel Tourpe has argued that Baader is in continuity with Aquinas. Tourpe says that Baader’s theory of knowledge is “a powerful return to Aquinas’s epistemology in the face of the Kantian critique. Baader’s profound originality stems from the theosophical frame into which he sets his reading of Aquinas, confronting it to Jacob Boehme’s Trinitarian vision in particular.” [70]

The historical issue of whether Aquinas really shared these ideas is still important, and should be debated. And if Aquinas can be interpreted in terms of Baader’s ideas, then that is itself a significant development. But in comparing Dooyeweerd, and in seeking ecumenical dialogue perhaps we should not become too bogged down in defending historical divisions that resulted from theological differences when there may be more important theosophical convergences.

D. The role of theology

Marlet says that philosophy looks at the concrete, and in this it depends on a “theological a priori.” H.G. Geertsema, who has also analyzed the similarities and differences between Marlet and Dooyeweerd, correctly points out that Marlet’s reference to a theological basis of philosophy is not intended in a theoretical-theological sense [71]. By ‘theology,’ Marlet does not mean formal presuppositions, but concrete and supra-theoretical assumptions, which Marlet compares to the religious basic structure and the corresponding Ground-Motives in Dooyeweerd (Marlet, 94-96).

And yet there is an ambiguity here. Marlet sometimes refers to the root-unity as a theological root unity. In that way, ‘theology’ is used to refer to ontical conditions, and not theoretical presuppositions.

But at other times, Marlet refers to theology as a theoretical discipline, as when he contrasts Dooyeweerd’s supposedly Calvinistic ideas on the sovereignty of God with the responsible actions of human.

After Marlet’s dissertation, Dooyeweerd wrote an article showing this ambiguous use of the word ‘theology’ in Roman Catholic thought [72]. Sometimes the word ‘theology’ is used to refer to the central religious drive that precedes all theory, and sometimes it refers to the theoretical results of theological thought. Dooyeweerd instead uses the term ‘religious’ to refer to the central supratemporal influence of God’s Word on our heart. And he uses the term ‘theology’ to refer to the temporal conceptual and theoretical work relating to the mode of consciousness of faith.

As we have already seen, Dooyeweerd emphasizes in his 1964 Lecture that religious ecumenism does not depend on any theoretical thought, including theology, but rather on the work of God’s Spirit upon our supratemporal heart.

Geertsema correctly emphasizes Dooyeweerd’s ideas of the concentric nature of the heart, of the heart as a unity that is expressed in the diversity of time, and Dooyeweerd’s comparison of this unity (as image of God) with God’s own unity as Origin. And Geertsema correctly distinguishes Dooyeweerd’s use of religion from theology. And yet Geertsema himself seems to take an overly theological view of Dooyeweerd. He criticizes Dooyeweerd for speaking of a relation of being between God’s being (as unity of Origin) and created being as the unity and the diversity that is expressed from the Origin (Geertsema, 247). Geertsema thinks that this brings in an idea of sharing in the being of God that goes counter to the idea of the law as boundary between God and creation:

But although Dooyeweerd does speak of God’s law as boundary, he does not do so in Vollenhoven’s sense, but in the sense of our dependence on God [73]. And Dooyeweerd speaks of our participation in Christ, and how our supratemporal selfhood images the way God expresses Himself in creation. It therefore seems to me that Geertsema misses the real connection between Dooyeweerd and Marlet, between Dooyeweerd and the new Catholic theology. For it is precisely our supratemporal imaging of God, in the root of our existence, which is central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy [74]. Similarly, it is that same philosophical anthropology, obtained via Baader, which allows the new Catholic theologians to overcome the scholastic dualism of soul and body, of nature and grace. So by making his analysis too theological, Geertsema misses the theosophical agreement in both Baader and the new Catholic theology.

E. Dooyeweerd and Ecumenism

Ecumenical dialogue was increasingly important to Dooyeweerd. His 1965 farewell lecture is entitled “The ecumenical Ground-Motive…” In his 1964 Lecture, he makes a very strong plea for an ecumenical approach to reformational philosophy, and for the Association to give up its label ‘Calvinistic.’ He says that the term is an obstacle to those who are otherwise attracted to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, and gives the impression of a narrow-minded [geborneerde] circle of adherents. (1964 Discussion 17-19). This is all very strongly opposed by Vollenhoven, who wants to restrict ecumenism to those within the Gereformeerde persuasion. He says that Dooyeweerd is being really rather naïve here (he uses the word ‘guileless’), and that modern Roman Catholic theology may have changed a bit, but that it is really the same old stuff (1964 discussion, pp. 22-25).

Dooyeweerd’s response is that Vollenhoven has not understood him. Vollenhoven has brought in theological issues here, the dissection of the 80 or 90 different kinds of theology that Vollenhoven had earlier mentioned. But Dooyeweerd says that he was not talking theology at all, but about the religious center of our being. When we do not talk in theological terms, but focus our Christian philosophy on what is central, we will then find unity with others, and Dooyeweerd gives examples from his own experience.

But I suspect that those reformational philosophers who follow Vollenhoven’s philosophy instead of Dooyeweerd’s will be less interested in this kind of project, preferring to continue to analyze and to label the differences that they might have with other religious denominations [75]. Vollenhoven did not agree with the idea of dialogue with the new Roman Catholic theology. In a 2005 lecture at Redeemer University College, I also suggested how these same ideas in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy could be used in ecumenical dialogue with the Orthodox Church [76]. But Vollenhoven's philosophy is not compatible with such dialogue. It is clear from a recently discovered document that Vollenhoven did not favour Eastern Orthodox views, which he regarded as too mystical. Instead he favoured the Western Augustinian tradition. [77]

V. Conclusion

A review of Marlet’s dissertation helps us to better understand Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of the Law-Idea and to place it in an historical context that allows for ecumenical dialogue with other Christian philosophy. Marlet provides a good summary of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, and shows many parallels to Catholic philosophy of transcendence.

Dooyeweerd stresses that the convergence of ideas between his philosophy and the new Catholic theology is not theological in nature in a theoretical sense. The convergence is rather based on the shared idea of a transcendental philosophy. And that in turn relies on a view of a transcendent selfhood, which Dooyeweerd refers to in this last lecture as “the key of self-knowledge.” What is at issue is not theology, but the central religious driving force of his philosophy. And by ‘central,’ he means the supratemporal root unity of man, which is unfolded and expressed in time, and given new direction by God’s Word for this task. In other words, the core of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, and of the transcendental critique, is this concentrated direction towards the center. It is the “law of concentration” of which Marlet speaks.

Marlet’s comparison of this new theology with Dooyeweerd’s philosophy could have been even stronger had he investigated the reliance of both the new Catholic theologians and Dooyeweerd on the Christian theosophy of Franz von Baader. The convergence of ideas between the new theology and Dooyeweerd is a result of their common inspiration by Baader’s ideas. This is particularly the case for Henri de Lubac, Erich Przywara and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Relying on Baader, these Roman Catholic theologians were able to overcome the scholastic dualism between nature and grace, and to arrive at a unified view of the selfhood, a selfhood that is above time. And since Pope Benedict shares some of this theology, this presents a continuing opportunity for continuing dialogue between Dooyeweerd’s kind of reformational philosophy and today’s Catholic Church.

Marlet claims that there is continuity between these new Catholic theologians and Aquinas. To the extent that the new theology relies on Baader, who in turn relied primarily on the Christian theosophy of Jacob Boehme, this claim of historical continuity with Aquinas might be disputed. But reformational philosophy’s claim of continuity with historic Calvinism can also be disputed, since Dooyeweerd says that he obtained the idea of the supratemporal heart from Kuyper. And recent research has shown that Kuyper obtained this idea from J.H. Gunning, Jr., who in turn obtained it from Baader. In my view, both Dooyeweerd’s reformational philosophy and the new Catholic theology owe more to Christian theosophy than to either Calvin or Aquinas. This is perhaps a good thing, since it allows for a convergence of ideas not on theological grounds, but on the basis of a common philosophical anthropology of the supratemporal heart, instead of the scholastic dualism of soul and body.

Bibliography

Baader, Franz Xavier von: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Franz Hoffmann, (Leipzig, 1851-1860) [‘Werke’].

Baader, Franz Xavier von (1818): “Über den Begriff der Zeit,” [Concerning the Concept of Time] Werke 1, 47-94. See my translation online [http://www.members.shaw.ca/baader/Zeit.html].

Baader, Franz Xavier von (1831): “Elementarbegriffe über die Zeit,” [Elementary Concepts Concerning Time] (1831).Werke 14, 29-54. See my translation online [http://www.members.shaw.ca/baader/Elementar.html].

Baader, Franz Xavier von (1865): Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie: Ideen über Recht, Staat, Gesellschaft und Kirche, ed. Franz Hoffmann, (Würzburg).

Baader, Franz Xavier von (1925): Baaders Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie, ed. Johann Sauter (Jena: Gustav Fischer).

Berkouwer, G.C. (1956): “Identiteit of conflict? Een poging tot analyse,” Philosophia Reformata 21 (1956), 1-44.

Betanzos, Ramon J. (1998): Franz von Baader’s Philosophy of Love (Vienna: Passagen Verlag)

Caldecott, Stratford: “An Introduction to Hans Urs von Balthasar,” online at [file://localhost/Research/Von%20Balthasar/re0486.html].

Couturier, W, (1950): “Het menselijk lichaam in het Thomistish denken,” BP 11, (1950).

de Lubac, Henri (1950): Catholicism, tr. L.C. Sheppard (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, originally published Paris: Cerf, 1938)

de Lubac, Henri (1967): The Mystery of the Supernatural, tr. Rosemary Sheed (Montreal: Palm Publishers, originally published as Le mystère du surnaturel, 1965).

de Lubac, Henri (1987): La Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore (Namur: Le Sycomore).

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1923): “Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde,” February, 1923. Excerpts in Verburg.

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1931): De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, in het licht eener Calvinistische kosmologie en kennistheorie (Amsterdam: Ten Have).

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1935-36), De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris) [‘WdW’], excerpts translated by J. Glenn Friesen, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Prolegomena1.html].

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1939): “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata (1939), 193-232.

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1946): Encylopedia of Legal Science (Amsterdam: Drukkerij D.A.V.I.D.); partially translated online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Encyclopedia.html].

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1947): “Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought,” Evangelical Quarterly XIX (1) Jan 1947).

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1953): A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed) [‘NC’].

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1958): “De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten,” Philosophia Reformata 23 (1958) 1-21, 49-84.

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1966): “Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorisch Grondmotief,” Philosophia Reformata 31 (1966), 3-15.

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1968): In the Twilight of Western Thought, (Nutley, N.J.: Craig Press, 1968).

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1975a): De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie, Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101, translated by J. Glenn Friesen, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/
Kentheoretische.html].

Dooyeweerd, Herman (2002): Encyclopedia of the Science of Law (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press).

Dooyeweerd, Herman (2007): “Centrum en omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een veranderende wereld,” Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) 1-20. For a translation of this lecture and the discussion that followed, see “Center and Periphery: The Philosophy of the Law-Idea in a changing world,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/1964Lecture.html] [‘1964 Lecture’ and ‘1964 Discussion’].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2003a): “The Mystical Dooyeweerd: The Relation of his Thought to Franz von Baader,” Ars Disputandi 3 (2003) [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/
publish/articles/000088/index.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2003b): “The Mystical Dooyeweerd Once Again: Kuyper’s Use of Franz von Baader,” Ars Disputandi 3 (2003) [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/
publish/articles/000130/index.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2005): “Dooyeweerd and Baader: A Response to D.F.M. Strauss,” [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Strauss.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2005a): “Monism, Dualism, Nondualism: A Problem with Vollenhoven’s Problem-Historical Method,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Method.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2005b): “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy,” Philosophia Reformata 70 (2005) 102-132, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Dialectic.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2005c): “Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and the Quest for an Ecumenical Orthodoxy.” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/ Mainheadings/Ecumenism.pdf].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2006a): "Dooyeweerd's Encyclopedia of the Science of Law: Problems with the present translation,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ Translation.pdf].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2006b): “Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical Themes in Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy,” [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/
Imagination.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2006c): Review of Johan Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte, (Stichting voor Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte, 2006), reviewed in Philosophia Reformata 71 (2006) 193-195.

Friesen, J. Glenn (2007): Review of Mietus, Lieuwe (2006): Gunning en de theosofie: Een onderzoek naar de receptie van de christelijke theosofie in het werk van J.H. Gunning Jr. van 1863-1876, (Gorinchem: Narratio), reviewed by J. Glenn Friesen, 72 Philosophia Reformata (2007) 86-91, extended version online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Gunning.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2010): “A Response to Roy Clouser’s Aristotelian Interpretation of Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata 75, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Clouser.html].

Friesen, J. Glenn (2011): “Two Ways of Reformational Philosophy: Early Writings of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/History.html].

Geertsema, H.G. (1994): “Dooyeweerd in discussie met de rooms-katholieke filosofie,” Herman Dooyeweerd 1894-1977. Breedte en actualiteit van zijn filosofie, (Kampen: Kok,), 228-254.

Lotz, Johannes B.: “Das Gedächtnis.” Geist und Leben 23 (1950), p. 126-127.

Lotz, Johannes B. (1954): Meditation: Der Weg nach innen (Frankfurt).

Maréchal, Jean: Études sur la psychologie des Mystiques. (Paris, n.d.). Translation. Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics (London, 1927).

Mietus, Lieuwe (2006): Gunning en de theosofie: Een onderzoek naar de receptie van de christelijke theosofie in het werk van J.H. Gunning Jr. van 1863-1876, (Gorinchem: Narratio), reviewed by J. Glenn Friesen, 72 Philosophia Reformata (2007) 86-91, extended version online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Gunning.html].

Mietus, Leo (2009): Gunning en Kuyper in 1978: A. Kuypers polemiek tegen Het Leven van Jezus van J.H. Gunning Jr. (Brochurereeks nr. 28, Velp: Bond van Vrije Evangelische Gemeenten in Nederland).

Przywara, Erich (1928): “Die Problematiek der Neuscholastiek,” Kantstudien (1928), 73-98.

Przywara, Erich (1930) “Das Augustinische Geistesmotive und die Krise der Gegenwart” Kantstudien.

Rahner, Karl (1939): Review of Hermann Spreckmeyer: Die philosophische Deutung des Sündenfalls bei Franz Baader (1938). Reviewed in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 63 (1939), S. 447. Included in Rahner: Sämtliche Werke. Vol. 8.

Ratzinger, Joseph Cardinal (Pope Benedict XVI) (2004): Introduction to Chrsitianity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, first published in German, Einführung in das Christentum, Kösel-Verlag, Munich)

Ratzinger, Joseph Cardinal (Pope Benedict XVI) (2006): “Faith, Reason and the University,” Sept. 12, 2006. Online at [http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html#_ftnref8].

Robbers, H. (1935): “Christelijke filosofie in katholieke en calvinsitische opvatting,” Studiën. Tijdschrift voor godsdienst, wetenschap en letteren 67 (1935) 85-99; Studiën 68 (1936) 152-153.

Robbers, H. (1936): “Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte,” Studiën. Tijdschrift voor godsdienst, wetenschap en letteren 65 (1937) 324-331.

Susini, Eugene (1942): Lettres Inédites de Franz von Baader (Paris: J. Vrin)

Tomberg, Valentin (2002): Meditations on the Tarot: A Journey into Christian Hermeticism (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2002), Afterword by Hans Urs von Balthasar.

Tourpe, Emmanuel (2004): “Connaître, comme une naissance: La logique générative de la philosophie religieuse selon Franz von Baader (1765-1841),” Laval théologique et philosophique 60 (June 2004),

Verburg, Marcel (1989): Herman Dooyeweerd. Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer (Baarn: Ten Have).

Vollenhoven D.H.Th.: “Propositions,” submitted to the Curators of the Free University, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/PropV.html].

von Balthasar, Hans Urs (1968): The Glory of the Lord (San Francisco: Ignatius Press; also T & T Clark Ltd., originally published as Herrlichkeit: Eine theolgosiche Ästhetik, 1962)

von Balthasar, Hans Urs (1965): Word and Redemption (New York: Herder and Herder).

von Balthasar, Hans Urs (1982): The von Balthasar Reader, ed. Medard Kehl and Werner Löser, tr. Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (New York: Crossroad).

von Balthasar, Hans Urs (1983): Does Jesus Know Us? Do We Know Him? (San Francisco: Ignatius Press).

von Balthasar, Hans Urs (2003): Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press).

Endnotes

This, however, is not to say that the religious centre of human existence is found in a rigid and static immobility. That is a metaphysical-Greek idea of supra-temporality (NC I, 31 fn1)