Enstasy4

Although Dooyeweerd does not accept the idea of enstasis as a pure consciousness that is separated from temporal reality, he does emphasize an inward contemplative direction. He calls this “religious self-reflection.” Self-reflection is experiential. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is based on experience (Friesen 2009, Thesis 1 and references).

Religious self-reflection is an inward movement. Dooyeweerd emphasizes the inwardness or innerness of our experience. There are “inner human acts of experience” that are ‘necessarily related to the ego as the transcendent centre of human existence.” Animals lack this center (NC II, 114). Inner and outer are related to the distinction between central and peripheral. The heart is central and inner and what is temporal is outer and on the periphery (WdW I, v-vii). Dooyeweerd refers to the human soul or heart as ‘the inner man’ [‘de inwendige mensch’] (Dooyeweerd 1939). In pre-theoretical intuition the transcendent root of our personality thinks inwardly [in-denken] en-statically. Our naïve thought is an in-denken, an inward thought, in enstasis:

In de rustende vóór-theoretische intuitie beleef ik denkende de tijdelijke werkelijkheid als mij eigen. In haar denkt de transcendente wortel onzer persoonlijkheid zich enstatisch in in den kosmisch-tijdelijken samenhang der werkelijkehid en beleeft wetende de zin-verscheidenheid, maar zonder gearticuleerde kennis der zin-modaliteiten. Wij kunnen in tegenstelling tot het theoretisch zelf-bewustzijn hier von een vóór-theoretisch kosmisch zelfbewustzijn spreken (WdW II, 414).

In the composure of my pre-theoretical intuition I have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as my own in my thought. In pre-theoretical thought our I-ness enters enstatically by means of its naïve intuition into the cosmic temporal coherence of experience. And thus we have conscious experience of the modal diversity of meaning but without distinct knowledge of the modal aspects. In contrast with theoretical self-consciousness we can speak here of a pre-theoretical cosmic self-consciousness (NC II, 478-79).

So religious self-reflection is related to ‘cosmic consciousness.’ Knowledge of self is related to knowledge of cosmos. Self-reflection is a way that we know the relation between our supratemporal selfhood and its expression within temporal reality. Just as God expresses Himself in man as his image, so our supratemporal selfhood expresses itself in temporal reality (Friesen 2009, Thesis 65 and references). In self-reflection, we know the modal functions as “our own.” (NC II, 474). We know ourselves as “fitted” within temporal reality, but simultaneously transcending it. We will look at these terms ‘cosmic consciousness,’ ‘our own’ and ‘fitted’ in more detail, as well as the idea of pre-theoretical intuition. For now, note that they are connected by Dooyeweerd to the idea of enstasis.

From where did Dooyeweerd obtain this idea of religious self-reflection? One source may be Husserl, who says

Die ekstatisch-religiöse Hingegebenheit is zugleich radikalste Selbstbesinnung (Husserl, 1929, 115).

[Ecstatic-religious surrender is at the same time the most radical self-consciousness]

Note however that Husserl refers to self-reflection as ‘ecstatic’ whereas Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘enstatic.’

Another likely source of the idea of religious self-reflection is Frederik van Eeden, who emphasized the importance of such inward beholding of the self [zelfschouw]. As discussed, Dooyeweerd corresponded with Van Eeden regarding the meaning of ‘intuition’ (Friesen 2011).

Dooyeweerd says that most philosophers dogmatically reject this idea of “religious self-reflection.” These philosophers want to save at all costs their starting point that assumes a self-sufficient reason. In other words, they start with immanence philosophy, which denies a supratemporal center, a center that would relativize their reason (WdW I, v-vii; inadequately translated in NC). All theoretical pushing away of the human selfhood from this central position in experience rests on a lack of philosophic self-reflection (WdW II, 494; NC II, 562). A truly critical epistemology depends on self-reflection on the cosmonomic Idea from which the thinker starts (NC II, 491). Ideas give an account of our relation to the eternal Origin (God), the supratemporal Totality (selfhood), and the temporal coherence (cosmos).

Can philosophy–which ought to be guided by the Idea of the totality of meaning–then ever be possible without critical self reflection? Evidently not. A philosophy which does not lead to this reflection must from the outset fail to be directed to the totality of meaning of our cosmos. ghw=qi seauton, “know thyself”, must indeed be written above the portals of philosophy. But in this very demand for critical self-reflection lies the great problem. To be sure, the ego is actually active in its philosophical thought, but it necessarily transcends the philosophical concept. For, as shall appear, the self is the concentration-point of all my cosmic functions. It is a subjective totality which can neither he resolved into philosophical thought, nor into some other function, nor into a coherence of functions. Rather it lies at the basis of all the latter as their presupposition (NC I, 5)

Note that by ‘critical’ self-reflection, Dooyeweerd means self-reflection that accounts for the existence of our supratemporal selfhood. To be critical is to be engaged in theory, in an attempt to give an account of our pre-theoretical knowledge [rekenschap geven; WdW I, 4). We give a theoretical account of our experience by theoretical Ideas, which point to and approximate the ontical conditions that are required to make such theoretical thought even possible. These ontical conditions include our supratemporal selfhood, the center of all our functions (Friesen 2009, Thesis 2 and references).

But no special science, nor an encyclopaedic sociology, can answer the question, what man himself is in the unity of his selfhood.

Human I-ness functions, to be sure, in all modal aspects of reality. But it is, nevertheless, a central and radical unity, which as such transcends all temporal aspects 1. The way of critical self-reflection is, consequently, the only one that can lead to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought (NC I, 51).

Dooyeweerd says that our self-knowledge itself exceeds the limits of theoretical thought and is rooted in our “heart” (NC I, 55). Our experience is rooted in religious self-consciousness (NC II, 560, where he makes clear that ‘religious’ refers to the transcendent horizon of the selfhood). Such self-reflection is the only way leading to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought. He also says that there was “great promise” in Kant's search for a starting point for his theoretical philosophy which would be raised above the special synthetic points of view.

For it is indubitable that our theoretical thought, so long as it is fixed on the different aspects of reality, is dissipated in a theoretical diversity. Only in the way of knowledge of itself can human consciousness concentrate on a central point where all the aspects of our consciousness converge in a radical unity. The ancient Greek philosophers knew this very well. Socrates already laid it down that self knowledge is the key to all philosophy. But here arises a new problem, which we may formulate thus:
(4) How is self-knowledge possible, and of what nature is this knowledge?
Kant did not wish to abandon the theoretical point of departure (Dooyeweerd 1947, 48).

Baader says that we have self-consciousness only by participating in God’s original self-consciousness [the divine Urselbstbewußtseins]; we know ourselves insofar as we know God (Werke V 95f; II 207f). And Dooyeweerd emphasizes our need to participate in Christ, the New Root of creation. Only as we do so can we truly understand our self.

But religious self-reflection is different from critical self-reflection. Critical self-reflection is a theoretical giving an account of what we know by religious self-reflection. And self-reflection is not at all the same as reflexive thought (Friesen 2008b)

We obtain knowledge of God by divine revelation. But Dooyeweerd does not view revelation in terms of propositional exegesis of Scripture (Friesen 2009, Thesis 42 and references). Revelation is not theoretical in nature. Revelation primarily has a religious enstatic character.

Deze kennis uit openbaring draagt primair een religieus-enstatisch karakter, ze rust primair evenmin in een zin-synthesis als het kosmisch zelfbewustzijn (WdW II, 494)

This knowledge in the full sense of the word contains the religious principle and foundation of all true knowledge, and primarily has a religious enstatic character. It no more rests primarily on a theoretical meaning-synthesis than does the cosmic self-consciousness (NC II, 562).

Religious self-reflection is dependent on the working in us of God's Word:

…als het gaat om de waarachtige gods- en zelfkennis, dan moeten we zeggen: er is geen theologie ter wereld en geen wijsbegeerte ter wereld, die de mens dat bij kan brengen. Dat is de onmiddelijke vrucht van de centrale werking van Gods Woord zelf in de gemeenschap van de Heilige Geest, in het hart, de radix, de worteleenheid van het menslijk bestaan (Dooyeweerd, 1964).
[And concerning true knowledge of self and of God, we must then say: there is no theology in the world and no philosophy in the world that can bring us to this kind of knowledge. It is the immediate fruit of the central working of God's Word itself in the community of the Holy Spirit, in the heart, the radix, the root unity of our human existence.] [my translation]

Provided that we do not interpret self-reflection as pure consciousness, or nirvikalpa samadhi, we may compare it to some kinds of inner meditation, such as the sahaja samadhi emphasized by Ramana Maharshi (Friesen 2001, 2006d). A central difference is of course Dooyeweerd’s insistence that true enstasis is centered on Christ as the New Root. But both Dooyeweerd and Ramana Maharshi emphasize the importance of our central heart experience. Such experiential religious self-reflection goes beyond theoretical Ideas (NC II, 4). It is religious because it involves the center of our existence, the supratemporal heart, and our heart in turn is dependent on and refers to our Origin, God. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that self-knowledge is linked to knowledge of God and to knowledge of the cosmos. We do not have knowledge of self without knowledge of God. And neither do we have proper knowledge of the cosmos.

True knowledge of the cosmos is bound to true self-knowledge, which is bound to true knowledge of God (NC II, 560).

This is shown in the biblical revelation of our creation concerning our creation in the image of God. Our self-knowledge is a central knowledge. Self-knowledge exceeds theoretical knowledge and is rooted in the heart or the religious centre of our existence (NC I, 55). The “earthly” cosmos is transcended by Man in his full selfhood where he partakes in the transcendent root (NC II, 593). Even if it is not disconnected from the outer and temporal, religious self-reflection involves an awareness of the inner and supratemporal.

We will now look at the terms ‘cosmic consciousness,’ ‘our own,’ ‘center and periphery’ and ‘fitted’ that Dooyeweerd associates with enstatic experience.

1. Cosmic consciousness

Dooyeweerd links our pre-theoretical consciousness with “cosmic consciousness” (NC II, 479).

It is only man who can have cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness because only man’s cosmic temporal structure is founded in an individual religious root transcending time, viz. his selfhood (NC II, 480)

Note the distinction between cosmic and cosmological consciousness. Cosmic consciousness is pre-theoretical. Cosmological consciousness, which distinguishes the aspects of our consciousness, is theoretical. But our theoretical consciousness is based on our pre-theoretical cosmic consciousness (WdW II, 415).

The term ‘cosmic consciousness’ is often used to describe mystical ecstatic experience. An early example is given by Richard Maurice Bucke in his book Cosmic Consciousness (Bucke, 1901, 1923).

Bucke was a Canadian doctor. In the spring of 1872 he had been reading some poetry by Whitman, with some friends in London. He left the friends after midnight in a calm mood, and took a long drive in his carriage. While riding, he had an experience of what he called illumination, or cosmic consciousness. It was described in the Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada:

All at once, without warning of any kind, he found himself wrapped around, as it were, by a flame-colored cloud. For an instant he thought of fire–some sudden conflagration in the great city. The next (instant) he knew that the light was within himself.

Directly after there came upon him a sense of exultation, of immense joyousness, accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination quite impossible to describe. Into his brain streamed one momentary lightning-flash of the Brahmic Splendor which ever since lightened his life. Upon his heart fell one drop of the Brahmic bliss, leaving thenceforward for always an aftertaste of Heaven. Among other things he did not come to believe, he saw and knew that the Cosmos is not dead matter but a living Presence, that the soul of man is immortal, that the universe is so built and ordered that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of each and all, that the foundation principle of the world is what we call love and that the happiness of every one is in the long run absolutely certain. (Bucke, 10).

The experience that Bucke reports is visionary and ecstatic. It uses Hindu terminology, relating the experience to Brahman. It is intensely experiential. Bucke says that cosmic consciousness carries with it the conviction of immortality. It is not that we shall have eternal life in the future but that it is possessed and experienced already.

Does Bucke's ecstatic and visionary experience of cosmic consciousness fit with Dooyeweerd's use of the term? Can we regard cosmic consciousness as an “illumination?” Dooyeweerd does speak of our opened naïve experience as an “illumination” of our temporal world:

In the Biblical attitude of naïve experience the transcendent, religious dimension of its horizon is opened. The light of eternity radiates perspectively through all the temporal dimensions of this horizon and even illuminates seemingly trivial things and events in our sinful world (NC III, 29).

Bucke's experience was frequently referred to by later philosophers of mysticism. William James refers to Bucke in his Varieties of Religious Experience (p. 398). We know that Dooyeweerd had read William James as early as 1915, he refers to James in his student article about van Eeden (Dooyeweerd 1915a). Dooyeweerd was still reading James in 1940 when he wrote about James's idea of the "specious present” (Dooyeweerd 1936-39).

Three years after Bucke's book, Wilhelm Wundt (whom Dooyeweerd also read) referred to the idea of cosmic consciousness in his Principles of Physiological Psychology:

We may say, then, that the mechanistic explanation of the movements of the lower animals is not the outcome of impartial and unprejudiced observation. But the rival theory, which ascribes mind and consciousness to the plant-world, is in no better case. Fechner, the chief representative of this theory, himself expressly declares that he derived it from considerations of general philosophy: he further attributes consciousness to the earth and the other heavenly bodies, making this cosmic consciousness the whole, of which the individual forms of consciousness in plant and animal are parts. (Wundt, I, 33)

Wundt's reference is to Gustav Fechner's Zend-avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits. Dooyeweerd makes express reference to that book, so we know he read it (WdW III, 554fn; NC III, 631 ft). But Dooyeweerd certainly rejected Fechner's hylozoism, which regards every movement, even the fall of a stone, as a part of a living organism.

In van Eeden's Johannes Viator, which has the subtitle “The book of love,” van Eeden writes of Johannes who tries to become conscious of cosmic love which holds all of creation in existence and also holds it together, and which will bring redemption to the contrariety in the world. In this book, van Eeden puts forward a worldview in which self and the world are brought together in a cosmic coherence (van Eeden, 1895). And there are other similarities Dooyeweerd and Frederik van Eeden (Friesen 2011).

Dooyeweerd may have obtained the phrase ‘cosmic consciousness’ from Joseph Maréchal. In his “On the Feeling of Presence in Mystics and Non-Mystics” he refers to cosmic consciousness. (Maréchal, 1924). We know that Dooyeweerd was familiar with Maréchal, since he owned a copy of the second French edition of that book (1938). Whether he was aware of the earlier edition is uncertain.

Dooyeweerd may also have obtained the phrase ‘cosmic consciousness’ from Eduard von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious [Philosophie des Unbewussten] (1869). It is clear that he read this, too (NC II, 315). This book was written well before Bucke's use of the term. Hartmann there expresses Schopenhauer's philosophy (itself derived from the Upanishads and Buddhism); von Hartmann refers to a cosmic consciousness that underlies individual consciousness. In most people this cosmic consciousness is unconscious.

... jetzt aber handelt es sich um Erweiterung des egoistischen zu einem kosmischen Bewusstsein und Streben, zu dem Bewusstsein, dass das Individuum wie die Nation nichts als ein Rad oder eine Feder in dem grossen Weltgetriebe sind und keine Aufgabe haben, als als solche ihre Schuldigkeit zu thun, um den Process des Ganzen, auf den es allein ankommt, zu fördern…(Von Hartmann 1869, 608).

[..we are now concerned with the enlargement of egoic consciousness to a cosmic consciousness and striving, to being conscious that both the individual and the nation are no more than a wheel or a spring in the great machinery of the world, and have no other task than to do their duty to further the process of the whole, on which alone it depends…] [my translation]

Von Hartmann writes this in the context of his view of history as proceeding from an individualistic view of responsibility to the Roman tribal view to one that goes beyond egotism. Dooyeweerd’s exposition of the history of law makes some similar distinctions. What is interesting in the present circumstance is the idea of cosmic consciousness pointing to a whole. But Dooyeweerd did not regard the cosmos in mechanistic terms.

And whereas Bucke tended to regard cosmic consciousness as a kind of pure consciousness of our selfhood, Dooyeweerd uses the term to relate the temporal cosmos to our supratemporal selfhood. Our selfhood is supratemporal. But for Dooyeweerd, the cosmos is always temporal. The illumination that we experience is an illumination of the world, in that we see its deeper unity:

Slechts het (…) kosmisch zelfbewustzijn kan de diepere eenheid van alle zin-zijden der werkelijken vatten, doch slecht daarom, wijl het zelve alle, in de kosmische tijdorde vervlochten, zinfuncties in den transcendenten wortel der zelfheid te boven gaat (WdW I, 399)

Only the cosmic self-consciousness (to be examined later in the discussion of the problem of knowledge) can grasp the deeper unity of all aspects of reality, because in the transcendent root of the selfhood it transcends all its modal functions, which are interwoven in the cosmic order of time (NC I, 431).

And so for Dooyeweerd, ‘cosmic consciousness’ includes the experience of cosmic unity. A similar idea is found in Baader, where the central intuitive beholding is not a view of a different region, but a view of the same region in a different way.

…ein Individuum, welches in irgend einer Region aus der Peripherie ins Centrum tritt, nothwendig nun allen einzelnen Peripheriepuncten allgegenwärtig (d.i. als Geist oder als eine unbegreifliche, unfassliche, unsperrbare und unaufhaltbare höhere Natur) zich bezeugen wird, so wie selbes die ganze Peripherie nun mit einem Blicke (Alles in Einem) übersieht (Werke 4, 23-4)

[…An individual in any region who moves from out of the periphery into the Center, necessarily witnesses all individual peripheral points as omni-present (i.e. As Spirit or as an incomprehensible, inconceivable, imperceptible, and incessant higher nature), just as he views the whole periphery with one glance (everything in one)] [my translation]

Dooyeweerd says that cosmic self-consciousness does not rest in a theoretical meaning-synthesis (WdW II, 494). Theoretical consciousness, which distinguishes the aspects of our experience for the first time, is called ‘cosmological consciousness.’
Dooyeweerd's 'cosmic consciousness' should not be interpreted as a nirvikalpa samadhi, where there is no awareness of subject or object. It may perhaps be similar to sahaja samadhi, although further research needs to be done on this point. (Friesen 2001; 2006d).

2. Experiencing temporal reality as “our own”

Enstasis is related to experiencing temporal reality as “our own.” In naïve experience, we have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as our own. It is worth repeating the quotation we have earlier discussed:

In de rustende vóór-theoretische intuitie beleef ik denkende de tijdelijke werkelijkheid als mij eigen. In haar denkt de transcendente wortel onzer persoonlijkheid zich enstatisch in in den kosmisch-tijdelijken samenhang der werkelijkehid en beleeft wetende de zin-verscheidenheid, maar zonder gearticuleerde kennis der zin-modaliteiten. Wij kunnen in tegenstelling tot het theoretisch zelf-bewustzijn hier von een vóór-theoretisch kosmisch zelfbewustzijn spreken (WdW II, 414).

In the composure of my pre-theoretical intuition I have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as my own in my thought. In pre-theoretical thought our I-ness enters enstatically by means of its naïve intuition into the cosmic temporal coherence of experience. And thus we have conscious experience of the modal diversity of meaning but without distinct knowledge of the modal aspects. In contrast with theoretical self-consciousness we can speak here of a pre-theoretical cosmic self-consciousness (NC II, 478-79).

Thus, the awareness of temporal reality and of temporal functions as “our own” is also cosmic consciousness. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that cosmic temporal reality is “our own” and not “alien” or foreign [vreemd, Fremd] to us. The problem of foreignness does not arise unless we accept Dooyeweerd’s starting point that our selfhood is beyond time, or supratemporal. The issue is then how our supratemporal selfhood relates to temporal reality, including our own body.

In our cosmic consciousness, we relate temporal reality to the structure of the human selfhood as such:

In the transcendent religious subjective a priori of the cosmic self-consciousness the whole of human cognition is directed either to the absolute Truth, or to the spirit of falsehood. In this cosmic self-consciousness we are aware of temporal cosmic reality being related to the structure of the human selfhood qua talis (NC II, 562)

Because temporal reality is necessarily related to the selfhood, Dooyeweerd denies the existence of things in themselves [Dinge an sich]. In fact, he denies that temporal reality has any existence apart from its rootedness in man as its supratemporal center (Friesen 2009, Thesis 66 and references; Friesen 2006b). A full exploration of this important idea is beyond the scope of this article.

Dooyeweerd says that even the identification of a sensation such as a sweet taste would be impossible without this intuition

How could I really be aware of a sweet taste, if I could not relate this sensory impression to myself, by means of my intuition entering into the cosmic stream of time? (NC II, 478; Cf. WdW II, 413).

What does he mean? In the text, he is responding to the ideas of Johannes Immanuel Volkelt, who said, “When I am immediately certain of the sensation of sweetness, this is not an intuitive certainty” (Volkelt 1918, cited in NC II, 477). Volkelt regarded sensation in an empiricistic way, abstracting from our sensory-psychical aspect of experience. Volkelt says that when we experience something sweet, we do not have certainty of things in their essence, but only of my emotions [Affection] (Volkelt 1873, 90). This is the empiricistic distinction between primary and secondary qualities, a distinction that Dooyeweerd also rejects (Friesen 2009, Thesis 23 and references).

In contrast to Volkelt, Dooyeweerd asserts:

Experience is related to the human I-ness. It is fundamentally different form the animal awareness of sensations (NC II, 477).

Again, there is a distinction here between animals that do not have a supratemporal center, and humans that do. And for that (enstatic) relation between selfhood and temporal reality we need intuition. Volkelt held that intuition is what goes beyond experience, but for Dooyeweerd, intuition is what relates our experience to our selfhood. And again, this selfhood is supratemporal:

De geheele innerlijke antinomie der zgn. kritische kennistheorie ligt in deze slechts-functioneele opvatting van het zelf-bewustzijn in nuce besloten. Het zelfbewustzijn draagt noodzakelijk tegelijk een den tijd transcendeerend en den tijd immanent karakter. De diepere identiteit, welke in de zelf-heid beleefd wordt, is een trans-functioneele, het is het zich een- en dezelfde weten in en boven alle kosmisch –tijdelijke zinfuncties en het zich zijn tijdelijke zinfuncties als eigen weten (Dooyeweerd 1931, 97).

[In a nutshell, the whole inner antinomy of so-called critical epistemology is based on this merely functionalistic view of self consciousness. Self-consciousness necessarily has at the same time both a time-transcending and a time-immanent character. The deeper identity that is experienced in the selfhood is trans-functional. It is knowing oneself as one and the same in and above all cosmic-temporal meaning functions, and knowing one’s temporal meaning functions as one’s own.] [my translation]

These temporal meaning functions which we know as “our own” include our function of thought. Our central supratemporal selfhood relativizes even our thought; it is not autonomous (WdW I, v-vii). If we improperly regard our thought as autonomous, we then have the problem of relating that which is not thought to thought. The non-rational aspects of reality are then “foreign to thought.” This problem occupied Dooyeweerd’s brother-in-law Vollenhoven, as he wrestled with the idea of what is foreign to thought [het denkvreemde] (Tol 2011; Friesen 2011).

Dooyeweerd followed his former teacher Jan Woltjer, who said that we ourselves stand in close connection with the world, and we can learn it because our own selfhood is not foreign [vreemd] to it:

Wij staan door geheel het organisme van ons kenvermogen, door onze zenuwen en hersenen en alle krachten die daarin werken, met die wereld in het nauste verband, zoodat we haar niet alleen door de dingen buiten ons, maar door ons eigen lichaam, dat we, krachtens ons zelbewustzijn, niet als iets dat ons vreemd is kunnen beschouwen, leeren kennen (Woltjer 1896, 33).

[By means of the whole organism of our faculty of knowing, by our nerves and brain and all powers that work therein, we stand in the closest connection to the world, so that we do not only know it through the things outside of us but by means of our own body, which we learn to know, and as a result of our self-consciousness, cannot regard as something that is foreign to us.] (my translation]

Dooyeweerd affirms the same position: that which is a-logical is not foreign to me:

De mogelijkheid der zin-synthesis is slechts op te klaren vanuit de door ons vroeger summier aangegeven opvatting i.z. de structuur van het zelfbewustzijn. Het zelfbewustzijn transcendeert den kosmischen tijd, inzooverre de individueele zelfheid deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschengeslacht, van welks zinvolheid alle tijdelijke zin-functies (zoowel natuur- als geestesfuncties) slechts tijdelijke zinbrekingen zijn. Het is immanent aan den kosmischen tijd, in zoovere onze bewustzijnsfuncties in de kosmische tijdsorde zijn ingevlochten. De a-logische zinfuncties zijn niet vreemd aan het zelfbesuwtzijn. Ze zijn alle gezamenlijk eigen aan onze zelfheid. Alleen daarom kunnen wij ze in hare zin-wetmatigheid leeren kennen (Dooyeweerd 1931, 103).

[The possibility of the synthesis of meaning can only be explained on the basis of our previously given summary view concerning the structure of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness transcends cosmic time insofar as the individual selfhood participates in the religious root of the human race, of which all temporal meaning functions (both natural as well as spiritual functions) are merely temporal refractions of meaning. [Self-consciousness] is immanent to cosmic time insofar as our functions of consciousness are interwoven in cosmic time. The a-logical meaning functions are not foreign to self-consciousness. They are all together the selfhood’s own. Only because of this can we come to know them in their lawful regularity.] [my translation]

So to see temporal reality as “our own” is to relate it by means of our intuition to our supratemporal selfhood.

From where did Dooyeweerd obtain this idea of making things “our own”? One source may be Husserl, who says in the Cartesian Meditations, “Moreover, this life is continually there for me.” (Husserl, 1960, First Meditation, 19).

A more likely source is be Frederik van Eeden, who says in his poem Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen,

Geen ding bestaat, zoo niet het Ik ‘t beleeft,
zich voelend, denkend, teegenwoordig weetend,
schoon het al schijnbaar door ‘t on-eig’ne zweeft

en zoekt een weg, herinn’rend, tastend, meetend
in wat een onbekende waereld schijnt.
Oneigen wordt tot eigen, want gekeetend

blijkt alle Zijn, hoe men ‘t begrip verfijnt,
aan Zelfbesef in altijdduurend Heeden,
en alle zin van ‘t woord “niet-ik” verdwijnt. (Lied, III, II, 55, emphasis added).

[Nothing exists except as it is lived by Self,
as feeling, thinking, knowing in the present,
although the seeming real is in not-I suspended,

and seeks a way, in memory, taste and measure
in what seems to be a world unknown.
Not-mine becomes my own, for all of Being

is attached to consciousness of self, in the forever
resting present (however we refine this thought),
and all the sense of "not-I" disappears].

3. Center and periphery

For Dooyeweerd, enstasis is the relation of our central heart to the peripheral cosmos, including our temporal body. We experience temporal reality as “our own.” The movement inwards of religious self-reflection is towards this center. It is only in that center that we have a view of totality (Friesen 2005a). We have seen how for Baader, true stasis is a relation to our true center. Baader also speaks of a view of totality from that center. And we have seen how Scheler, influenced by Baader, says that (in contrast to humans), temporal reality is ‘ecstatic’ because of its inability to report back to a center.

The distinction between our central supratemporal heart and its peripheral functions is emphasized by Dooyeweerd in the opening pages of his major work, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935). Dooyeweerd begins with a discussion of the importance of this central significance of the heart. Kant’s Copernican revolution was not central or radical (from ‘radix’), but only a revolution in the periphery, because rationality is only a peripheral function that finds its center in the heart. In contrast, a truly radical and revolutionary philosophy begins with the central supratemporal heart, which relativizes everything temporal, including our rationality. That is why Dooyeweerd can criticize the “autonomy of thought.” [15] Thought is not autonomous, but is only one temporal function of our supratemporal center (WdW I, v-vii, poorly translated in NC I, v-vii; see Friesen 2011).

In one of his last lectures before his retirement, Dooyeweerd again emphasized the importance of the distinction between central and peripheral (Dooyeweerd 2007; lecture given in 1964).

4. That we are “fitted into” cosmic time

Dooyeweerd relates cosmic self-consciousness to our being ‘fitted’ into temporal reality. This idea of being ‘fitted’ is related to Baader’s idea of being ‘placed’ in time. This placement is actually a displacement because of the fall, whereby man fell into time. Dooyeweerd, too speaks of a fall into time (Friesen 2009, Thesis 76 and references). Baader says that this placement is a being set [gesetzt] by God’s Law [Gesetz]. Dooyeweerd makes a similar play on words for his idea of our being fitted into the temporal cosmos. See his February, 1923 address, “Advies over Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde.” As far as I can tell, this is his first use of the word ‘gesteld’ which is translated “fitted into.”

Al het bestaande ligt gebonden aan zijn objectieven zin, die zijn wezen uitmaakt. Het schouwen is gebonden aan zijn gezichtsvelden, het denken aan zijn kategorieën. In deze binding van schouwen en denken ligt hun objectieven zin. Waar nu het bewustzijn niets meer autonoom stelt, maar alles heeft ontvangen, in alles gesteld is, als objectieven zin, nu de wet der heteronomie onbeperkt in al het bestaande gaat heerschen, ook in het zingevend bewustzijn, komt de vraag naar den wetgever, den ordenaar, den Schepper van zelf naar boven. (Dooyeweerd 1923b).

[All that exists is bound to its objective meaning, which gives it its essence. Intuition is bound to its fields of view and thought is bound to its categories. In this relation of intuition and thinking lies their objective meaning. If now our consciousness no longer autonomously sets its own meaning, but rather has received everything, has been set or placed in everything, as objective meaning, and if now the law of heteronomy can rule unhindered in all that exists, even in the consciousness that gives meaning, the question then arises as to the lawgiver, the one who orders, the Creator]. [my translation]

There is a play on the words ‘stelt’ and ‘gesteld,' just as Baader makes a play on the words ‘setzen’ and ‘gesetzt.’ Selbstsetzung is autonomy, and being ‘gesetzt’ is being placed or sub-jected to God's law [Gesetz].

The idea of being fitted is therefore related to our being at the same time both supratemporal beings as well as beings who are placed, fitted within time (Friesen 2009, Thesis 76 and references).

In 1931, Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘ingesteld’ in this way. Our pre-theoretical experience is of being fitted into temporal reality, and this experience is one of enstasis, as opposed to theoretical synthesis of meaning:

De naieve, vóór-theoretische ervaring is en-statisch, niet synthetisch in de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid met al hare in de kosmische tijdsorde samengevlochten zinzijden, zoowel natuurlijke als geestelijke, ingesteld en komt intuïtief in verzet tegen iedere poging van het verabsoluteerd synthetisch denken, om haar een of meer zin-zijden harer werkelijkheid to ontrooven. (Dooyeweerd 1931, 87)

[It is not in a synthetic but an enstatic way that naïve, pre-theoretical experience is fitted into full temporal reality with all of its meaning-sides (both natural and spiritual) that are interwoven in the cosmic order of time. And this naïve, pre-theoretical experience intuitively opposes every attempt of absolutized synthetic thought to rob it of one or more of its meaning-sides.]

Dooyeweerd contrasts our merely being fitted into temporal reality in our pre-theoretical or naïve experience with the deliberate “setting over-against” of theoretical thought. Dooyeweerd here plays on the meaning of the words:

In het zin-synthetisch denken bevrijdt de verdiepte analytische bewustzijnsfunctie zich van een bloot ingesteld zijn in de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid: het stelt zich de ter kennis opgegeven a-logische zin functies tegenover, het wordt “gegenständlich.” (Dooyeweerd 1931, 102).

[In meaning-synthetic thought, the deepened analytic function of consciousness frees itself from being merely fitted into full temporal reality; it sets itself over against the a-logical meaning-functions that are given to be known, it becomes “gegenständlich.”] [my translation]

There are a couple of instances of the word ‘gesteld’ in the WdW. Dooyeweerd criticizes Rickert's view that thought can autonomously set its own limits (door het denken gesteld) (WdW I, 36). There are several instances of the word ‘ingesteld’ in WdW II, 401-08). But Dooyeweerd generally changes to the word ‘gevoegd.’

Het is een wereldsamenhang, dien de mensch wel in zijn zelfheid transcendeert, naar waarbinnen hij met alle schepselen, die met hem in denzelfden wereldsamenhang gevoegd zijn, in universeele gebondenheid aan den tijd verkeert (WdW I, 36)

[It is a temporal coherence. Man transcends it in his selfhood, it is true,–but within this coherence he exists in a status of being-universally-bound-to-time. Man is bound to time together with all creatures that are fitted with him in the same temporal order] (as translated in NC I, 24].

In Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946), Dooyeweerd says,

Now what is unique to naïve experience is that it does not set the functions of consciousness over against a reality that is foreign to it (the Gegenstand of knowledge, as it is called by the Germans). Rather, with the functions of consciousness (the psychical and logical), our naïve experience is naïvely fitted into [in-gesteld] full temporal reality. That is to say, it understands the psychical, logical and the later spiritual functions as an organic part of and in full temporal reality.

Naïve experience is therefore fitted into the full temporal reality with all its meaning-sides (law-spheres), but without an articulated knowledge of the law-spheres (Dooyeweerd 1946, 9; my translation).

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Endnotes

[15] Kuyper specifically praised Baader for his opposition to the autonomy of thought (Friesen 2003b; 2011).

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Revised Nov10/11 typos.