Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Studies relating to D.H.Th. Vollenhoven De Problemen Rondom de Tijd (1963)

De Problemen Rondom de Tijd
[The Problems Around Time]

by D.H.Th. Vollenhoven

Translated and annotated for study purposes only
by J. Glenn Friesen ©2004

Note: This is a very fragmentary article [1]

[p. 170]

Introduction by Vollenhoven

The title should not cause any surprise. For in our group it has always been the case that, although there is agreement concerning the main matters, [there are] still differences in working them out.[2] Isagogie [is] not the same as The Philosophy of the Law Idea [De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee]. And this is consciously known. Proof: The name of the association is “The Association for Calvinistic Philosophy” [Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte]. And its constitution [Article 3] says, “in the direction of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea.”

For many years these differences have consciously not been set out in the foreground.

[p. 171]

Reasons:

1. There [is] a serious attempt here to come to arrive at a Scriptural philosophy; therefore it was necessary to maintain a united front.

2. As chairman, my task was above all here.

3. [I was] occupied with other work, where the [study] of the problematics of current thought required an especially great amount of time–the last [edition of] Isagogie was in 1943! “Short Summary [of the History of Philosophy]” [“Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte”] is from 1956.

It was really in connection with [the] Brede Coetus [Meeting of Faculty] that these points, among others, came up for discussion. Certainly [a discussion of differences] is not the only goal; [it is also important that] those involved in the special sciences [provide] ground under our feet–now don’t let the younger generation forget this!

And yet [it is important to] also [discuss] these points.

And now that questions are expressly being asked about these issues, I myself have no objection [to them being discussed publicly].

Method

Proceeding from what is common in the vision, I will speak about the differences. The most important points of difference [are the following]:

1. The modalizing of time.
2. Cosmic time.
3. The temporal order.
4. Development in the realms [of created reality]
5. Man

a)The supratemporality of the soul.
b) The mutual relation of soul and body.
c) Man as office-bearer
d) History.

Of course this did not all come up for discussion at the same time. Instead, attention was first drawn to a very complicated question: the use of the term ‘supratemporality of the soul’ [in] anthropology and other [sciences]. Only later did it become clear what lay behind these objections.

And so [there took place] a gradual strengthening of what was for me an already old vision ([in the] Isagogie!) [with relation to the following]:

1. Threefold law and thereby threefold being-subject

[i] All creatures are subject to the command to come into existence; [p. 172]
[ii] Only man is subject to the command of love.
[iii] In positivized law, man himself is related to the giving of the law [in office-bearing]

2. The foundation of the common struggle against the teaching of evolution–the importance exactly here of the distinction between subject and object.[3]

3. The psychical is not the same as the soul, but the organic is also not the same as man’s body.

4. The mutual relation of man’s soul and body.

>In relation to law and that which is subjected to it: the law is what holds good [geldt], it is not God or man who does so. N.B. God sets the law and creates man. So there is a twofold correlation and no dualism (e.g. God and man) and also no monism (God-man); cf. Pomponazzi in relation to God and world.<

>In relation to the structural law: the structure of the whole is more than the modal law; the structural law certainly implies the modal ordering. Law gives the ordering, not functioning as such; otherwise there isn’t the correlation [between law and function]. Not a separate law for each individual thing or man. [Also] the universal [belongs to] the created. The individual [is related to] history, the other factors here that are succession-like. N.B. [Here also] God’s direction […and the] reactions of man, etc. It is always not all at the same time. Determination by the place that you take in historical time. The individual differences come only later on.

Classification

But now to a discussion of the points themselves. In relation to [the problem of] time, they allow themselves to be summarized in two questions:

I. Have we not begun too soon in introducing time? [4]
II Have we not stopped too soon in relation to time? [5]

I believe that both questions must be answered affirmatively. By this, [a] double correction is necessary: we must give up something and yet add a lot. (This evening I will limit myself to the first question.) [p. 173]

I. Have we not begun too soon in introducing time?

Introduction. Where is it assumed that time first occurs? In the arithmetical [function]. And through that function, it later occurs in all functions. And for Dooyeweerd [time was] itself exclusively in the functions. [6] In this way he arrived at:

1. the modalizing of time;
2. The teaching of ‘cosmic’ time; [7]
3. his own view of the temporal order.

>N.B. “God-law-cosmos” is a triad [drieslag] that points to its existence but is not intended as three modes of being in an ontological sense, for neither God nor law can be comprehended within an ontology: ontology relates only to the cosmos. [8]

The relation of cosmos and law is expressed in being-subject. Within this being subjected is the subject-object relation (thus within the cosmos, the subject-relation does not cancel the previous relation of cosmos-law, let alone that of God-law, which really is also of a difference nature than that of cosmos-law. But the subject-object relation is determined by the relation of cosmos-law, and is therefore [a relation] of lesser extent).<

Scope [of Vollenhoven’s lecture]: Three of the points I have referred to come under the issues that will be addressed this evening; the two remaining-the development of the realms, and man–must remain until the second evening.

Division: First the difficulties (A); then the positive view (B).

A. The difficulties

The difficulties do not concern the theme of the order of the functions; here Dooyeweerd [has] provided splendid work in showing the retrocipations and anticipations. But the difficulties do concern the idea that each function has its own time and […] and the idea that the order of the functions is a temporal order, which is more precisely called ‘cosmic’ time.

For in this way, each modality [obtains] a kind of “independence,” whereby the distinction between function and thing, of modality and realm is not made sufficiently clear.

[It] especially gets stuck when we consider physical things. These possess, as one knows, four functions ([in increasing complexity:] arithmetical, spatial, mechanical, and the function of physical energy ).[9] [p. 174]

There are two groups of difficulties:

1. In the arithmetical and spatial [aspects]
2. In the [aspects of the] mechanical and that of physical energy.

1. In the arithmetical and spatial [aspects].

Here [there is] a difficulty both with the specific time as well as with the order.

a) The specific time

At the time of my dissertation [1918], I held to Poincaré’s views. He is an ennoëtist.

[Diagram of ennoëtism:]

[higher contemplative thought ] [nous]

[Lower contemplated object]

[psyche-time-number]
[soma -space, geometrical figure]

Time appears in number; time does not appear in space, except [only] via movement (simultaneity):

[The] mutual relation [within each divergence is always] a contrasting relation:

yes
no

b) Order

[Within ennoëtism, the order of time/number and space is analogous to that of soul (psyche) and body (soma)—that is, it is based on a contrast:

time [number]
space

But [the] relation between retrocipation and anticipation must [be] different: it must be non-contrasting. And also the order [of higher and lower] must be different: Space retrocipates the arithmetical and the arithmetical anticipates the spatial. Their order is therefore [the reverse of ennoëtism]:

2 simultaneity [space]
1 succession [time, number]

c) [The geometrical point]

Furthermore [there is] a difficulty with the object: where is the object in the spatial aspect that refers back to the arithmetical? [The answer always given here is]: “the point.” But [the spatial] retrocipates in [the length] of the line and in the multiplicity of dimensions. How can that fit with the separate place of the point [as object]? [p. 175] No mathematician knew the answer. And, this perplexity [is found] at the basis [of Dooyeweerd’s view that objects involve retrocipation]. There is something wrong here.

Arguments defending [this idea of the point as objectification in the spatial] are as follows:

(i) “[A] line] [is] determined objectively by two points.

[Answer] But this is playing with the word ‘objective.’

<A point is a minimal dimension resulting from the intersection [of two or more lines], and it no longer an object function. Actually the word ‘dimension’ is not even used here. A point is certainly spatial, but it is not extensiveness. One can say that the point has a place in space, but not that it takes up space.<

(ii) [But] these functions [are] also not outside of time. [There is] change within both the arithmetical and spatial functions. “And if we give up on a specific time for each function, do we not end up in rationalism?”

Answer: Time certainly has meaning for these functions, but indirectly, by the changing of things [which appear in this aspect]. Therefore [there is here] no danger of rationalism.[10]

Regarding point 2. In the [aspects of the] mechanical and that of physical energy.

This distinction [between these two aspects] was only made later. But it is correct. It was also a gain for our understanding of retrocipation. Think about the difference between emotionality and intensity of feeling.

Here the above-mentioned issue is somewhat simpler than in the arithmetical and spatial; there is no difficulty here in the mutual order of these two functions, [for] force supposes motion, the energetic implies the mechanical.

But [there is] also again found here [the] difficulty regarding the view of a specific time [in each aspect], as well as with the view of the object.

a) The modalizing of time

Argument: the uncertainty principle–or better, the relation of imprecision–in contrast to the complementarity theory. A physicist cannot at the same time determine the strength of the force and the place of the particle it relates to. In other words: a specific principle of measurement can be used to determined particles or waves, but the relation remains an imprecision.

Now the analogy with Bohr leads to the topic of subject and object. But sharply distinguished: Bohr is a biochemist, and moreover, he is an adherent of unlimited parallelism: [p. 176]

[Diagram of unlimited parallelism:]

(soma)

Subject: consciousness
Object: biotic

matter

Subject: psychical
Object: physical-.[material]

Now certainly Dooyeweerd wants nothing to do with parallelism. And we both sharply distinguish the biotic from the pre-biotic [aspects]. More than an analogy is not intended here [in referring to the imprecision principle]. But is that itself here possible? Does [the imprecision principle] in fact concern the distinction between energetic and mechanical? And does not the argument [of imprecision] put forward the existence of a non-energetic matter instead of presupposing that the relation between energy and matter should be seen as two differing modal levels?

b) With this, the question of the possibility of the schema [of] subject-object is actually debatable.

>Remark regarding physics and chemistry.

Physics is a modal special science of the energetic and mechanical [aspects] (in a vertical sense). The mechanical is that on which the energetic is based. Force is “the cause of a change in [speed and of] direction of movement.” N.B. The energetic [aspect] also exists in plants, animals and humans. This is not seen enough today, because now science is determined too much by practice

[In contrast to this], chemistry is a structural science of things: putting together and separating (horizontal). Here the relations of subject-object and subject-subject are examined, which require technical understanding, and which also stands closer to our lives. <

B. Positive View

1. Time implies change in and through creatures. The thing that changes cannot be avoided.

The modalizing of time makes functions into pseudo-things, and makes a combination of larger functions into a higher realm. [p. 177]

>Question: If each function has its own specific time, and there is cosmic time and there is also a temporal order of functions, does this necessarily imply that functions will be independently made into things and [modalities] into kingdoms?

[Answer] If each function is seen this way, also within the physical [aspect], then we are involved with a substantializing of time. We must see time in connection with change. That does not mean that we must remove the arithmetical and spatial from time in order to make them a priori–as rationalism does–for time is always inherent in (physical) things. We must distinguish between time in relation to functions and time in relation to order (the latter does not have to be temporal).<[11]

2. The object

[We must] certainly not scrap (the idea of) the object. Thinkers so divergent as Brentano, Scheler, Whitehead again acknowledge objects. Because of this, [our] everyday experience [is] already richer.

But objects always presuppose–certainly in the non-human [realms]–other things and events. There are certainly no inherent objects here [in the physical and chemical aspects]. Whoever looks for them, simply will not find them.

Result: the number of the modally different types of object functions is significantly smaller than originally thought (3 groups less). Physical things [are] purely subject. But their meaning [is] greater: the object-function plays a role in the mutual relation of two realms, therefore by inter-regnal relations.[12]

>The definition of an object function can now be described as “the repetition of the meaning of the subject-functions of things of lower realms." Thus, object-functions appear [only] after the physical [aspect]; these object-functions are built [upon the physical].<

>The physicist does not deal with objects but only with subjects. Thus there is one distinction less in this field of research [i.e. no subject-object-relation], but this field of research as such remains the same [thus including the possibility of mathematical formulation of physical states of affairs. [This latter point concerns] the question of formalization. Because [an] object is at least [one] thing, the lowest four modalities repeat themselves in the object-functions [of things]. […] Not even one of the first four [modal functions] can be determinative in a definite manner (within the physical thing). [p. 178] Because of his unlimited parallelism, Bohr was forced not only to regard a cell in the lower [realm] as a biotic “something” in an object function (this is correct), but he then had to apply this (vertical subject-object) within the physical thing, by which he reduced the mechanical and energetic [aspects] to a relation of object-subject.<

As a result, the differences for humans between the non-human carriers of object functions are [also clearer]; this is already evident in the naïve experience of the child: the child throws a ball, waters a plant, and plays with an animal. A grown-up: shapes metal, nurtures plants, breeds animals.

3. [The] temporal order is not an order of modalities. It is true that in retrocipation, the higher modality does presuppose the lower just as the more complicated presupposes the less complicated. But temporal order is first present in the order of realms.

[Is this] of relevance for retrocipations? No. But it is relevant for the object-functions. Although this may not be the case in its epistemology, evolutionism takes account only of subject-functions in its doctrine of evolution–and in a way that furthermore cannot be justified. Everything is causal [for the evolutionist]. But the higher realm depends for its realization on the presence of the object-functions in the lower [realms].

Conclusion. We have therefore begun too soon with time: it does play a role in all functions, but via change in the relevant things. And the structure of things is of relevance for their object-functions, which rest upon the subject-functions of things.

Remark. Dooyeweerd does not overestimate the object in the general current sense. He, too has the Gegenstand-relation next [to the] subject-object [relation]. This is of especially great importance in epistemology. Think for example of the distinction between non-scientific and scientific knowledge. Where the Gegenstand-relation is not distinguished from the horizontal relation–for example in phenomenology–science is primarily referred to regional zones and to reflection. But these also [appear in the] everyday experience.[13]

>Time is not to be limited to the body, to the cosmos, as Dooyeweerd does. The cosmos is in time; [thus time] is [p. 179] broader [than cosmos] and it is subject between God and world. (The ‘priority teaching’ or [one of its conceptions in] the later Aristotle [14] is the [logical] consequence of Dooyeweerd’s [ideas]. Time is in all of the cosmos–the cosmos is a continually changing cosmos–and therefore nothing [that has been created is] above time. Time is not modal (prism and the specific time, e.g. in the arithmetical and spatial) [15] [and it does not determine] [the] cosmic order. Rather, [time stands] in relation with things [including plants, animals and humans], and it does not appear primarily in modalities. Specific time presupposes more the structure of things than modalities.<

>A temporal order of realms implies that the more comprehensive realm requires the less comprehensive realm; the subjects [of the higher realms] require the object-functions of the lower realms. The first four modalities are ordered by their increasing complexity and not by time.

Now the law is supratemporal; the law […] [is related to] temporality, but then [only] insofar as it affects subjects in that which is subjected [to law]. It is difficult [to give] a satisfying definition of time in relation to the correlation of law and what is subjected to it. The thought that time is to be seen in relation to changing things [including plants, etc.] is a ‘help.’ […] The law of love and the structural law are not dissolved within time (vs. the ‘Gebot der Stunde’ [law of the hours]). But on the other hand, [time does inhere] in positivized law.[16]

The structure of [e.g.] the state [must then also] not only [be seen] in relation to the modal law, but also with history.[17] But history does not exclude the need to continue to speak of creation ordinances. ‘Creation ordinances’ means that [positivization] is not arbitrary; it is a relation given in nature–it connects to the modal and structural relations, etc. We must be careful that we do not make all connections independent–especially the latter one–by pushing them into ‘paradise.’ On the other hand, [we] must be very careful not to fall into the thought of ‘physis’ versus ‘nomos,’ in which the ‘nomos’ is then equated to convention (this is speculating with nature and culture). […] Although we cannot understand the meaning of the law without time, we must not conclude […] [that] time is [present] in the law, but above all we must take into account that time also inheres in the functions [of things].<

[p. 180]

II. Have we not stopped too soon in relation to time?

Two points here:

A. Genesis [becoming] in the realms (apart from humans) [=the fourth point of difference];
B. Man [=the fifth point of difference; more detail:] Soul, soul and body, office-bearing, history. […]

A. Genesis [becoming] in the realms (apart from humans)

1. There [is] genesis here [in each realm]. […]

>We also find genesis in the physical (therefore in all realms). It is not necessary to here discuss plants, animals and humans, for genesis is never denied for those realms. The splitting of the atom has been brought about technically. The atom was never ‘dead’: ‘dead’ always relates to religion and not to realms; cf. stones are also still creatures!<

[2]. No evolutionism

Evolution implies genetic thought–[this is] correct–but [it is also] monistic in certain types, […] [e.g. there where] more than one realm [appears] by the higher. […]

[Evolutionism has] various opponents. But [there is] a difference in argumentation. Dooyeweerd proceeds from the constancy of species [soorten].[18] In my view [this is] an Aristotelian thought: becoming [is related] solely to the individual thing.

>There is a stronger possible argument, which does not proceed from the becoming of individual things, but from procreation.<

a) But in the case of plants and animals, there is procreation. And with this there is transformation in [both] a negative sense (degeneration) as well as in a positive sense (evolution). Neither can be denied. […]

>In procreation we can distinguish two kinds of transformation: degeneration and evolution. But this is then a question within the realms, within a certain realm. We must leave whatever happens here to the researchers of the relevant realms; let us just say, “species are unchanging.” The researchers of these realms are…not those involved in the [modally determined] special sciences, but those who [p. 181] practice botany, zoology, anthropology, etc.<

b) [But] we only speak of transformism in the positive direction of evolutionism in a genesis that oversteps the boundaries of the realms.

This implies a change in the realm’s structures of anticipations and retrocipations, and [takes] less [account of] the accent that falls on object-functions.

>We can forget that transformation only has meaning when we consider the boundaries of the realms. For otherwise we have transformism–in its two kinds of ‘-isms’–degenerationism and evolutionism. Evolution is therefore a progression of transformation, whereas evolutionism is progression of transformism.

This is clearer, especially in relation to the species, for now degeneration is included in the concept of species (versus Dooyeweerd’s views).

Both ‘isms’ (of positive and negative transformism) involve stepping over the boundaries of the realms: one of these [‘-isms’] cuts across the realms. <

>The structure of things of the same realm is different from those in another realm. [This is because each realm has its own proper number of modal functions, so that each has its own configuration of anticipations and anticipations]. We may not see modality, or function in the philosophical sense of transformation (positive or negative).<

>Question: Why is the argument against evolution, based on the constancy of the species and the becoming of individual things, weaker than your argument of procreation with its two kinds of transformation, i.e. degeneration and evolution? Is it only because the first argument gives no place to degeneration?

Answer: No, not only in connection with degeneration. But also the concept of kinds is too vague over against evolutionism. As a concept, species is a collection of characteristics; this is [p. 182] too vague, because we are here concerned about concrete things. (For example, if one knows only about white swans and then suddenly hears that there are also black swans, then the concept of species must be changed! We should also add that species is often thought of in too static a way (perhaps because of an Aristotelian confusion of eidos and morphe).

It is better to speak of procreation (in both a positive and a negative sense): procreation, which only appears in the post-physical [aspects].

We can use the concept ‘species’ [improperly] to strangle the whole idea of transformation.

Summary: Species is too vague as a concept, too rigid, not concrete enough. […] The concept of realm is clearer: realm, with a number of functions. That is what is determinative.<

>Evolutionism knows of no object-functions.[19] That is to say as evolutionism (although it does eventually speak of object-functions in its epistemology, e.g. Whitehead). Evolutionism has a chance only in the doctrine of the subject.<

>Evolutionism appears [to be] subjectivistic. It is all very well to say that God connects Himself to what already exists (cf. education of children), but He makes realms with object-functions, which evolutionism forgets because of its subjectivism. N.B. The animal must exist prior to man, plants before man and animals, physical things before plants, animals and man. And don’t forget that man is structured through and through. For example Adam had to name the animals: here [man is concerned with] the animal as object-function in the lingual aspect for humans.<

>Evolutionism can, and in fact does, speak about ‘objects.’ But [in evolutionism] it concerns causal series, and here the object-functions play no role: the relation between subject and object is not that of causality. We must not forget that the term ‘cause’ [aanleiding] is something other than stimulus (thus between [things of] two realms) and is never identical with reproduction, e.g. two things within one realm.<

>The complexity of differentiation does not explain the different realms. The higher realm [p. 183] requires the lower. Not the higher out of the lower, but (maybe) the later than the lower. (Specialists must limit themselves to their own specialty, and therefore they are unqualified to judge about other realms).<

>[In the problematics of evolutionism], we require the history of philosophy, for example [monistic] Cretan Dionysian Orphism and the [analogous monistic] zoological theory of interactionism. If we see these things clearly (historically), we will not readily ‘Christianly’ baptize wrong theories with the idea of creation.< [20]

[3. Summary about] genesis [becoming]

>Genesis is broader than procreation: genesis also occurs in the physical and by the splitting of one-celled beings (splitting is pure genesis). Thus the physical is included in genesis, but physical genesis and one-celled splitting are something other than reproduction. […] Reproduction is of a sexual nature.<

i. For physical creatures [there is a] combination and separation on various reaction-levels; we can think here for example of radioactive phenomena.

ii. For one-celled biotic creatures, [non-sexual] reproduction [takes place by splitting of the cell] nucleus and [separation] of plasma. Already here there is a relation of subject and object [between] the biotic and physical, but there is no analogy in the physical (contra Bohr). [See] Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, vol. III, par. 2 and 3 [of] concluding [chapter, pp. 699-732).

iii. [For] sensory creatures–plants–there is sexual reproduction, but indirectly, e.g. spores carried by the wind or by insects–reaction to stimuli of warmth and cold, light and darkness, dryness and dampness.

>Sensory, i.e. stimulus and reaction; it is not purely biotic, although it comes close to it. “Reaction to” is something other than sensory perception. It is not a form (cf. Aristotle) and it is also not a being, but [it is rather] modal. <

iv. For vital creatures ≥the accent is on passion [drift] <; also defence mechanisms [p. 184] [play a role here].

v. [For] feeling creatures [we speak of] pleasure and pain [onlust]. ([cf.] W.K. van Dijk, [professor of psychology at Groningen, “Neurosis and religion,” Mededelingen [of the Ver. voor Calvin. Wijs] Dec. ’62).

[Note for iv/v]. Animals [display] motor-nerve [conduct] in reproduction: ‘mating.’ [Are these creatures] still mutually different?

vi. Man [has] many more functions. Reproduction and mating [are terms that] are here not sufficient. [The term previously used was] ‘sexual intercourse.’ [This is] not only functional; intercourse is not the same as association. The need [is] not purely functional, and the inner life [het innerlijke] is in that case also not primary.

B. Man

Introduction. Here the remaining points [are discussed:] soul, soul and body, office-bearer, history.

1. Soul
[In our group there is] agreement [concerning the fact], that the soul it not the same as the psychical. No special science is possible in relation to the soul.

[There is] difference [about] (a) the supratemporality of ‘the I-ness’ and ‘the self,’ [(b) ‘soul’ in the Holy Scriptures].

[Regarding (a) The supratemporality of the soul.]

Information: [Dooyeweerd places] the soul between God and the other creatures.

[Diagram:]

[…]

>Differences have appeared [within our group] in relation to I and self, especially when the article ‘the’ is used with them. Vollenhoven is afraid of substantializing. (Geesink, one of Vollenhoven’s teachers, once said, “The will wills” does not exist and also “Reason proposes that” does not exist, etc.). [p. 185] There is something to these statements, insofar as we can find considerations relating to will [and reason]. (Geesink really didn’t see this clearly enough), but Geesink was correct to oppose a substantializing of will and reason. Vollenhoven therefore opposes “the I” and “the self.” Already linguistically they are very dangerous and suspicious. Therefore Vollenhoven does not want to place soul between God and cosmos, as Dooyeweerd does, but rather sees the soul as belonging totally to the cosmos. <

>”I”: the speaker and what is spoken of coincide! Not “the I,” “the Self.’’ This is contrary to Dooyeweerd’s frequent use of these expressions. Insofar as [these expressions concern] self-consciousness, it is very broad, e.g. [it includes] memory (the past in one’s own life) as well as capability to be responsible. This self is only one line of life within trillions of beings. To say that the self is related to the human soul via consciousness is false, for ‘I’ and ‘self’ do not only refer to the soul but also to the body in the same sense. Do not say, “temporal-body-cosmos.” To say, “I experience time” is an abstraction. Time and change are correlates: [this] concerns the whole man. Be careful to avoid dualism in the sense of: the transcendent is unchanging, the non-transcendent is changing.< [21]

Regarding (b). As opposed to [the supratemporal meaning], the word ‘soul’ has two meanings in the Holy Scriptures:

[(i) the] creature that moves itself (man and animals);

>[One meaning of] ‘soul’ as a term in the Holy Scriptures is, “the creature that breathes through the nose.”

“How my soul clings to the earth” [het stof] is not a form of materialism, for the passage directly continues, “make me living through your Word.” The meaning is therefore: Ensure that by your promise, Lord, I, who have no courage to stand up, can again stand up and live. Note well: the Jew slept on the ground, close to the matter of the earth, and thus almost literally sat fixed to the earth. We, in contrast to the Jew, sleep on a nice soft and high bed. Vollenhoven himself previously had a great deal of difficulty with scholasticism, especially in connection with the use of the word ‘soul’ in the Bible–until one day a simple old believing man said to Vollenhoven, “my soul is very oppressed, and therefore I want to lay my soul before you.” Then Vollenhoven was at once freed in principle [p. 186] from the scholastic view of the soul.

Still another example: Saul says to David, “My soul has become beloved [dierbaar] in your eyes,” after David did not kill him. ‘Soul’ here means only ‘me.’ Psalm 124:4: “Then the waters had overwhelmed us, the stream had gone over our soul,” over the nefesh, soul (Cf. nose, not lips here). Nephesh: in other words to breathe through the nose. This is the meaning of ‘soul’ in most instances in the Bible (Old Testament). The word ‘ruach’ is also used: that is to say, through the mouth. This relates to speaking! Example: “Through the Word of the Lord was the world made.”<

[(ii)] only in humans: “My soul in me”

>The expression “My soul in me” is sometimes different than the meaning in (i) above of man with everything that belongs to him. ‘Soul’ then means the ‘heart,’ that is to say the center, and also ‘spirit,’ that is to say, direction. The [latter] plays a large role in ontology and anthropology [see point 2 below]. [We must not regard] spirit in Aristotle’s terms as a substance (universal and individual) or as a part or component of a substance). […] Transcending is a reaching out above the creation (not pointing beyond–that is Aristo-teleological).[22] There is dependence here, in the sense of the statement in Holy Scripture, “everything has need of life and awaits food from You.” Man is certainly not excluded here: a Christian human who reaches out in this way, penetrates into the throne room of God. And God then listens–do not forget this! –on the basis of His grace.<

>”Pointing beyond” refers only to the ontical. “Reaching out,” on the other hand presupposes human activity. Man is more than the other creatures, because he can respond to revelation, and this response to revelation is now exactly the same as his reaching out over all the other creatures. Vollenhoven strongly opposes working with the scholastic concepts of ‘all-sufficiency’ (God) and ‘insufficiency’ (the created).< [23]

>The insufficiency inheres in all of creation, also in [man as] image of God. Therefore [we must] not speak of the image of God. [24] Meanings of this mirroring:

i. mirror of the law, just as a man goes to stand before a mirror to see whether his jacket fits well, etc. This is the old reformational understanding: how God thinks about you. This is wrong.

[p. 187]

ii. In the old Authorized Version of the Bible, 2 Cor. 3:18 says, “But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord…” [KJV]. The word ‘beholding’ [aanschouwen] is used here under influence of mysticism. [25] Calvin is also to blame here through influence of Augustine and neo-Platonism! [But] here it really means ‘reflection,’ ‘throwing back,’ and not ‘beholding.’ It concerns here the glory of God (e.g. it “Moses uncovered” intends to say, different than the rest of Israel). Thus not standing before a mirror to see how we look, not checking oneself in accordance with the law, for in that even Moses considered himself very small. [26]

iii. The idea that we are ourselves the mirror is totally wrong!<

 

2. Soul and body

[Within our group we are in] agreement [that the] soul is not the same as the psychical, and similarly [that the] human body is not the same is as an organism. A plant is [an] organism; animals and man are not. It is also not the case [that they] have an organism [in the sense of a body as organ]. Animal is animal and man is man.

>Soul is different than the psychical. The body is also different than the organism! Only a plant is an organism, and other organisms do not exist, except as a metaphor. Plants are organisms. An animal is not an organism plus a [psychical] function. It is true that an animal has one more function [than a plant], but this function is not placed on top (then we would have a dualism with dichotomy), for the psychical can never be found without the lower [functions]. Man, too is not an organism plus functions; it is therefore also wrong to say that man has an organism. We should only say, also in our philosophy, that a plant is a plant, an animal an animal, a man a man. (We do not only have to fight against speculation in others but also against speculation in our own thinking, and we therefore have to watch out for a wrong use of words.)< [27]

[There are also] differences. [According to Dooyeweerd] the soul is supratemporal and within me [i.e. man]. [For Vollenhoven, the soul is] not supratemporal, [man is] man according to soul and body. Body and soul [are also] related in reproduction.

What then is the role of the soul? Regulating? No, [that is too] functionalistic: [regulating is] already [present] in physical things, plants and animals (cybernetics-Blok).

[p. 188]

>e.g. Cybernetics, which sometimes tries to say too much, but yet has something good in it, namely the idea of self-regulation of things: e.g. an oil stove; also in nature, namely atoms. <

[Is the role of the soul] normative? Also not; this is regulating with self-distinction.

>It is tempting to confuse natural law and norms, and then Christians often also confuse the law of love with norms. Both forget that the latter, i.e. norms, require practice. The consequence of this confusion is primarily that Christianity is understood in an intellectualistic way.

The difference between self-regulation and self-distinction is the difference between the pre-logical and the post-psychical. We must not divide the mantle of functions.[28] Therefore don’t place natural law (body) over against norm (soul or spirit).< [29]

>Norm only appears after the logical, for only in the logical do we speak of distinguishing. Thus, to distinguish a duality occurs within the logical. Norm is something other than positive law.
Positive law presupposes norms […]. Norms exist earlier than positive law. Both norm and positive law concern the post-psychical [aspects]. The law for human nature is norm whenever the relevant modality is post-psychical. It is always in the analytical that the distinction begins between the (modal) law and that which is subjected to it; the pre-analytical does not yet have this distinction.

Summary:

a. norm and positive law both appear in the same terrain, namely in the post-psychical.

b. norm is earlier than positive law.

c. norm cannot be corrected; as against this, positive law can be corrected.

N.B. Norm= [post-psychical] modal law!<

>[The distinction between] the command bringing into existence and the command of love [is] not [the same as] the distinction between natural and normative functions, thus between normed and non-normed. [The distinction between normed and non-normed] is correct, but do not make it into an antinomy. [p. 189] Norm is only to be used in connection with human nature: the logical function for example must be ruled by love. <

[The role of the soul is] directing. Being for or against God and Christ; antithesis in one’s own heart.

This [is] not exclusively [a] vertical [capability]; it is also not exclusively horizontal. [It is] both […] at the same time [but in which] the vertical is not the same as the horizontal. Here [is the] correlation with the law of love. [That’s why it] first [has] meaning in creatures with a heart. But not only for the heart (against dispositional morality): body and soul [are related to] one’s whole life.

>Man is thus a man according to soul and body: soul, that is to say direction, the direction-giving in relation with good and evil, cf. the “soul in me.” This direction-giving is to be understood in the sense of “other than only one or all of the functions.” Religion is thus a different matter than the normed higher functions, where we speak of norms. (Often Christians say, that whenever non-Christians speak of the normative then that is a Christian trait in their thinking. But they then forget that the humanist can very easily speak about the normative without binding it with religion–at least in a conscious manner–and they (these Christians) then also forget that they have identified the normative and religion in an impossible manner.) Body: the whole man; compare breathing through the nose. <

>With relation to ‘the direction-giving’ [diagram with vertical modal scale, with left and right directions going horizontally off of it]

Direction is determined by being obedient or disobedient to the law of love. Vollenhoven finds nothing in the Old Testament [p. 190] about “the” [direction-giving] in relation to the determination of the direction; but he does find something of this in the New Testament, something that is maintained after death and goes directly to God. But don’t forget that man is created (and re-created) for the new earth; see the New Testament in relation to the “spiritual body.” Ontologically we can in any event say that death, the grave, is not the end. Christologically we can say that we are the Lord’s. We must assume something personal in man, for otherwise he becomes a plaything of the environment. The law (of love) gives the counsel of God to this ‘something’ of man. See Mary: “And she treasured all these words in her heart.” There are not two substances. But there are two directions. In our anthropology we must continue to hold onto the unity of man, something that “direction-giving” does not exclude, but rather just includes, because it concerns a man.

Direction is not intended here in the vertical sense of above or below, but in the horizontal sense of good and evil. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to speak in scientific language concerning the unity of man and “the direction-giving.” Here one can and may only use the “language of Holy Scripture,” which [ought to] rule our philosophy!

Man lives to the right and to the left with all his functions. But don’t now go speaking about right and left in [the non-normative functions as such], e.g. the arithmetical. […] [But it still makes sense to speak of direction on this level.] In the physical [aspect], direction plays a great role, e.g. taking pills for nervousness. It also plays a role in the spatial aspect: e.g. an alcoholic, who stands outside of a bar, and who has a change of mind and runs away from that place. [30]

Right and left, [which are] not identical with the vertical direction, can be clearly distinguished in man, in spite of man’s many maneuvers.

Pre-functional; this is not [itself] functional [in a modal sense], but yet it is a functioning. This is such a difficult question, at least to be able to express it in words!< [31]

>Note. God is not correlative to the world, for then we would find ourselves in all kinds of dualisms with respect to time and eternity. But God is the One-who-sets the law (cf. law of love with its correlate) [p. 191] and the Creator of the cosmos (cf. structural law with its correlate). We thus can speak of a double correlation, with a difference then again between them: the law of love only has meaning for a creature with a heart, namely man. “Man with a heart.” And do not start speaking about “the heart” alone, for then we remove the heart [from the temporal] and the consequence is false teaching of a dispositional morality, which is without meaning for practical life.

N.B. No animal, plant, etc. is related to the law of love in a direct manner in the sense of a correlation; but they are related in an indirect manner, i.e. man’s following of the law of love has an influence on animals, plants, etc.<

>Nature and culture: these are not the same; culture involves human activity. J. Waterink is against “Christian” culture. But he thereby misses the opposition [of good and evil in culture].

Reproduction: one born from two in such a manner, that the one is different than one of the two from which it is born. The one is also different in relation to another child from the same two parents. [This distinction is] already present in pregnancy and birth, as well as by education and age etc. (The expression “a family is a small society” is very valuable: cf. positivizing in the whole life, discussed later.)

If we look at the soul in relation to the [distinction of] inner-outer in the interaction theory, then soul is consciousness and body is original matter. That is not possible, because of the contrast [here] between the organic and the inorganic. We do not speak of contrasting but rather of the working out of a plan.

The relation of soul and body is not an interaction, for in our anthropology we must not think in contrasts, and for us the “soul in me” is something different from the inside of consciousness. Consciousness is always in the body! This is ontological. Now there is still an epistemological argument (against the interaction idea): in the interaction theory, subject and object are always seen horizontally (consciousness is at their base.) Therefore, there is no ‘Gegenstand-relation’ possible here. Those who adhere to the interaction theory do not have the possibility to speak about science and the special sciences; because of that they lay great emphasis on reflection! Also parallelism and the priority teaching cannot be used, because they identify the ‘Gegenstand-relation’ [p. 192] with the subject-object relation. <

[It is also relevant] for us to regard for a moment the worth of the body in our sense for the act of knowing.

a. The body [is] that which beholds [aanschouwende], even at the logical level.
For the difference between logical and psychical [is] not necessarily that between abstract and concrete: there also exists a logical perception of the concrete, and on the other hand also vagueness in psychical perception. But on the post-logical level we find “the view”: a woodcutter views a forest very differently than a dealer in timber, while a painter again sees this forest in a still different way.

This [difference in view] is not a question of difference [in] point of view [i.e. mode of experience], but rather a difference [in] the field of view [or existing terrains].
Diagrammatic representation of epistemology.

subject to object: agreed; but then from out of the object in the logical downwards and above toward the field of research. Fields:
s + o
s + o
s + o
s + s ([level of] physical things
s + s

Even science can take no step further without beginning with this everyday perception.

Perception is now something different than distinguishing perception, and the latter is in turn different from the logical. For distinguishing always presupposes [at least] two things, of which we have become aware. Abstraction is not always only the leaving behind of the concrete in order that we may work with concepts: for concepts can also be of individual things. The concrete is not always the same as the individual: cf. vague perception. <

>Perception of a thing […] is something different than the studying of a thing (this without the psychical). In the ‘Gegenstand-field’ being investigated [we find] everywhere subject-object [p. 193] and subject-subject-relations, except in the lowest four modalities where there are only subjects and no objects.

N.B. ‘Gegenstand’ is something other than a horizontal object. <

>Note. Perception is therefore not the same as the psychical; the above-mentioned fields of view cannot be reduced to psychical anticipations. For each modality we must use another term (of or for perception); e.g. becoming aware [ont-waren], and then we can speak of retrocipations to the psychical in the subject. Be careful not to confuse the pre-logical with the object! In all functions we must look straight ahead–thus to see the subject-object-relation in the horizontal and not only the subject-subject-relation. For example, what is comical is not a purely psychical perception, and we can still perceive the logical object-functions. (N.B. A function [belongs to the] being-subject of a particular modality. <

We should consider the meaning of beholding [aanschouwing] for fantasy and on the role of fantasy in science ([e.g. the] working hypothesis!)

>Note. Fantasy is something other than phantasms; fantasy is also something other than knowledge–a skeptic never arrives at his work. In the beginning this fantasy in a working hypothesis is too unbridled, that is unfounded or too little founded; one must then verify or eventually correct it. Fantasy [has a role] in the activity of thought. <

>Note. It is incorrect to state that the knowable is simply identical to the object. Fortunately, one sees again today something of the subject in the knowable, via the idea of the act. [But] we must not overestimate the horizontal subject-object relation, and we must clearly see and acknowledge the vertical relation (e.g. the logical and the non-logical). <

b. Until now I have paid special attention to man’s knowledge of the non-human. Now we must deal with the relation between humans.

In friendship and love this is itself a relation of subject to subject; two people become friends; others form “a couple.” In this, the play of surprise by revealing and hiding. […]

[p. 194]

But also whenever a businessman receives someone who has solicited for a job that has become vacant, it is then not a question of friendship, and even less a relation of buyer and merchandise: here the offer is one of a work group with e.g. better conditions of employment. This requires an understanding in the other person: whenever the employer notices that the solicitant for work is only concerned about more money in his pay packet, he will classify him as lower in energy, and with an offer from more than one side, he will if possible pass him by.

>Note. Co-humanity is not the same as love of neighbour. ‘Neighbour’ [concerns] the religious, for the direction of God determines who my neighbour is. Therefore love of neighbour is very difficult [to analyze? to practice?] because it is concrete. In a certain sense there are therefore ‘boundaries’ to neighbourly love.

A machine is an economic object for a business; a machine is therefore something different than an appeal to a co-worker. We must not identify objects in passivity. These two are the same only in language; in the setting of a broken bone, a man is subject but passive; in the setting of a broken paw an animal is an object; so also is the relation between a dentist and the tooth (of a man) one of subject-subject, while the relation between the tooth and a medicine for the tooth is one of subject-object. <

And now the question of the relation of ‘psyche’ and ‘soma’ for myself.

[Note. Tol says that this part is incomplete; it is not included].

3. Office. [Tol says that this subject was not discussed at all during the lecture, and that only a few notes are useable].

[Office includes] positivizing of the law of love. Not only the state [is the topic here] but also and first of all the family. In office [there is] always more than one person [affected].

[p. 195]

4. History [This subject was also not discussed in the lecture. It is discussed in “Problemen van de tijd in onze kring.”

[Conclusion]

Therefore [we have] stopped too soon [in introducing time].

End. Time [is] extremely important. [The] difficulties [were]:

-somewhat too soon begun [in introducing time]
- ended much too soon [in connection with time]

From this our differences.

And to convince each other.
So that our movement does not get stranded.
But, in agreement with the spirit in which it began,
May we come to a Scriptural philosophy.
In order to bless our people and not only our people.

Endnotes

[1] This is a copy of notes of lectures given by Vollenhoven in 1963. A copy of the lecture appears, together with some valuable notes, in A. Tol and K.A. Bril: Vollenhoven als Wijsgeer (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1992), 160-198. Tol and Bril edited the lecture and combined it with notes taken by a student at the time, J.C. Vander Stelt. Vander Stelt’s notes are indicated by the markings ‘>’ and ‘< .’. The notes are quite incomplete, which means that it is sometimes difficult to follow. Most of the information set out between square brackets is that of Tol and Bril. The Stichting voor Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte has placed a copy of the Dutch version of this lecture online at the following web address http://home.wxs.nl/~srw/nwe/vollenhoven/63b.htm. I have included the original page numbers in square brackets in bold typeface.

[2] JGF: The disagreements would seem to be far more profound than a matter of merely working out of what was agreed on. These are fundamental differences between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven with respect to almost every key philosophical issue. They also disagree as to the relation of the Bible to philosophy. Vollenhoven regards Scripture as one of the sources of our knowledge. On the basis of Biblical texts, Vollenhoven thought he could philosophize about heaven and world of angels, because they belong to the created world. (See J. Klapwijk, "Honderd jaar filosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit," (1980), cited by Verburg, 90).

[3] JGF: Was there actually a commonality in opposing evolutionism? The Dooyeweerd Archives (Amsterdam) have a letter from Prof. JJ. Duyvené de Wit of Bloemfontein, South Africa, who had sought Dooyeweerd’s advice regarding creation science. Dooyeweerd’s replied by letter dated Feb. 11, 1964:

I thought that it should be clear at the outset for readers and listeners: whether there is a genetic line that runs from a one-celled being via multi-celled organisms to the first man–about this we can say neither yes nor no.
[…] Whenever we try to oppose "macroevolution" with the help of the "mechanisms of microevolution," such as mutations and so on that we can observe today, we may say, "Gentlemen, in this way the "gene pool" can only grow smaller and can never become greater." That is of great importance scientifically, but it does not prove, and cannot prove that there has been no macroevolution. [my translation]

[4] JGF: Vollenhoven says that the temporal order does not apply to the first four aspects. Thus, by beginning with the first aspect as having a special mode of time, we have begun too soon.

[5] JGF: Vollenhoven’s point is that, although humanity transcends all the aspects, humanity is also fully temporal, and by speaking of the supratemporal soul or heart we have stopped too soon in our discussion of the relation with time.

[6] JGF: The point here is that, according to Dooyeweerd, the aspects are themselves an order of temporal moments, a temporal order of before and after. Vollenhoven also fails to distinguish aspects and functions, something that Dooyeweerd does in his last article, “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata (1975) 83-101.

[7] Vollenhoven’s note: Dooyeweerd no longer supposes God-law-cosmos, but God-soul-cosmos (in between my position and that of Bavinck, which is God-‘man’-cosmos).

[8] JGF: Dooyeweerd has no hesitation in referring to God as Being. But Dooyeweerd does not have a “chain of being” ontology, since created reality exits only as meaning and not as being. See NC I, 99. Vollenhoven seems to take exactly the opposite approach. For Vollenhoven, only the cosmos has being, and God is beyond being.

[9] JGF: WdW has ‘bewegingszijde’ which the NC translates as ‘that of physical energy.’ Here Vollenhoven speaks of ‘het energetische.’

[10] JGF: The question that Vollenhoven addresses is whether we are committed to rationalism if we deny that the first two modalities are in time. For if they are not in time, then they must stand outside of time, in the sense of a priori thought. Mathematics and geometry then have some kind of transcendent status. His answer is that things, which are temporal and changing, have arithmetical and spatial functions. And therefore we are not committed to rationalism.
But does Vollenhoven really answer the question? Rationalists do not suppose that things have no mathematical or spatial functions.

[11] See footnote 10 for criticism of his argument here. Dooyeweerd would also deny that he is hypostatizing aspects by his view of cosmic time.

[12] JGF: Vollenhoven understands ‘meaning’ as related to previously existing things. Vollenhoven’s view is really the ‘modernist’ view of science–that things have properties. For him, a thing exists in the first four properties and has meaning according to how it functions in the other aspects. This is very different from Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd’s view of meaning is that things have no existence, but only meaning. The word ‘meaning’ is clearly being used by them in different senses.

[13] JGF: Unlike other critics of Dooyeweerd like H. van Riessen and D.F.M. Strauss, Vollenhoven does maintain a distinction between the Gegenstand-relation and the subject-object relation. Is it the same as Dooyeweerd’s view of the Gegenstand-relation? I suggest not, in view of the fact that for Dooyeweerd the Gegenstand-relation depends on the acceptance of the supratemporal selfhood. See his last article, “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata (1975) 83-101.

[14] JGF: A recent book by Prof. A.P. Bos, De Ziel en haar voertuig: Aristoteles’ psychologie geherinterpreteerd en de eenheid van zijn oeuvre gedemonstreerd (Damon, 1999), calls into question this whole distinction of early/late Aristotle. Vollenhoven’s view of the origins of what he calls “semi-mysticism” may therefore need to be re-examined.

[15] JGF: Vollenhoven therefore rejects the whole image of the prism, which is so central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. See NC I, 101, 102.

[16] JGF: This is because positivized law is historical.

[17] JGF: In history we positivize laws; but even such positivized laws are not to be viewed as unrelated to creation ordinances.

[18] JGF: Is this so? See footnote 3.

[19] JGF: Neither does Vollenhoven in the first four aspects.

[20] JGF: Dooyeweerd says that the idea of creation in the Christian Ground-Motive must it include the "key of knowledge"–the central and supratemporal religious root (In the Twilight of Western Thought (Craig Press, 1968), 145, 124-125, 135-36.. That is of course denied by Vollenhoven, so from Dooyeweerd’s point of view, Vollenhoven is himself baptizing wrong theories with the idea of creation.

[21] JGF: That is not Dooyeweerd’s view. In his long footnote at NC I, 30-32, Dooyeweerd criticizes Vollenhoven’s idea of a temporal prefunctional heart, and Dooyeweerd specifically denies that the supratemporal religious center is to be found in a rigid and static immobility. This footnote was written for the English edition of the NC in 1953, before this lecture by Vollenhoven.

[22] JGF: The idea of pointing beyond is of course related Dooyeweerd’s whole view of meaning. Vollenhoven’s view of meaning seems to be restricted to how things function within time. There is no pointing beyond. See also footnotes 3 and 12.

[23] JGF: Dooyeweerd speaks of God as self-sufficient, and of creation as restless and insufficient. Creation as meaning is restless and points to the Origin which is absolute and self-sufficient (NC I, 10).

[24] JGF: In contrast to Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd speaks of man as the image of God. Our central selfhood, restored in Christ, is that image. This is a key idea for Dooyeweerd. Just as God expresses His image in our selfhood, so our selfhood expresses itself in the coherence of temporal functions (NC I, 4).

He [God] has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon its Origin. (NC I, 55).

The radical unity of all the different modalities in which they coalesce, is […] the concentration of meaning in the imago Dei, which is nothing in itself, but rather the reflection of the Divine Being in the central human sphere of creaturely meaning. And since the fall of mankind this imago Dei is only revealed in its true sense in Jesus Christ. (NC III, 68-69).

[25] JGF: Dooyeweerd frequently uses the word ‘beholding’ [aanschouwen], as well as ‘schouwen.’ And true Christian faith will find its fulfillment in the religious “vision face to face”[de volle religieuze aanschouwing] (WdW II, 228; NC II, 298).

[26] JGF: Vollenhoven appears to himself express this view of mirroring as living up to the law in his article, “Problemen van de tijd.” He says there, rather inconsistently,

In the Scriptures, to be the image of God is a characteristic of human life that we can lack if we do not live in accordance with God’s commandments.

[27] Dooyeweerd’s view of man is of an enkapsis of various different individuality structures. Is this what Vollenhoven is opposed to? Or is it the use of organic analogies in the relation of temporal and supratemporal in Dooyeweerd? See NC II, 418. See also Dooyeweerd’s “32 Propositions of Anthropology.”

[28] JGF: Dooyeweerd uses ‘functiemantel’ [cloak of functions] to refer to the body that is the temporal expression of our supratemporal selfhood. Vollenhoven has only a pre-functional heart, so this usage does not fit as well with his philosophy.

[29] JGF: Dooyeweerd does distinguish between the “natural” and the “spiritual” functions. (e.g. NC I, v).

[30] Tol observes that there is something unclear about this paragraph. The directional difference should be of significance for all aspects, and not within an aspect.

[31] JGF: Dooyeweerd denies that we have any experience of a temporal pre-functionality. NC I, 3-32.

Revised Feb 23/05