De Problemen Rondom de Tijd
[The Problems Around Time]
by D.H.Th. Vollenhoven
Translated and annotated for study purposes only
by J. Glenn Friesen ©2004
Note: This is a very fragmentary article 
Introduction by Vollenhoven
The title should not cause any surprise. For in our group
it has always been the case that, although there is agreement concerning
the main matters, [there are] still differences in working them out.
Isagogie [is] not the same as The Philosophy of the Law Idea
[De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee]. And this is consciously known.
Proof: The name of the association is “The Association for Calvinistic
Philosophy” [Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte]. And its
constitution [Article 3] says, “in the direction of the
Philosophy of the Law-Idea.”
For many years these differences have consciously not been
set out in the foreground.
1. There [is] a serious attempt here to come to arrive
at a Scriptural philosophy; therefore it was necessary to maintain a united
2. As chairman, my task was above all here.
3. [I was] occupied with other work, where the [study]
of the problematics of current thought required an especially great amount
of time–the last [edition of] Isagogie was in 1943! “Short
Summary [of the History of Philosophy]” [“Kort Overzicht van
de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte”] is from 1956.
It was really in connection with [the] Brede Coetus [Meeting
of Faculty] that these points, among others, came up for discussion. Certainly
[a discussion of differences] is not the only goal; [it is also important
that] those involved in the special sciences [provide] ground under our
feet–now don’t let the younger generation forget this!
And yet [it is important to] also [discuss] these
And now that questions are expressly being asked about these
issues, I myself have no objection [to them being discussed publicly].
Proceeding from what is common in the vision, I
will speak about the differences. The most important points of difference
[are the following]:
1. The modalizing of time.
2. Cosmic time.
3. The temporal order.
4. Development in the realms [of created reality]
a)The supratemporality of the soul.
b) The mutual relation of soul and body.
c) Man as office-bearer
Of course this did not all come up for discussion at
the same time. Instead, attention was first drawn to a very complicated
question: the use of the term ‘supratemporality of the soul’
[in] anthropology and other [sciences]. Only later did it become clear
what lay behind these objections.
And so [there took place] a gradual strengthening of what
was for me an already old vision ([in the] Isagogie!) [with relation
to the following]:
1. Threefold law and thereby threefold being-subject
[i] All creatures are subject to the command to come into
existence; [p. 172]
[ii] Only man is subject to the command of love.
[iii] In positivized law, man himself is related to the giving of the
law [in office-bearing]
2. The foundation of the common struggle against
the teaching of evolution–the importance exactly here of
the distinction between subject and object.
3. The psychical is not the same as the soul, but the organic
is also not the same as man’s body.
4. The mutual relation of man’s soul and body.
>In relation to law and that which is subjected
to it: the law is what holds good [geldt], it is not God or man who
does so. N.B. God sets the law and creates man. So there is a twofold
correlation and no dualism (e.g. God and man) and also no monism (God-man);
cf. Pomponazzi in relation to God and world.<
>In relation to the structural law: the structure
of the whole is more than the modal law; the structural law certainly
implies the modal ordering. Law gives the ordering, not functioning
as such; otherwise there isn’t the correlation [between law and
function]. Not a separate law for each individual thing or man. [Also]
the universal [belongs to] the created. The individual [is related to]
history, the other factors here that are succession-like. N.B. [Here
also] God’s direction […and the] reactions of man, etc.
It is always not all at the same time. Determination by the place that
you take in historical time. The individual differences come only later
But now to a discussion of the points themselves. In
relation to [the problem of] time, they allow themselves to be summarized
in two questions:
I. Have we not begun too soon in introducing time? 
II Have we not stopped too soon in relation to time? 
I believe that both questions must be answered
affirmatively. By this, [a] double correction is necessary: we must give
up something and yet add a lot. (This evening I will limit myself to the
first question.) [p. 173]
I. Have we not begun too soon in introducing time?
Introduction. Where is it assumed that time first occurs?
In the arithmetical [function]. And through that function, it later occurs
in all functions. And for Dooyeweerd [time was] itself exclusively in
the functions.  In this way he arrived at:
1. the modalizing of time;
2. The teaching of ‘cosmic’ time; 
3. his own view of the temporal order.
>N.B. “God-law-cosmos” is a triad [drieslag]
that points to its existence but is not intended as three modes of being
in an ontological sense, for neither God nor law can be comprehended
within an ontology: ontology relates only to the cosmos. 
The relation of cosmos and law is expressed in being-subject.
Within this being subjected is the subject-object relation (thus within
the cosmos, the subject-relation does not cancel the previous relation
of cosmos-law, let alone that of God-law, which really is also of a
difference nature than that of cosmos-law. But the subject-object relation
is determined by the relation of cosmos-law, and is therefore [a relation]
of lesser extent).<
Scope [of Vollenhoven’s lecture]: Three
of the points I have referred to come under the issues that will be addressed
this evening; the two remaining-the development of the realms,
and man–must remain until the second evening.
Division: First the difficulties (A); then the
positive view (B).
A. The difficulties
The difficulties do not concern the theme of
the order of the functions; here Dooyeweerd [has] provided splendid work
in showing the retrocipations and anticipations. But the difficulties
do concern the idea that each function has its own time and […]
and the idea that the order of the functions is a temporal order, which
is more precisely called ‘cosmic’ time.
For in this way, each modality [obtains] a kind of “independence,”
whereby the distinction between function and thing, of modality and realm
is not made sufficiently clear.
[It] especially gets stuck when we consider physical
things. These possess, as one knows, four functions ([in increasing
complexity:] arithmetical, spatial, mechanical, and the function of physical
energy ). [p. 174]
There are two groups of difficulties:
1. In the arithmetical and spatial [aspects]
2. In the [aspects of the] mechanical and that of physical energy.
1. In the arithmetical and spatial [aspects].
Here [there is] a difficulty both with the specific
time as well as with the order.
a) The specific time
At the time of my dissertation , I held to Poincaré’s
views. He is an ennoëtist.
[Diagram of ennoëtism:]
[higher contemplative thought ] [nous]
[Lower contemplated object]
[soma -space, geometrical figure]
Time appears in number; time does not appear in space,
except [only] via movement (simultaneity):
[The] mutual relation [within each divergence is always]
a contrasting relation:
[Within ennoëtism, the order of time/number and
space is analogous to that of soul (psyche) and body (soma)—that
is, it is based on a contrast:
But [the] relation between retrocipation and anticipation
must [be] different: it must be non-contrasting. And also the
order [of higher and lower] must be different: Space retrocipates
the arithmetical and the arithmetical anticipates the spatial. Their order
is therefore [the reverse of ennoëtism]:
2 simultaneity [space]
1 succession [time, number]
c) [The geometrical point]
Furthermore [there is] a difficulty with the object:
where is the object in the spatial aspect that refers back to the arithmetical?
[The answer always given here is]: “the point.” But [the spatial]
retrocipates in [the length] of the line and in the multiplicity of dimensions.
How can that fit with the separate place of the point [as object]? [p.
175] No mathematician knew the answer. And, this perplexity [is
found] at the basis [of Dooyeweerd’s view that objects
involve retrocipation]. There is something wrong here.
Arguments defending [this idea of the point as objectification
in the spatial] are as follows:
(i) “[A] line] [is] determined objectively by two
[Answer] But this is playing with the word ‘objective.’
<A point is a minimal dimension resulting from the
intersection [of two or more lines], and it no longer an object function.
Actually the word ‘dimension’ is not even used here. A point
is certainly spatial, but it is not extensiveness. One can say that
the point has a place in space, but not that it takes up space.<
(ii) [But] these functions [are] also not outside of
time. [There is] change within both the arithmetical and spatial functions.
“And if we give up on a specific time for each function, do we not
end up in rationalism?”
Answer: Time certainly has meaning for these
functions, but indirectly, by the changing of things [which
appear in this aspect]. Therefore [there is here] no danger of rationalism.
Regarding point 2. In the [aspects of the] mechanical
and that of physical energy.
This distinction [between these two aspects] was only made later. But
it is correct. It was also a gain for our understanding of retrocipation.
Think about the difference between emotionality and intensity of feeling.
Here the above-mentioned issue is somewhat simpler than
in the arithmetical and spatial; there is no difficulty here in the mutual
order of these two functions, [for] force supposes motion, the energetic
implies the mechanical.
But [there is] also again found here [the] difficulty
regarding the view of a specific time [in each aspect], as well as with
the view of the object.
a) The modalizing of time
Argument: the uncertainty principle–or better,
the relation of imprecision–in contrast to the complementarity theory.
A physicist cannot at the same time determine the strength of the force
and the place of the particle it relates to. In other words:
a specific principle of measurement can be used to determined particles
or waves, but the relation remains an imprecision.
Now the analogy with Bohr leads to the topic of subject
and object. But sharply distinguished: Bohr is a biochemist, and moreover,
he is an adherent of unlimited parallelism: [p. 176]
[Diagram of unlimited parallelism:]
Now certainly Dooyeweerd wants nothing to do with parallelism.
And we both sharply distinguish the biotic from the pre-biotic [aspects].
More than an analogy is not intended here [in referring to the
imprecision principle]. But is that itself here possible? Does
[the imprecision principle] in fact concern the distinction between energetic
and mechanical? And does not the argument [of imprecision] put forward
the existence of a non-energetic matter instead of presupposing
that the relation between energy and matter should be seen as two differing
b) With this, the question of the possibility of the
schema [of] subject-object is actually debatable.
>Remark regarding physics and chemistry.
Physics is a modal special science of the energetic
and mechanical [aspects] (in a vertical sense). The mechanical is that
on which the energetic is based. Force is “the cause of a change
in [speed and of] direction of movement.” N.B. The energetic [aspect]
also exists in plants, animals and humans. This is not seen enough today,
because now science is determined too much by practice
[In contrast to this], chemistry is a structural science
of things: putting together and separating (horizontal). Here the relations
of subject-object and subject-subject are examined, which require technical
understanding, and which also stands closer to our lives. <
B. Positive View
1. Time implies change in and through creatures. The
thing that changes cannot be avoided.
The modalizing of time makes functions into pseudo-things,
and makes a combination of larger functions into a higher realm. [p.
>Question: If each function has its own specific
time, and there is cosmic time and there is also a temporal order of
functions, does this necessarily imply that functions will be independently
made into things and [modalities] into kingdoms?
[Answer] If each function is seen this way, also within
the physical [aspect], then we are involved with a substantializing
of time. We must see time in connection with change. That does not mean
that we must remove the arithmetical and spatial from time in order
to make them a priori–as rationalism does–for time is always
inherent in (physical) things. We must distinguish between time in relation
to functions and time in relation to order (the latter does not have
to be temporal).<
2. The object
[We must] certainly not scrap (the idea of) the object.
Thinkers so divergent as Brentano, Scheler, Whitehead again acknowledge
objects. Because of this, [our] everyday experience [is] already richer.
But objects always presuppose–certainly in the
non-human [realms]–other things and events. There are certainly
no inherent objects here [in the physical and chemical aspects].
Whoever looks for them, simply will not find them.
Result: the number of the modally different
types of object functions is significantly smaller than originally thought
(3 groups less). Physical things [are] purely subject. But their
meaning [is] greater: the object-function plays a role in the mutual relation
of two realms, therefore by inter-regnal relations.
>The definition of an object function can now be
described as “the repetition of the meaning of the subject-functions
of things of lower realms." Thus, object-functions appear
[only] after the physical [aspect]; these object-functions are built
[upon the physical].<
>The physicist does not deal with objects but only
with subjects. Thus there is one distinction less in this field of research
[i.e. no subject-object-relation], but this field of research as such
remains the same [thus including the possibility of mathematical formulation
of physical states of affairs. [This latter point concerns] the question
of formalization. Because [an] object is at least [one] thing, the lowest
four modalities repeat themselves in the object-functions [of things].
[…] Not even one of the first four [modal functions] can be determinative
in a definite manner (within the physical thing). [p. 178]
Because of his unlimited parallelism, Bohr was forced not only to regard
a cell in the lower [realm] as a biotic “something” in an
object function (this is correct), but he then had to apply this (vertical
subject-object) within the physical thing, by which he reduced the mechanical
and energetic [aspects] to a relation of object-subject.<
As a result, the differences for humans between the non-human
carriers of object functions are [also clearer]; this is already evident
in the naïve experience of the child: the child throws a ball, waters
a plant, and plays with an animal. A grown-up: shapes metal, nurtures
plants, breeds animals.
3. [The] temporal order is not an order of modalities.
It is true that in retrocipation, the higher modality does presuppose
the lower just as the more complicated presupposes the less complicated.
But temporal order is first present in the order of realms.
[Is this] of relevance for retrocipations? No. But it
is relevant for the object-functions. Although this may not be the case
in its epistemology, evolutionism takes account only of subject-functions
in its doctrine of evolution–and in a way that furthermore cannot
be justified. Everything is causal [for the evolutionist]. But
the higher realm depends for its realization on the presence of the object-functions
in the lower [realms].
Conclusion. We have therefore begun too soon
with time: it does play a role in all functions, but via change in the
relevant things. And the structure of things is of relevance
for their object-functions, which rest upon the subject-functions
Remark. Dooyeweerd does not overestimate the object in
the general current sense. He, too has the Gegenstand-relation next
[to the] subject-object [relation]. This is of especially great importance
in epistemology. Think for example of the distinction between non-scientific
and scientific knowledge. Where the Gegenstand-relation is not distinguished
from the horizontal relation–for example in phenomenology–science
is primarily referred to regional zones and to reflection. But these also
[appear in the] everyday experience.
>Time is not to be limited to the body, to the cosmos,
as Dooyeweerd does. The cosmos is in time; [thus time] is [p.
179] broader [than cosmos] and it is subject between
God and world. (The ‘priority teaching’ or [one of its conceptions
in] the later Aristotle  is the [logical]
consequence of Dooyeweerd’s [ideas]. Time is in all of the cosmos–the
cosmos is a continually changing cosmos–and therefore nothing
[that has been created is] above time. Time is not modal (prism and
the specific time, e.g. in the arithmetical and spatial) 
[and it does not determine] [the] cosmic order. Rather, [time stands]
in relation with things [including plants, animals and humans], and
it does not appear primarily in modalities. Specific time presupposes
more the structure of things than modalities.<
>A temporal order of realms implies that the more
comprehensive realm requires the less comprehensive realm; the subjects
[of the higher realms] require the object-functions of the lower realms.
The first four modalities are ordered by their increasing complexity
and not by time.
Now the law is supratemporal; the law […] [is
related to] temporality, but then [only] insofar as it affects subjects
in that which is subjected [to law]. It is difficult [to give] a satisfying
definition of time in relation to the correlation of law and what is
subjected to it. The thought that time is to be seen in relation to
changing things [including plants, etc.] is a ‘help.’ […]
The law of love and the structural law are not dissolved within time
(vs. the ‘Gebot der Stunde’ [law of the hours]). But on
the other hand, [time does inhere] in positivized law.
The structure of [e.g.] the state [must then also]
not only [be seen] in relation to the modal law, but also with history.
But history does not exclude the need to continue to speak of creation
ordinances. ‘Creation ordinances’ means that [positivization]
is not arbitrary; it is a relation given in nature–it connects
to the modal and structural relations, etc. We must be careful that
we do not make all connections independent–especially the latter
one–by pushing them into ‘paradise.’ On the other
hand, [we] must be very careful not to fall into the thought of ‘physis’
versus ‘nomos,’ in which the ‘nomos’ is then
equated to convention (this is speculating with nature and culture).
[…] Although we cannot understand the meaning of the law without
time, we must not conclude […] [that] time is [present] in the
law, but above all we must take into account that time also inheres
in the functions [of things].<
II. Have we not stopped too soon in relation to time?
Two points here:
A. Genesis [becoming] in the realms (apart from humans)
[=the fourth point of difference];
B. Man [=the fifth point of difference; more detail:] Soul, soul and
body, office-bearing, history. […]
A. Genesis [becoming] in the realms (apart from humans)
1. There [is] genesis here [in each realm]. […]
>We also find genesis in the physical (therefore
in all realms). It is not necessary to here discuss plants, animals
and humans, for genesis is never denied for those realms. The splitting
of the atom has been brought about technically. The atom was never ‘dead’:
‘dead’ always relates to religion and not to realms; cf.
stones are also still creatures!<
. No evolutionism
Evolution implies genetic thought–[this is] correct–but
[it is also] monistic in certain types, […] [e.g. there where] more
than one realm [appears] by the higher. […]
[Evolutionism has] various opponents. But [there is]
a difference in argumentation. Dooyeweerd proceeds from the constancy
of species [soorten]. In my view [this is]
an Aristotelian thought: becoming [is related] solely to the
>There is a stronger possible argument, which does
not proceed from the becoming of individual things, but from procreation.<
a) But in the case of plants and animals, there is procreation.
And with this there is transformation in [both] a negative sense
(degeneration) as well as in a positive sense (evolution). Neither
can be denied. […]
>In procreation we can distinguish two kinds of
transformation: degeneration and evolution. But this is then a question
within the realms, within a certain realm. We must leave whatever happens
here to the researchers of the relevant realms; let us just say, “species
are unchanging.” The researchers of these realms are…not
those involved in the [modally determined] special sciences, but those
who [p. 181] practice botany, zoology, anthropology,
b) [But] we only speak of transformism in the
positive direction of evolutionism in a genesis that oversteps the boundaries
of the realms.
This implies a change in the realm’s structures
of anticipations and retrocipations, and [takes] less [account of] the
accent that falls on object-functions.
>We can forget that transformation only has meaning
when we consider the boundaries of the realms. For otherwise we have
transformism–in its two kinds of ‘-isms’–degenerationism
and evolutionism. Evolution is therefore a progression of transformation,
whereas evolutionism is progression of transformism.
This is clearer, especially in relation to the species,
for now degeneration is included in the concept of species (versus Dooyeweerd’s
Both ‘isms’ (of positive and negative transformism)
involve stepping over the boundaries of the realms: one of these [‘-isms’]
cuts across the realms. <
>The structure of things of the same realm is different
from those in another realm. [This is because each realm has its own
proper number of modal functions, so that each has its own configuration
of anticipations and anticipations]. We may not see modality, or function
in the philosophical sense of transformation (positive or negative).<
>Question: Why is the argument against evolution,
based on the constancy of the species and the becoming of individual
things, weaker than your argument of procreation with its two kinds
of transformation, i.e. degeneration and evolution? Is it only because
the first argument gives no place to degeneration?
Answer: No, not only in connection with degeneration.
But also the concept of kinds is too vague over against evolutionism.
As a concept, species is a collection of characteristics; this is [p.
182] too vague, because we are here concerned about concrete
things. (For example, if one knows only about white swans and then suddenly
hears that there are also black swans, then the concept of species must
be changed! We should also add that species is often thought of in too
static a way (perhaps because of an Aristotelian confusion of eidos
It is better to speak of procreation (in both a positive
and a negative sense): procreation, which only appears in the post-physical
We can use the concept ‘species’ [improperly]
to strangle the whole idea of transformation.
Summary: Species is too vague as a concept, too rigid,
not concrete enough. […] The concept of realm is clearer: realm,
with a number of functions. That is what is determinative.<
>Evolutionism knows of no object-functions.
That is to say as evolutionism (although it does eventually speak of
object-functions in its epistemology, e.g. Whitehead). Evolutionism
has a chance only in the doctrine of the subject.<
>Evolutionism appears [to be] subjectivistic. It
is all very well to say that God connects Himself to what already exists
(cf. education of children), but He makes realms with object-functions,
which evolutionism forgets because of its subjectivism. N.B. The animal
must exist prior to man, plants before man and animals, physical things
before plants, animals and man. And don’t forget that man is structured
through and through. For example Adam had to name the animals: here
[man is concerned with] the animal as object-function in the lingual
aspect for humans.<
>Evolutionism can, and in fact does, speak about
‘objects.’ But [in evolutionism] it concerns causal series,
and here the object-functions play no role: the relation between subject
and object is not that of causality. We must not forget that the term
‘cause’ [aanleiding] is something other than stimulus (thus
between [things of] two realms) and is never identical with reproduction,
e.g. two things within one realm.<
>The complexity of differentiation does not explain
the different realms. The higher realm [p. 183] requires
the lower. Not the higher out of the lower, but (maybe) the later than
the lower. (Specialists must limit themselves to their own specialty,
and therefore they are unqualified to judge about other realms).<
>[In the problematics of evolutionism], we require
the history of philosophy, for example [monistic] Cretan Dionysian Orphism
and the [analogous monistic] zoological theory of interactionism. If
we see these things clearly (historically), we will not readily ‘Christianly’
baptize wrong theories with the idea of creation.< 
[3. Summary about] genesis [becoming]
>Genesis is broader than procreation: genesis also
occurs in the physical and by the splitting of one-celled beings (splitting
is pure genesis). Thus the physical is included in genesis, but physical
genesis and one-celled splitting are something other than reproduction.
[…] Reproduction is of a sexual nature.<
i. For physical creatures [there is a] combination
and separation on various reaction-levels; we can think here for example
of radioactive phenomena.
ii. For one-celled biotic creatures, [non-sexual]
reproduction [takes place by splitting of the cell] nucleus and [separation]
of plasma. Already here there is a relation of subject and object [between]
the biotic and physical, but there is no analogy in the physical (contra
Bohr). [See] Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought,
vol. III, par. 2 and 3 [of] concluding [chapter, pp. 699-732).
iii. [For] sensory creatures–plants–there
is sexual reproduction, but indirectly, e.g. spores carried by the wind
or by insects–reaction to stimuli of warmth and cold, light and
darkness, dryness and dampness.
>Sensory, i.e. stimulus and reaction; it is not
purely biotic, although it comes close to it. “Reaction to”
is something other than sensory perception. It is not a form (cf. Aristotle)
and it is also not a being, but [it is rather] modal. <
iv. For vital creatures ≥the accent is
on passion [drift] <; also defence mechanisms [p. 184] [play a role
v. [For] feeling creatures [we speak of] pleasure
and pain [onlust]. ([cf.] W.K. van Dijk, [professor of psychology at Groningen,
“Neurosis and religion,” Mededelingen [of the Ver.
voor Calvin. Wijs] Dec. ’62).
[Note for iv/v]. Animals [display] motor-nerve [conduct]
in reproduction: ‘mating.’ [Are these creatures] still mutually
vi. Man [has] many more functions. Reproduction
and mating [are terms that] are here not sufficient. [The term previously
used was] ‘sexual intercourse.’ [This is] not only functional;
intercourse is not the same as association. The need [is] not purely functional,
and the inner life [het innerlijke] is in that case also not primary.
Introduction. Here the remaining points [are discussed:]
soul, soul and body, office-bearer, history.
[In our group there is] agreement [concerning the fact], that
the soul it not the same as the psychical. No special science is possible
in relation to the soul.
[There is] difference [about] (a) the supratemporality
of ‘the I-ness’ and ‘the self,’ [(b) ‘soul’
in the Holy Scriptures].
[Regarding (a) The supratemporality of the soul.]
Information: [Dooyeweerd places] the soul between God
and the other creatures.
|| cosmos -subject-side
||cosmos includes body and soul
>Differences have appeared [within our group] in relation to I
and self, especially when the article ‘the’ is
used with them. Vollenhoven is afraid of substantializing. (Geesink,
one of Vollenhoven’s teachers, once said, “The will wills”
does not exist and also “Reason proposes that” does not
exist, etc.). [p. 185] There is something to these
statements, insofar as we can find considerations relating to will [and
reason]. (Geesink really didn’t see this clearly enough), but
Geesink was correct to oppose a substantializing of will and reason.
Vollenhoven therefore opposes “the I” and “the self.”
Already linguistically they are very dangerous and suspicious. Therefore
Vollenhoven does not want to place soul between God and cosmos, as Dooyeweerd
does, but rather sees the soul as belonging totally to the cosmos. <
>”I”: the speaker and what is spoken
of coincide! Not “the I,” “the Self.’’
This is contrary to Dooyeweerd’s frequent use of these expressions.
Insofar as [these expressions concern] self-consciousness, it is very
broad, e.g. [it includes] memory (the past in one’s own life)
as well as capability to be responsible. This self is only
one line of life within trillions of beings. To say that the
self is related to the human soul via consciousness is false,
for ‘I’ and ‘self’ do not only refer to the
soul but also to the body in the same sense. Do not say, “temporal-body-cosmos.”
To say, “I experience time” is an abstraction. Time and
change are correlates: [this] concerns the whole man. Be careful to
avoid dualism in the sense of: the transcendent is unchanging, the non-transcendent
is changing.< 
Regarding (b). As opposed to [the supratemporal meaning],
the word ‘soul’ has two meanings in the Holy Scriptures:
[(i) the] creature that moves itself (man and animals);
>[One meaning of] ‘soul’ as a term in
the Holy Scriptures is, “the creature that breathes through the
“How my soul clings to the earth” [het
stof] is not a form of materialism, for the passage directly continues,
“make me living through your Word.” The meaning is therefore:
Ensure that by your promise, Lord, I, who have no courage to stand up,
can again stand up and live. Note well: the Jew slept on the ground,
close to the matter of the earth, and thus almost literally sat fixed
to the earth. We, in contrast to the Jew, sleep on a nice soft and high
bed. Vollenhoven himself previously had a great deal of difficulty with
scholasticism, especially in connection with the use of the word ‘soul’
in the Bible–until one day a simple old believing man said to
Vollenhoven, “my soul is very oppressed, and therefore I want
to lay my soul before you.” Then Vollenhoven was at once freed
in principle [p. 186] from the scholastic view of the
Still another example: Saul says to David, “My
soul has become beloved [dierbaar] in your eyes,” after David
did not kill him. ‘Soul’ here means only ‘me.’
Psalm 124:4: “Then the waters had overwhelmed us, the stream had
gone over our soul,” over the nefesh, soul (Cf. nose,
not lips here). Nephesh: in other words to breathe through
the nose. This is the meaning of ‘soul’ in most instances
in the Bible (Old Testament). The word ‘ruach’
is also used: that is to say, through the mouth. This relates to speaking!
Example: “Through the Word of the Lord was the world made.”<
[(ii)] only in humans: “My soul in me”
>The expression “My soul in me” is sometimes
different than the meaning in (i) above of man with everything that
belongs to him. ‘Soul’ then means the ‘heart,’
that is to say the center, and also ‘spirit,’ that is to
say, direction. The [latter] plays a large role in ontology and anthropology
[see point 2 below]. [We must not regard] spirit in Aristotle’s
terms as a substance (universal and individual) or as a part or component
of a substance). […] Transcending is a reaching out above the
creation (not pointing beyond–that is Aristo-teleological).
There is dependence here, in the sense of the statement in Holy Scripture,
“everything has need of life and awaits food from You.”
Man is certainly not excluded here: a Christian human who reaches out
in this way, penetrates into the throne room of God. And God then listens–do
not forget this! –on the basis of His grace.<
>”Pointing beyond” refers only to the
ontical. “Reaching out,” on the other hand presupposes human
activity. Man is more than the other creatures, because he can respond
to revelation, and this response to revelation is now exactly the same
as his reaching out over all the other creatures. Vollenhoven strongly
opposes working with the scholastic concepts of ‘all-sufficiency’
(God) and ‘insufficiency’ (the created).< 
>The insufficiency inheres in all of creation, also
in [man as] image of God. Therefore [we must] not speak of the
image of God.  Meanings of this mirroring:
i. mirror of the law, just as a man goes to stand before
a mirror to see whether his jacket fits well, etc. This is the old reformational
understanding: how God thinks about you. This is wrong.
ii. In the old Authorized Version of the Bible, 2 Cor.
3:18 says, “But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass
the glory of the Lord…” [KJV]. The word ‘beholding’
[aanschouwen] is used here under influence of mysticism. 
Calvin is also to blame here through influence of Augustine and neo-Platonism!
[But] here it really means ‘reflection,’ ‘throwing
back,’ and not ‘beholding.’ It concerns here the glory
of God (e.g. it “Moses uncovered” intends to say, different
than the rest of Israel). Thus not standing before a mirror to see how
we look, not checking oneself in accordance with the law, for in that
even Moses considered himself very small. 
iii. The idea that we are ourselves the mirror is totally
2. Soul and body
[Within our group we are in] agreement [that
the] soul is not the same as the psychical, and similarly [that the] human
body is not the same is as an organism. A plant is [an] organism; animals
and man are not. It is also not the case [that they] have an organism
[in the sense of a body as organ]. Animal is animal and man is man.
>Soul is different than the psychical. The body
is also different than the organism! Only a plant is an organism, and
other organisms do not exist, except as a metaphor. Plants are organisms.
An animal is not an organism plus a [psychical] function. It is true
that an animal has one more function [than a plant], but this function
is not placed on top (then we would have a dualism with dichotomy),
for the psychical can never be found without the lower [functions].
Man, too is not an organism plus functions; it is therefore also wrong
to say that man has an organism. We should only say, also in our philosophy,
that a plant is a plant, an animal an animal, a man a man. (We do not
only have to fight against speculation in others but also against speculation
in our own thinking, and we therefore have to watch out for a wrong
use of words.)< 
[There are also] differences. [According to
Dooyeweerd] the soul is supratemporal and within me [i.e. man]. [For Vollenhoven,
the soul is] not supratemporal, [man is] man according to soul and body.
Body and soul [are also] related in reproduction.
What then is the role of the soul? Regulating?
No, [that is too] functionalistic: [regulating is] already [present] in
physical things, plants and animals (cybernetics-Blok).
>e.g. Cybernetics, which sometimes tries to say
too much, but yet has something good in it, namely the idea of self-regulation
of things: e.g. an oil stove; also in nature, namely atoms. <
[Is the role of the soul] normative? Also not;
this is regulating with self-distinction.
>It is tempting to confuse natural law and norms,
and then Christians often also confuse the law of love with norms. Both
forget that the latter, i.e. norms, require practice. The consequence
of this confusion is primarily that Christianity is understood in an
The difference between self-regulation and self-distinction
is the difference between the pre-logical and the post-psychical. We
must not divide the mantle of functions.
Therefore don’t place natural law (body) over against norm (soul
or spirit).< 
>Norm only appears after the logical, for only in
the logical do we speak of distinguishing. Thus, to distinguish a duality
occurs within the logical. Norm is something other than positive law.
Positive law presupposes norms […]. Norms exist earlier than positive
law. Both norm and positive law concern the post-psychical [aspects].
The law for human nature is norm whenever the relevant modality is post-psychical.
It is always in the analytical that the distinction begins between the
(modal) law and that which is subjected to it; the pre-analytical does
not yet have this distinction.
a. norm and positive law both appear in the same terrain,
namely in the post-psychical.
b. norm is earlier than positive law.
c. norm cannot be corrected; as against this, positive
law can be corrected.
N.B. Norm= [post-psychical] modal law!<
>[The distinction between] the command bringing
into existence and the command of love [is] not [the same as] the distinction
between natural and normative functions, thus between normed and non-normed.
[The distinction between normed and non-normed] is correct, but do not
make it into an antinomy. [p. 189] Norm is only to
be used in connection with human nature: the logical function for example
must be ruled by love. <
[The role of the soul is] directing. Being for
or against God and Christ; antithesis in one’s own heart.
This [is] not exclusively [a] vertical [capability];
it is also not exclusively horizontal. [It is] both […] at the same
time [but in which] the vertical is not the same as the horizontal. Here
[is the] correlation with the law of love. [That’s why it] first
[has] meaning in creatures with a heart. But not only for the heart (against
dispositional morality): body and soul [are related to] one’s whole
>Man is thus a man according to soul and body: soul,
that is to say direction, the direction-giving in relation with good
and evil, cf. the “soul in me.” This direction-giving is
to be understood in the sense of “other than only one or all of
the functions.” Religion is thus a different matter than the normed
higher functions, where we speak of norms. (Often Christians say, that
whenever non-Christians speak of the normative then that is
a Christian trait in their thinking. But they then forget that the humanist
can very easily speak about the normative without binding it with religion–at
least in a conscious manner–and they (these Christians) then also
forget that they have identified the normative and religion in an impossible
manner.) Body: the whole man; compare breathing through the nose. <
>With relation to ‘the direction-giving’
[diagram with vertical modal scale, with left and right directions going
horizontally off of it]
Direction is determined by being obedient or disobedient
to the law of love. Vollenhoven finds nothing in the Old Testament [p.
190] about “the” [direction-giving] in relation
to the determination of the direction; but he does find something of
this in the New Testament, something that is maintained after death
and goes directly to God. But don’t forget that man is created
(and re-created) for the new earth; see the New Testament in relation
to the “spiritual body.” Ontologically we can in any event
say that death, the grave, is not the end. Christologically we can say
that we are the Lord’s. We must assume something personal in man,
for otherwise he becomes a plaything of the environment. The law (of
love) gives the counsel of God to this ‘something’ of man.
See Mary: “And she treasured all these words in her heart.”
There are not two substances. But there are two directions. In our anthropology
we must continue to hold onto the unity of man, something that “direction-giving”
does not exclude, but rather just includes, because it concerns a man.
Direction is not intended here in the vertical sense
of above or below, but in the horizontal sense of good and evil. It
is very difficult, if not impossible, to speak in scientific language
concerning the unity of man and “the direction-giving.”
Here one can and may only use the “language of Holy Scripture,”
which [ought to] rule our philosophy!
Man lives to the right and to the left with all his
functions. But don’t now go speaking about right and left in [the
non-normative functions as such], e.g. the arithmetical. […] [But
it still makes sense to speak of direction on this level.] In the physical
[aspect], direction plays a great role, e.g. taking pills for nervousness.
It also plays a role in the spatial aspect: e.g. an alcoholic, who stands
outside of a bar, and who has a change of mind and runs away from that
Right and left, [which are] not identical with the
vertical direction, can be clearly distinguished in man, in spite of
man’s many maneuvers.
Pre-functional; this is not [itself] functional [in
a modal sense], but yet it is a functioning. This is such a difficult
question, at least to be able to express it in words!< 
>Note. God is not correlative to the world,
for then we would find ourselves in all kinds of dualisms with respect
to time and eternity. But God is the One-who-sets the law (cf. law of
love with its correlate) [p. 191] and the Creator of
the cosmos (cf. structural law with its correlate). We thus can speak
of a double correlation, with a difference then again between them:
the law of love only has meaning for a creature with a heart, namely
man. “Man with a heart.” And do not start speaking about
“the heart” alone, for then we remove the heart [from the
temporal] and the consequence is false teaching of a dispositional morality,
which is without meaning for practical life.
N.B. No animal, plant, etc. is related to the law of
love in a direct manner in the sense of a correlation; but they are
related in an indirect manner, i.e. man’s following of the law
of love has an influence on animals, plants, etc.<
>Nature and culture: these are not the same; culture
involves human activity. J. Waterink is against “Christian”
culture. But he thereby misses the opposition [of good and evil in culture].
Reproduction: one born from two in such a manner, that
the one is different than one of the two from which it is born. The
one is also different in relation to another child from the same two
parents. [This distinction is] already present in pregnancy and birth,
as well as by education and age etc. (The expression “a family
is a small society” is very valuable: cf. positivizing in the
whole life, discussed later.)
If we look at the soul in relation to the [distinction
of] inner-outer in the interaction theory, then soul is consciousness
and body is original matter. That is not possible, because of the contrast
[here] between the organic and the inorganic. We do not speak of contrasting
but rather of the working out of a plan.
The relation of soul and body is not an interaction,
for in our anthropology we must not think in contrasts, and for us the
“soul in me” is something different from the inside of consciousness.
Consciousness is always in the body! This is ontological. Now there
is still an epistemological argument (against the interaction idea):
in the interaction theory, subject and object are always seen horizontally
(consciousness is at their base.) Therefore, there is no ‘Gegenstand-relation’
possible here. Those who adhere to the interaction theory do not have
the possibility to speak about science and the special sciences; because
of that they lay great emphasis on reflection! Also parallelism and
the priority teaching cannot be used, because they identify the ‘Gegenstand-relation’
[p. 192] with the subject-object relation. <
[It is also relevant] for us to regard for a moment the
worth of the body in our sense for the act of knowing.
a. The body [is] that which beholds [aanschouwende],
even at the logical level.
For the difference between logical and psychical [is] not necessarily
that between abstract and concrete: there also exists a logical perception
of the concrete, and on the other hand also vagueness in psychical perception.
But on the post-logical level we find “the view”: a woodcutter
views a forest very differently than a dealer in timber, while a painter
again sees this forest in a still different way.
This [difference in view] is not a question of difference
[in] point of view [i.e. mode of experience], but rather a difference
[in] the field of view [or existing terrains].
Diagrammatic representation of epistemology.
subject to object: agreed; but then from out of the
object in the logical downwards and above toward the field of research.
s + o
s + o
s + o
s + s ([level of] physical things
s + s
Even science can take no step further without beginning
with this everyday perception.
Perception is now something different than distinguishing
perception, and the latter is in turn different from the logical. For
distinguishing always presupposes [at least] two things, of which we
have become aware. Abstraction is not always only the leaving behind
of the concrete in order that we may work with concepts: for concepts
can also be of individual things. The concrete is not always the same
as the individual: cf. vague perception. <
>Perception of a thing […] is something different
than the studying of a thing (this without the psychical). In the ‘Gegenstand-field’
being investigated [we find] everywhere subject-object [p. 193]
and subject-subject-relations, except in the lowest four modalities
where there are only subjects and no objects.
N.B. ‘Gegenstand’ is something other than
a horizontal object. <
>Note. Perception is therefore not the
same as the psychical; the above-mentioned fields of view cannot be
reduced to psychical anticipations. For each modality we must use another
term (of or for perception); e.g. becoming aware [ont-waren], and then
we can speak of retrocipations to the psychical in the subject. Be careful
not to confuse the pre-logical with the object! In all functions we
must look straight ahead–thus to see the subject-object-relation
in the horizontal and not only the subject-subject-relation. For example,
what is comical is not a purely psychical perception, and we can still
perceive the logical object-functions. (N.B. A function [belongs to
the] being-subject of a particular modality. <
We should consider the meaning of beholding [aanschouwing]
for fantasy and on the role of fantasy in science ([e.g. the] working
>Note. Fantasy is something other than
phantasms; fantasy is also something other than knowledge–a skeptic
never arrives at his work. In the beginning this fantasy in a working
hypothesis is too unbridled, that is unfounded or too little founded;
one must then verify or eventually correct it. Fantasy [has a role]
in the activity of thought. <
>Note. It is incorrect to state that the
knowable is simply identical to the object. Fortunately, one sees again
today something of the subject in the knowable, via the idea of the
act. [But] we must not overestimate the horizontal subject-object relation,
and we must clearly see and acknowledge the vertical relation (e.g.
the logical and the non-logical). <
b. Until now I have paid special attention to man’s
knowledge of the non-human. Now we must deal with the relation between
In friendship and love this is itself a relation of subject
to subject; two people become friends; others form “a couple.”
In this, the play of surprise by revealing and hiding. […]
But also whenever a businessman receives someone who
has solicited for a job that has become vacant, it is then not a question
of friendship, and even less a relation of buyer and merchandise: here
the offer is one of a work group with e.g. better conditions of employment.
This requires an understanding in the other person: whenever the employer
notices that the solicitant for work is only concerned about more money
in his pay packet, he will classify him as lower in energy, and with an
offer from more than one side, he will if possible pass him by.
>Note. Co-humanity is not the same as love of neighbour.
‘Neighbour’ [concerns] the religious, for the direction
of God determines who my neighbour is. Therefore love of neighbour is
very difficult [to analyze? to practice?] because it is concrete. In
a certain sense there are therefore ‘boundaries’ to neighbourly
A machine is an economic object for a business; a machine
is therefore something different than an appeal to a co-worker. We must
not identify objects in passivity. These two are the same only in language;
in the setting of a broken bone, a man is subject but passive; in the
setting of a broken paw an animal is an object; so also is the relation
between a dentist and the tooth (of a man) one of subject-subject, while
the relation between the tooth and a medicine for the tooth is one of
And now the question of the relation of ‘psyche’
and ‘soma’ for myself.
[Note. Tol says that this part is incomplete;
it is not included].
3. Office. [Tol says that this subject was not
discussed at all during the lecture, and that only a few notes are useable].
[Office includes] positivizing of the law
of love. Not only the state [is the topic here] but also and first of
all the family. In office [there is] always more than one person [affected].
4. History [This subject was also not discussed
in the lecture. It is discussed in “Problemen van de tijd in onze
Therefore [we have] stopped too soon [in introducing
End. Time [is] extremely important. [The] difficulties [were]:
-somewhat too soon begun [in introducing time]
- ended much too soon [in connection with time]
From this our differences.
And to convince each other.
So that our movement does not get stranded.
But, in agreement with the spirit in which it began,
May we come to a Scriptural philosophy.
In order to bless our people and not only our people.
 This is a copy of notes of
lectures given by Vollenhoven in 1963. A copy of the lecture appears,
together with some valuable notes, in A. Tol and K.A. Bril: Vollenhoven
als Wijsgeer (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1992), 160-198.
Tol and Bril edited the lecture and combined it with notes taken by a
student at the time, J.C. Vander Stelt. Vander Stelt’s notes are
indicated by the markings ‘>’ and ‘< .’.
The notes are quite incomplete, which means that it is sometimes difficult
to follow. Most of the information set out between square brackets is
that of Tol and Bril. The Stichting voor Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte
has placed a copy of the Dutch version of this lecture online at the following
web address http://home.wxs.nl/~srw/nwe/vollenhoven/63b.htm.
I have included the original page numbers in square brackets in bold
 JGF: The disagreements would
seem to be far more profound than a matter of merely working out of what
was agreed on. These are fundamental differences between Dooyeweerd and
Vollenhoven with respect to almost every key philosophical issue. They
also disagree as to the relation of the Bible to philosophy. Vollenhoven
regards Scripture as one of the sources of our knowledge. On the basis
of Biblical texts, Vollenhoven thought he could philosophize about heaven
and world of angels, because they belong to the created world. (See J.
Klapwijk, "Honderd jaar filosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit,"
(1980), cited by Verburg, 90).
 JGF: Was there actually a commonality
in opposing evolutionism? The Dooyeweerd Archives (Amsterdam) have a letter
from Prof. JJ. Duyvené de Wit of Bloemfontein, South Africa, who
had sought Dooyeweerd’s advice regarding creation science. Dooyeweerd’s
replied by letter dated Feb. 11, 1964:
I thought that it should be clear at the outset for
readers and listeners: whether there is a genetic line that runs from
a one-celled being via multi-celled organisms to the first man–about
this we can say neither yes nor no.
[…] Whenever we try to oppose "macroevolution" with
the help of the "mechanisms of microevolution," such as mutations
and so on that we can observe today, we may say, "Gentlemen, in
this way the "gene pool" can only grow smaller and can never
become greater." That is of great importance scientifically, but
it does not prove, and cannot prove that there has been no macroevolution.
 JGF: Vollenhoven says that
the temporal order does not apply to the first four aspects. Thus, by
beginning with the first aspect as having a special mode of time, we have
begun too soon.
 JGF: Vollenhoven’s point
is that, although humanity transcends all the aspects, humanity is also
fully temporal, and by speaking of the supratemporal soul or heart we
have stopped too soon in our discussion of the relation with time.
 JGF: The point here is that,
according to Dooyeweerd, the aspects are themselves an order of temporal
moments, a temporal order of before and after. Vollenhoven also fails
to distinguish aspects and functions, something that Dooyeweerd does in
his last article, “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische
Subject-Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata (1975) 83-101.
note: Dooyeweerd no longer supposes God-law-cosmos, but God-soul-cosmos
(in between my position and that of Bavinck, which is God-‘man’-cosmos).
 JGF: Dooyeweerd has no hesitation
in referring to God as Being. But Dooyeweerd does not have a “chain
of being” ontology, since created reality exits only as meaning
and not as being. See NC I, 99. Vollenhoven seems to take exactly the
opposite approach. For Vollenhoven, only the cosmos has being, and God
is beyond being.
 JGF: WdW has ‘bewegingszijde’
which the NC translates as ‘that of physical energy.’ Here
Vollenhoven speaks of ‘het energetische.’
 JGF: The question that Vollenhoven
addresses is whether we are committed to rationalism if we deny that the
first two modalities are in time. For if they are not in time, then they
must stand outside of time, in the sense of a priori thought. Mathematics
and geometry then have some kind of transcendent status. His answer is
that things, which are temporal and changing, have arithmetical and spatial
functions. And therefore we are not committed to rationalism.
But does Vollenhoven really answer the question? Rationalists do not suppose
that things have no mathematical or spatial functions.
 See footnote 10 for criticism of his argument
here. Dooyeweerd would also deny that he is hypostatizing aspects by his
view of cosmic time.
 JGF: Vollenhoven understands
‘meaning’ as related to previously existing things. Vollenhoven’s
view is really the ‘modernist’ view of science–that
things have properties. For him, a thing exists in the first four properties
and has meaning according to how it functions in the other aspects. This
is very different from Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd’s view of meaning
is that things have no existence, but only meaning. The word ‘meaning’
is clearly being used by them in different senses.
 JGF: Unlike other critics
of Dooyeweerd like H. van Riessen and D.F.M. Strauss, Vollenhoven does
maintain a distinction between the Gegenstand-relation and the subject-object
relation. Is it the same as Dooyeweerd’s view of the Gegenstand-relation?
I suggest not, in view of the fact that for Dooyeweerd the Gegenstand-relation
depends on the acceptance of the supratemporal selfhood. See his last
article, “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,”
Philosophia Reformata (1975) 83-101.
 JGF: A recent book by Prof.
A.P. Bos, De Ziel en haar voertuig: Aristoteles’ psychologie
geherinterpreteerd en de eenheid van zijn oeuvre gedemonstreerd (Damon,
1999), calls into question this whole distinction of early/late Aristotle.
Vollenhoven’s view of the origins of what he calls “semi-mysticism”
may therefore need to be re-examined.
 JGF: Vollenhoven therefore
rejects the whole image of the prism, which is so central to Dooyeweerd’s
philosophy. See NC I, 101, 102.
 JGF: This is because positivized law is historical.
 JGF: In history we positivize
laws; but even such positivized laws are not to be viewed as unrelated
to creation ordinances.
 JGF: Is this so? See footnote 3.
 JGF: Neither does Vollenhoven in the first
 JGF: Dooyeweerd says that
the idea of creation in the Christian Ground-Motive must it include the
"key of knowledge"–the central and supratemporal religious
root (In the Twilight of Western Thought (Craig Press, 1968),
145, 124-125, 135-36.. That is of course denied by Vollenhoven, so from
Dooyeweerd’s point of view, Vollenhoven is himself baptizing wrong
theories with the idea of creation.
 JGF: That is not Dooyeweerd’s
view. In his long footnote at NC I, 30-32, Dooyeweerd criticizes Vollenhoven’s
idea of a temporal prefunctional heart, and Dooyeweerd specifically denies
that the supratemporal religious center is to be found in a rigid and
static immobility. This footnote was written for the English edition of
the NC in 1953, before this lecture by Vollenhoven.
 JGF: The idea of pointing
beyond is of course related Dooyeweerd’s whole view of meaning.
Vollenhoven’s view of meaning seems to be restricted to how things
function within time. There is no pointing beyond. See also footnotes
3 and 12.
 JGF: Dooyeweerd speaks of
God as self-sufficient, and of creation as restless and insufficient.
Creation as meaning is restless and points to the Origin which is absolute
and self-sufficient (NC I, 10).
 JGF: In contrast to Vollenhoven,
Dooyeweerd speaks of man as the image of God. Our central selfhood, restored
in Christ, is that image. This is a key idea for Dooyeweerd. Just as God
expresses His image in our selfhood, so our selfhood expresses itself
in the coherence of temporal functions (NC I, 4).
He [God] has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire
temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which
the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon
its Origin. (NC I, 55).
The radical unity of all the different modalities in
which they coalesce, is […] the concentration of meaning in the
imago Dei, which is nothing in itself, but rather the reflection of
the Divine Being in the central human sphere of creaturely meaning.
And since the fall of mankind this imago Dei is only
revealed in its true sense in Jesus Christ. (NC III, 68-69).
 JGF: Dooyeweerd frequently
uses the word ‘beholding’ [aanschouwen], as well as ‘schouwen.’
And true Christian faith will find its fulfillment in the religious “vision
face to face”[de volle religieuze aanschouwing] (WdW II, 228; NC
 JGF: Vollenhoven appears
to himself express this view of mirroring as living up to the law in his
article, “Problemen van de tijd.” He says there, rather inconsistently,
In the Scriptures, to be the image of God is a characteristic
of human life that we can lack if we do not live in accordance with
 Dooyeweerd’s view of
man is of an enkapsis of various different individuality structures. Is
this what Vollenhoven is opposed to? Or is it the use of organic analogies
in the relation of temporal and supratemporal in Dooyeweerd? See NC II,
418. See also Dooyeweerd’s “32
Propositions of Anthropology.”
 JGF: Dooyeweerd uses ‘functiemantel’
[cloak of functions] to refer to the body that is the temporal expression
of our supratemporal selfhood. Vollenhoven has only a pre-functional heart,
so this usage does not fit as well with his philosophy.
 JGF: Dooyeweerd does distinguish
between the “natural” and the “spiritual” functions.
(e.g. NC I, v).
 Tol observes that there is
something unclear about this paragraph. The directional difference should
be of significance for all aspects, and not within an aspect.
 JGF: Dooyeweerd denies that
we have any experience of a temporal pre-functionality. NC I, 3-32.
Revised Feb 23/05